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Imagine	   that,	   deeply	   immersed	   in	   thought,	   you	   inadvertently	   walk	   home	   on	  
autopilot	  when	  you	  meant	  to	  go	  to	  the	  store	  instead.	  You	  have	  no	  memory	  of	  the	  route,	  
how	  much	  time	  it	  took,	  nor	  even	  who	  or	  what	  you	  might	  have	  passed	  along	  the	  way.	  If	  
asked,	  you	  would	  hardly	  classify	  this	  as	  a	  voluntary	  act,	  and	  yet	  to	  an	  outside	  observer	  it	  
is	   likely	   to	  appear	  that	  you	  have	  purposefully	  chosen	  your	  path.	  What	  constitutes	  the	  
feeling	  of	  volition	  (i.e.,	  will;	  the	  faculty	  of	  choice	  and	  determination	  by	  which	  we	  control	  
ourselves	  or	  our	  environment)	  is	  often	  an	  entirely	  internal	  experience,	  with	  descriptors	  
such	   as	   willing,	   intending,	   desiring,	   and	   being	   inclined.	   It	   is	   the	   subtle	   difference	  
between	  a	  blink	  and	  a	  wink	  (Morsella,	  Molapour,	  &	  Lynn,	  2013).	  Undoubtedly,	  volition	  
is	   fundamental	   to	  what	   it	  means	   to	  be	  human;	  we	  diverge	   from	  other	  species	  due	   to	  
this	   specific	   power	   of	   deliberation.	   While	   the	   behavior	   of	   other	   species	   is	   largely	  
determined	   by	   environmental	   triggers,	   our	   ability	   to	   control	   behavior	   endogenously	  
grants	  us	  freedom	  from	  immediacy	  (Shadlen	  &	  Gold,	  2004).	  	  
	  
Problems	  inherent	  in	  volition	  as	  a	  scientific	  concept	  
Lacking	  omniscient	  access	  to	  the	   internal	  states	  of	  others,	  scientists	  have	  been	  
faced	  with	   the	  struggle	   to	  define	  what	  constitutes	  a	  volitional	  act	  and	  how	   it	  may	  be	  
measured.	   Phenomenologically,	   a	   volitional	   act	   is	   characterized	   by	   its	   first-­‐person	  
ontology:	  An	  act	   is	  volitional	   if	   I	   feel	  that	   I	  have	  acted	  as	   intended.	  This	  conception	  of	  
volition	   is	   reflected	   in	   the	   introspective	   tradition	   of	   the	   early	   days	   of	   empirical	  
psychology	  research	  (e.g.,	  Harleß,	  1861;	  James,	  1890;	  Lotze,	  1852).	  However,	  since	  the	  
rise	   of	   behaviorism,	   introspection	   has	   been	   dismissed	   for	   its	   subjectivity	   and	   largely	  
abandoned	  as	  a	  method	  for	  psychological	  research.	  Alternatively,	  volitional	  action	  can	  
be	  defined	  by	  comparing	   it	  with	  stimulus-­‐driven	  action	  (e.g.,	  Herwig,	  Prinz,	  &	  Waszak,	  
2007;	  Herwig	  &	  Waszak,	  2009;	  Waszak	  et	  al.,	  2005).	  This	  definition	  is	  more	  fruitful	  for	  
empirical	  research,	  as	  it	  allows	  for	  the	  comparison	  of	  actions	  that	  differ	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  
locus	   of	   decision	   yet	   are	   similar	   in	   terms	   of	   movement	   kinematics.	   This	   conception	  
contains	  several	  problems,	  however:	  First,	  it	  limits	  the	  study	  of	  volition	  to	  rather	  simple	  
movements	   such	   as	   button	   presses.	   Second,	   it	   is	   quite	   controversial	   to	   what	   extent	  
internal	  factors	  can	  be	  traced	  experimentally	  (Nachev	  &	  Husain,	  2010).	  Finally,	  there	  is	  
an	   increasing	   consensus	   that,	   in	   everyday	   experience,	   actions	   are	   never	   exclusively	  
volitional	  or	  stimulus-­‐driven,	  but	  rather	  exist	  along	  a	  continuum	  of	  “reflexiveness”	  (see	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Krieghoff,	  Waszak,	   Prinz,	  &	   Brass,	   2011).	   Hence,	   the	   difference	   between	   endogenous	  
and	   exogenous	   causes	   may	   blur,	   particularly	   when	   similar	   actions	   are	   executed	  
repetitively,	  as	  in	  most	  psychological	  experiments.	  
Beyond	   denotation,	   another	   challenge	  when	   studying	   volition	   is	   the	   design	   of	  
suitable	  experimental	  paradigms.	  Volitional	  behavior	  is	  characterized	  by	  its	  reliance	  on	  
endogenous	   rather	   than	   exogenous	   determinants	   (Haggard,	   2008).	   Thus,	   any	  
instruction	   from	   the	   experimenter	   that	   specifies	   how	   the	   participant	   should	   behave	  
ultimately	   calls	   into	   question	   to	   what	   extent	   subsequent	   behavior	   should	   still	   be	  
categorized	   as	   volitional.	   The	   catch	   is	   that	   a	   certain	   level	   of	   instruction	   is	   simply	  
necessary	   to	   obtain	   meaningful	   data	   that	   can	   be	   quantified	   and	   compared	   across	  
participants.	  The	  most	  prevalent	  strategy	  in	  the	  literature	  has	  been	  to	  give	  incomplete	  
instructions,	  in	  which	  certain	  movement	  parameters	  (e.g.	  the	  selection	  or	  the	  timing	  of	  
a	  movement)	  are	  left	  free	  to	  be	  generated	  by	  the	  participant	  (Haggard	  &	  Eimer,	  1999;	  
Krieghoff,	   Brass,	   Prinz,	   &	   Waszak,	   2009;	   Libet,	   Gleason,	   Wright,	   &	   Pearl,	   1983).	  
Although	  such	  “gaps”	  in	  task	  instruction	  certainly	  draw	  upon	  internal	  generation,	  they	  
confine	  volition	  to	  very	  specific	  aspects	  of	  the	  decision	  process.	  A	  final	  cardinal	  problem	  
in	   the	   study	   of	   volition	   concerns	  motivational	   aspects.	   Volitional	   behavior	   is	   typically	  
directed	   toward	   a	   desired	   outcome	   (see	   Haggard,	   2008).	   In	   other	   words,	   we	   act	   or	  
suppress	   action	   because	   we	   want	   to	   bring	   about	   some	   (short-­‐term	   or	   long-­‐term)	  
change	  in	  our	  environment.	  Thus,	  paradigms	  intended	  to	  inform	  volition	  should	  create	  
experimental	  contexts	   in	  which	  behavior	   is	  not	  only	  endogenously	  generated	  but	  also	  
motivated	   (rather	   than,	   e.g.,	   choosing	   between	   left-­‐hand	   and	   right-­‐hand	   button	  
presses).	  Altogether,	   these	  considerations	   illustrate	   the	  obstacles	   inherent	   in	  studying	  
volition	   as	   a	   scientific	   construct;	   one	   is	   faced	   with	   an	   inevitable	   tradeoff	   between	  




In	  spite	  of	  these	  challenges,	  several	  effective	  strategies	  have	  been	  used	  to	  work	  
around	  the	  aforementioned	  problems	  and	  measure	  volition	  in	  a	  scientifically	  acceptable	  
and	  ecologically	  valid	  way.	  In	  the	  following,	  I	  will	  briefly	  describe	  three	  such	  strategies	  




measures	  of	  volitional	  processes	  rather	  than	  to	  rely	  on	  introspection.	  For	  instance,	  the	  
perceptual	   attraction	   between	   a	   voluntary	   action	   and	   its	   sensory	   outcome	   has	   been	  
validated	  as	  a	  measure	  of	  the	  sense	  of	  agency	  (i.e.	  the	  experience	  of	  causing	  the	  action	  
outcome,	  see	  Moore	  &	  Obhi,	  2012	  and	  later	  sections).	  In	  this	  sense,	  implicit	  measures	  
are	   directly	   observable	   and	   quantifiable	   variables	   that	   stand	   in	   some	   relation	   to	   the	  
unobservable	   volitional	  process	  of	   interest.	  A	   second	   strategy	   is	   to	  employ	   functional	  
brain	   imaging	   while	   subjects	   engage	   in	   volitional	   behavior.	   Neuroimaging	   permits	  
measurement	   of	   an	   observable	   correlate	   of	   volitional	   processes	   in	   the	   human	   brain,	  
and	   as	   such	   is	   another	  means	   of	  materializing	   and	  quantifying	   certain	   volitional	   acts.	  
Research	  along	  these	  lines	  has	  revealed	  that	  endogenous	  control	  of	  behavior	  relies	  on	  
the	  medial	  frontal	  cortex,	  whereas	  the	  contextual	  guidance	  of	  behavior	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  
external	  information	  relies	  more	  strongly	  on	  the	  lateral	  part	  of	  the	  frontal	  lobe	  (Amodio	  
&	   Frith,	   2006;	   Goldberg,	   1985;	   Passingham,	   Bengtsson,	   &	   Lau,	   2010;	   Rushworth,	  
Walton,	  Kennerley,	  &	  Bannerman,	  2004)1.	  Moreover,	  recent	  neuroimaging	  studies	  have	  
begun	   to	   decompose	   the	   broad	   concept	   of	   volition	   into	   distinct	   components	   on	   the	  
basis	  of	  their	  neural	  signature	  (Brass	  &	  Haggard,	  2008;	  Brass,	  Lynn,	  Demanet,	  &	  Rigoni,	  
2013;	  Haggard,	  2008;	  Krieghoff	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  However,	  despite	  its	  great	  appeal,	  a	  caveat	  
needs	  to	  be	  kept	   in	  mind:	  this	  method	  often	  relies	  crucially	  on	  reverse	   inference;	   i.e.,	  
the	   inference	   of	   a	   psychological	   process	   based	   on	   the	   activity	   of	   a	   particular	   brain	  
region,	  which	  is	  deductively	  invalid	  and	  potentially	  misleading	  (Poldrack,	  2006).	  A	  final	  
strategy	   is	   to	   study	   neuropsychiatric	   patients	   for	   whom	   particular	   components	   of	  
volitional	   control	  have	  gone	  awry	   (e.g.,	  Brandt,	   Lynn,	  Obst,	  Brass,	  &	  Münchau,	  2014).	  
For	   instance,	  anarchic	  hand	  syndrome,	  which	  can	  result	  from	  brain	   lesions	  to	  the	  pre-­‐
supplementary	   motor	   area,	   is	   characterized	   by	   an	   inability	   to	   suppress	   an	   action	  
tendency	   that	   is	   induced	   by	   an	   external	   stimulus	   despite	   having	   the	   subjective	  
experience	  of	  doing	  so	  (e.g.,	  Della	  Sala,	  Marchetti,	  &	  Spinnler,	  1991;	  Kritikos,	  Breen,	  &	  
Mattingley,	   2005;	   Pacherie,	   2007).	   Such	   findings	   are	   highly	   informative	   about	   the	  
phenomenology,	   the	   neural	   basis,	   and	   the	   functional	   mechanisms	   that	   give	   rise	   to	  
volitional	  behavior	  and	  experiences.	   Importantly,	  each	  of	   these	   strategies	  has	  distinct	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	   In	  line	  with	  this	  conceptual	  distinction,	  the	  medial	  frontal	  cortex	  has	  extensive	  connections	  with	  areas	  
that	   are	   involved	   in	   processing	   internal	   states,	   whereas	   the	   lateral	   frontal	   cortex	   has	   stronger	  
connections	   with	   sensory	   areas	   that	   infer	   details	   of	   the	   external	   world	   (see	   Passingham	   et	   al.,	   2010;	  
Passingham	  &	  Wise,	  2012).	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strengths	  and	  limitations,	  and	  a	  satisfying	  science	  of	  volition	  requires	  integration	  across	  
methods.	  	  
Other	   lines	   of	   research	   have	   focused	   less	   on	   the	   architecture	   of	   volition,	   but	  
rather	  on	  the	   identification	  of	   factors	   that	   influence	  the	  ability	  or	  motivation	  to	  exert	  
volitional	  control.	  For	  example,	  a	  host	  of	  studies	  have	  examined	  the	   idea	  that	  volition	  
relies	   on	   a	   limited	   self-­‐regulatory	   resource,	   and	   that	   exhaustion	   thereof	   (via	   effortful	  
acts	   of	   self-­‐control)	   results	   in	   an	   ultimate	   breakdown	   of	   volitional	   control	   on	  
subsequent	  tasks	  (ego	  depletion,	  see	  Baumeister,	  Bratslavsky,	  Muraven,	  &	  Tice,	  1998).	  
Other	  studies	  have	  focused	  on	  the	  influence	  of	  high-­‐level	  beliefs	  on	  behavioral	  control.	  
In	  particular,	  beliefs	  about	  the	  concept	  of	  volition	  (or	  free	  will)	  have	  received	  increasing	  
attention;	   it	   has	   been	   shown	   that	   undermining	   the	   strength	   of	   these	   beliefs	   has	   a	  
substantial	   impact	   on	   behavior	   in	   social	   contexts	   (e.g.,	   Baumeister,	   Masicampo,	   &	  
Dewall,	   2009;	   Vohs	   &	   Schooler,	   2008)	   and	   even	   on	   basic	   motor	   control	   processes	  
(Rigoni,	  Kühn,	  Sartori,	  &	  Brass,	  2011),	  although	  the	  underlying	  mechanisms	  remain	   to	  
be	  understood	  (see	  later	  sections).	  
In	  summary,	  various	  means	  of	  studying	  volition	  have	  been	  developed,	  and	  can	  
be	   broadly	   categorized	   into	   (i)	   research	   that	   attempts	   to	   measure	   particular	  
components	  of	  volition,	  and	  (ii)	  research	  that	  seeks	  to	  identify	  factors	  that	  influence	  the	  
exertion	  of	  volitional	  control.	  This	  distinction	  also	  applies	  to	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  present	  
thesis.	   In	  the	  first	  part,	   I	  will	  attempt	  to	  develop	  a	  novel	  and	  ecologically	  valid	  way	  of	  
measuring	  volition	   in	  a	  particular	  domain,	  namely	   the	   control	  of	  behavioral	   impulses.	  
Thereafter,	  in	  the	  second	  part	  of	  my	  thesis,	  my	  goal	  is	  to	  identify	  factors	  that	  impact	  the	  
ability	  to	  exert	  volitional	  control.	  
	  
Part	  I:	  Volition	  as	  impulse	  control	  
One	  way	  volitional	  behavior	  can	  be	  defined	   is	  by	   its	  capacity	  to	  be	  suppressed	  
(Passingham,	  1993).	  We	  experience	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  impulses	  each	  day,	  some	  stimulus-­‐
driven,	   some	   internally	   generated.	   Yet	   these	   impulses	  may	  not	   always	  be	   concordant	  
with	  long-­‐term	  goals	  or	  societal	  norms.	  Accordingly,	  the	  ability	  to	  control	  and	  override	  
unwanted	   behavioral	   impulses	   is	   a	   hallmark	   of	   adaptive	   behavior	   in	   complex	   social	  





Evidence	  from	  social	  psychology	  
Social	  psychological	  perspectives	  on	  impulse	  control	  tend	  to	  be	  concerned	  with	  
the	  situational	  or	  dispositional	  factors	  that	  determine	  one’s	  self-­‐regulatory	  abilities,	  and	  
how	  this	  faculty	  might	  be	  perturbed.	  Metcalfe	  and	  Mischel	  (1999)	  originally	  proposed	  a	  
dual-­‐systems	   framework	   for	   the	   exertion	   of	   self-­‐control,	   in	   which	   the	   hot	   emotional	  
system	   responds	   to	   impulsive	   motivational	   triggers,	   while	   the	   cool	   cognitive	   system	  
operates	   in	   a	   reflective	   and	   deliberative	   manner	   to	   override	   the	   hot	   system	   when	  
necessary.	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  hot	  system	  is	  directly	  under	  stimulus	  control,	  while	  the	  cool	  
system	   incorporates	   prior	   knowledge	   to	   achieve	   long-­‐term	   goals.	   Other	   work	   has	  
focused	   on	   delineating	   psychological	   strategies	   that	   people	   apply	   in	   order	   to	   resist	  
impulses	   such	  as	  distraction,	   forming	   implementation	   intentions,	  or	   re-­‐appraisal	   (e.g.,	  
Fischbach,	   Friedman,	  &	   Kruglanski,	   2003;	   Gollwitzer	  &	   Brandstätter,	   1997;	  Mischel	   &	  
Baker,	   1975),	   and	  designing	  methods	   to	  enhance	   the	  ability	   for	   impulse	   control	   (e.g.,	  
Webb	  &	  Sheeran,	  2003).	  Self-­‐control	  has	  further	  been	  quantified	  at	  the	  trait	  level,	  and	  
is	   predictive	   of	   long-­‐term	   outcomes	   such	   as	   job	   success,	   health,	   self-­‐esteem,	   and	  
prosocial	  behavior	  (Mischel	  et	  al.,	  2011;	  Tangney,	  Baumeister,	  &	  Boone,	  2004).	  Not	  only	  
has	   it	  been	  shown	  that	   individuals	  high	   in	  trait	  self-­‐control	  perform	  better	  on	  tests	  of	  
inhibition	   (Schmeichel	  &	  Zell,	  2007),	  but	  when	  controlling	   for	   individual	  differences	   in	  
the	   frequency	   of	   impulsive	   tendencies,	   Friese	   and	   Hofmann	   (2009)	   found	   that	   the	  
expression	   of	   behavioral	   urges	   occurs	  much	  more	   readily	   in	   people	   low	   in	   trait	   self-­‐
control.	  Overall,	  the	  social	  psychological	  approach	  to	  impulse	  control	  is	  characterized	  by	  
its	   diversity	   of	   paradigms	   in	   which	   impulsive	   behavior	   is	   assessed,	   ranging	   from	  
performance	   at	   simple	   laboratory	   tasks	   (e.g.,	   the	   Stroop	   task)	   to	   complex	   real	   life	  
behaviors	  (e.g.,	  dieting).	  
	  
Evidence	  from	  cognitive	  psychology	  and	  neuroscience	  
	   In	  cognitive	  psychology	  and	  neuroscience,	  a	  quite	  different	  approach	  has	  been	  
employed	  when	  studying	  the	  capacity	  to	  control	   impulsive	  behavior.	  Here,	  research	   is	  
concerned	   with	   the	   delineation	   of	   the	   core	   functional	   and	   neural	   mechanisms	   that	  
enable	   the	   stopping	   of	   a	   prepotent	   action	   tendency	   under	   strictly	   controlled	  
experimental	   conditions.	  The	  most	   commonly	  used	   tasks	   to	  assess	   this	  ability	  are	   the	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stop	  signal	  task	  and	  the	  go/nogo	  task	  (see	  Verbruggen	  &	  Logan,	  2009	  for	  a	  review).2	  In	  
both	  tasks,	  participants	  are	  required	  to	  perform	  speeded	  responses	  to	  the	  identity	  of	  a	  
frequently	  presented	  go	  stimulus,	  inducing	  a	  strong	  response	  tendency	  or	  “readiness	  to	  
act.”	  Occasionally,	  however,	  a	  stop	  or	  nogo	  signal	  is	  presented,	  instructing	  participants	  
to	   withhold	   the	   prepotent	   response.	   Nogo	   signals	   are	   typically	   presented	   as	   target	  
stimuli	  instead	  of	  the	  go	  signal	  and	  the	  dependent	  measure	  the	  error	  rate	  on	  nogo	  trials	  
(i.e.,	   the	  success	  of	  stopping).	  Stop	  signals,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  are	  typically	  presented	  
after	   the	   go	   signal	   (e.g.,	   as	   a	   sound),	   thus	   requiring	   a	   cancellation	  of	   a	   response	  at	   a	  
point	   in	   time	   in	  which	   it	   is	  already	  prepared	  or	   initiated.	   	  This	  conflict	  between	  going	  
and	  stopping	  is	  typically	  conceived	  as	  a	  race	  between	  a	  go	  process	  and	  a	  stop	  process,	  
in	   which	   the	   process	   that	   is	   completed	   first	   determines	   the	   outcome	   (see	   Logan	   &	  
Cowan,	  1984;	  Verbruggen	  &	  Logan,	  2008).	  By	  systematically	  manipulating	  the	  time	  lag	  
between	   the	   go	   signal	   and	   the	   stop	   signal,	   and	   taking	   into	   account	   a	   participant’s	  
reaction	  time	  on	  go	  trials,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  estimate	  the	  speed	  of	  an	  individual’s	  stopping	  
process,	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  stop-­‐signal	  reaction	  time	  (SSRT).	  This	  measure	  is	  commonly	  
employed	  as	  an	  index	  of	  individual	  stopping	  ability.3	  
Over	   the	  past	  decade,	  myriad	  neuroscience	  studies	  have	  employed	  variants	  of	  
the	  stop	  signal	  and	  go/nogo	  task	  to	  reveal	  the	  neural	  mechanisms	  that	  are	  involved	  in	  
the	  suppression	  of	  action	  tendencies.	  Multi-­‐method	  evidence	  suggests	  that	  stopping	  in	  
response	  to	  the	  occurrence	  of	  nogo	  or	  stop	  signals	  relies	  critically	  on	  the	  integrity	  of	  the	  
right	  inferior	  frontal	  gyrus	  (rIFG),	  a	  small	  part	  of	  the	  lateral	  prefrontal	  cortex	  (PFC)	  that	  
lies	  rostral	  to	  the	  precentral	  sulcus	  and	  ventral	  to	  the	  inferior	  frontal	  sulcus	  (see	  Aron,	  
Robbins,	  &	  Poldrack,	  2014	  for	  a	  recent	  review).	  This	  region	  is	  not	  only	  reliably	  activated	  
during	  stopping	  (e.g.,	  Garavan	  et	  al.,	  2002;	  Garavan,	  Ross,	  &	  Stein,	  1999;	  Konishi	  et	  al.,	  
1999;	  Konishi	  et	  al.,	  1998),	  but	  disruption	  of	  its	  integrity	  –	  either	  via	  natural	  lesions	  or	  
by	  means	  of	  transcranial	  magnetic	  stimulation	  (TMS)	  –	  results	  in	  a	  substantial	  increase	  
in	  SSRT,	  even	  when	  controlling	  for	  damage	  to	  other	  PFC	  sub-­‐regions	  (Aron	  et	  al.,	  2003;	  
Chambers	   et	   al.,	   2006;	  Verbruggen	  &	  Aron,	   2010).	  Notably,	   despite	   copious	   evidence	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	   Note	   that	   there	   are	   numerous	   other	   tasks	   that	   may	   also	   rely	   on	   inhibitory	   control,	   such	   as	   the	  
antisaccade	  task	  (see	  Hutton	  &	  Ettinger,	  2006),	  but	  these	  tasks	  also	   involve	  a	  number	  of	  non-­‐inhibitory	  
executive	  functions	  and	  are	  therefore	  not	  discussed	  in	  detail	  here.	  
3	   Note	   that	   the	   exact	   estimation	   of	   SSRT	   is	   still	   somewhat	   controversial,	   as	   it	   might	   be	   sensitive	   to	  





that	  the	  rIFG	   is	  essential	   for	  the	  ability	  to	  stop	  a	  prepotent	  tendency	   in	  response	  to	  a	  
stop	  or	  nogo	  signal,	  it	  has	  been	  proposed	  that	  its	  role	  might	  be	  better	  characterized	  as	  
an	   attentional	   monitor	   for	   salient	   external	   events	   (e.g.,	   Erika-­‐Florence,	   Leech,	   &	  
Hampshire,	  2014;	  Hampshire	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  However,	  recent	  evidence	  that	  signals	  from	  
the	  rIFG	  directly	  suppress	  the	  excitability	  of	   the	  primary	  motor	  cortex	   (Neubert	  et	  al.,	  
2010)	  seems	  hard	  to	  reconcile	  with	  an	  exclusively	  attentional	  account.	  
Beyond	   the	   rIFG,	   the	   pre-­‐supplementary	   motor	   area	   (preSMA)	   is	   another	  
cortical	   region	   that	   has	   been	   implicated	   in	   behavioral	   inhibition	   (see	   Chambers,	  
Garavan,	  &	  Bellgrove,	  2009;	  Nachev,	  Kennard,	  &	  Husain,	  2008).	  The	  preSMA	  is	  located	  
in	  the	  posterior	  medial	  frontal	  wall,	  rostral	  to	  the	  supplementary	  motor	  area	  and	  dorsal	  
to	  the	  cingulate	  gyrus.	  It	  is	  connected	  with	  the	  rIFG	  structurally	  and	  functionally	  (Aron,	  
2007;	   Johansen-­‐Berg	   et	   al.,	   2004)	   and	   also	   exhibits	   reliable	   activity	   during	   stopping	  
(e.g.,	  Boehler	  et	  al.,	  2010;	  Duann,	  Ide,	  Luo,	  &	  Li,	  2009;	  Swann	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  Moreover,	  as	  
mentioned	   above,	   unilateral	   lesions	   to	   the	   preSMA	   can	   lead	   to	   anarchic	   hand	  
syndrome.	  Patients	  with	  anarchic	  hand	  syndrome	  are	  unable	  to	  inhibit	  stimulus-­‐induced	  
action	   tendencies	  with	   the	  hand	   contralateral	   to	   the	   lesion,	   even	   though	   they	   report	  
having	  an	  intention	  to	  do	  so	  (Della	  Sala,	  Marchetti,	  &	  Spinnler,	  1991;	  Kritikos,	  Breen,	  &	  
Mattingley,	  2005;	  Pacherie,	  2007).	  Considerable	  controversy	  has	  evolved	  regarding	  the	  
differential	   contributions	   of	   the	   preSMA	   and	   the	   rIFG	   to	   stopping	   (e.g.,	   Chevrier,	  
Noseworthy,	   &	   Schachar,	   2007;	   Chikazoe	   et	   al.,	   2009;	   Li,	   Huang,	   Constable,	   &	   Sinha,	  
2006;	  Neubert	  et	  al.,	  2010;	  Sharp	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  In	  this	  regard	  it	  is	  quite	  noteworthy	  that,	  
whereas	  the	  rIFG	  seems	  to	  be	  recruited	  rather	  specifically	   for	  response	   inhibition,	  the	  
preSMA	   appears	   to	   contribute	   to	   cognitive	   control	   more	   generally.	   For	   instance,	  
activation	   of	   the	   preSMA	   is	   often	   found	   in	   the	   Stroop	   task	   or	   during	   task	   switching	  
(Niendam	  et	  al.,	  2012),	  and	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  to	  what	  extent	  these	  tasks	  require	  inhibitory	  
control.	  Moreover,	  the	  preSMA	  also	  contributes	  to	  the	  planning	  and	  generation	  of	  self-­‐
initiated	   movements.	   Accordingly,	   it	   has	   been	   proposed	   that	   the	   pre-­‐SMA	   may	   be	  
critical	   for	   adjusting	   the	   degree	   of	   action	   readiness	   (Cunnington,	   Windischberger,	   &	  
Moser,	  2005;	  Forstmann	  et	  al.,	  2008)	  and	  implementation	  of	  action	  decisions	  that	  can	  
yield	  facilitation	  or	  suppression	  of	  motor	  output.	  	  
Current	   models	   of	   response	   inhibition	   assume	   that	   the	   rIFG	   and	   the	   preSMA	  
implement	  behavioral	   inhibition	  via	   interactions	  with	  subcortical	   regions.	   In	  particular	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the	  subthalamic	  nucleus	  (STN),	  a	  small	  basal	  ganglia	  input	  nucleus,	  has	  been	  ascribed	  a	  
prominent	  role.	  It	  receives	  direct	  projections	  from	  both	  the	  rIFG	  and	  the	  preSMA	  and	  is	  
functionally	  coupled	  with	   these	   regions	  on	  successful	   stop	   trials	   (Aron,	  2007;	   Inase	  et	  
al.,	   1999).	   Models	   typically	   also	   distinguish	   between	   a	   hyperdirect	   pathway	   that	  
involves	  only	  direct	  projections	  from	  the	  cortex	  to	  the	  STN	  and	  leads	  to	  fast	  and	  global	  
motor	  suppression	  (i.e.,	  suppression	  of	  all	  motor	  output)	  and	  an	   indirect	  pathway	  that	  
also	   involves	   the	   striatum	   and	   the	   pallidum	   and	   allows	   for	   less	   instantaneous,	   yet	  
effector-­‐specific,	  inhibition	  (see	  Aron	  et	  al.,	  2014;	  Aron,	  2011	  for	  a	  detailed	  overview).	  	  
	  
Limitations	  of	  previous	  research	  on	  impulse	  control	  
	   It	  should	  be	  evident	  from	  the	  previous	  section	  that	  the	  social	  psychological	  and	  
cognitive	  approaches	  toward	  the	  study	  of	  impulse	  control	  differ	  substantially	  from	  one	  
another,	   and	   entail	   complementary	   strengths	   and	   limitations	   in	   revealing	   the	  
mechanisms	  of	  impulse	  control.	  The	  social	  approach	  greatly	  benefits	  from	  its	  ecological	  
validity,	   as	   it	   examines	   self-­‐regulatory	   behaviors	   in	   realistic	   scenarios.	   Moreover,	   it	  
allows	  for	  the	  investigation	  of	  the	  impact	  of	  subjective	  variables	  on	  self-­‐control,	  which	  
are	   typically	   neglected	   in	   cognitive	   studies.	   That	   being	   said,	   in	   the	   more	   naturalistic	  
settings	   of	   social	   psychological	   studies	   it	   is	   very	   difficult	   to	   reveal	   the	   precise	  
mechanisms	   that	   contribute	   to	   self-­‐regulation,	   as	   the	   tasks	   often	   permit	   multiple	  
strategies	   to	   be	   employed.	   Conversely,	   the	   cognitive	   approach	   offers	   maximal	  
experimental	   control,	   which	   is	   suitable	   for	   the	   delineation	   of	   specific	   componential	  
processes	   and	   the	   characterization	   of	   the	   involved	   neural	   systems.	   Yet	   classical	  
cognitive	  paradigms,	  such	  as	  the	  SST	  or	  the	  go/nogo	  task	  fall	  short	  in	  terms	  of	  ecological	  
validity.	  As	  the	  decision	  to	  implement	  or	  inhibit	  an	  action	  tendency	  is	  fully	  determined	  
by	  external	  stimuli	  in	  these	  tasks,	  it	  is	  questionable	  to	  what	  extent	  conclusions	  may	  be	  
generalized	   to	   impulse	   control	   in	   the	   real	   world,	   where	   self-­‐control	   must	   typically	  
originate	  endogenously.	   	  
	   In	   recent	   years,	   efforts	   have	   been	   undertaken	   to	   bridge	   the	   gap	   between	  
experimental	  scenarios	  of	  response	  inhibition	  and	  impulse	  control	  in	  everyday	  life.	  One	  
approach	   has	   been	   to	   extend	   classical	   response	   inhibition	   paradigms	   in	   order	   to	  
increase	  their	  reliance	  on	  endogenous	  and	  motivational	  processes.	  As	  such,	  the	  concept	  




Chikazoe	  et	  al.,	  2009;	  Jaffard	  et	  al.,	  2008;	  Jahfari,	  Stinear,	  Claffey,	  Verbruggen,	  &	  Aron,	  
2010;	  Wessel	  &	  Aron,	  2014).	  Proactive	  inhibition	  is	  assessed	  in	  a	  modified	  version	  of	  the	  
SST	  by	  giving	  participants	  advance	  information	  about	  the	  probability	  of	  a	  stop	  signal	  in	  
the	   current	   block.	   It	   is	   then	   measured	   how	   this	   knowledge	   affects	   the	   proactive	  
preparation	   to	   stop	   by	   comparing	   blocks	   without	   stop	   signals	   (never	   stop;	   NS)	   with	  
blocks	  that	  contain	  a	  moderate	  number	  of	  stop	  signals	  (maybe	  stop;	  MS).	  Behaviorally,	  
it	   has	  been	  documented	   that	   anticipating	   the	  possibility	   of	   a	   stop	   leads	   to	   elongated	  
reaction	   time	   on	  MS	   go	   trials,	   indicating	   strategic	   adjustments	   (Verbruggen	  &	   Logan,	  
2009).	   Neuroimaging	   studies	   have	  moreover	   revealed	   greater	   rIFG	   activity	   on	  MS	   go	  
trials	  compared	  with	  NS	  go	  trials,	  with	  the	  amount	  of	  IFG	  activity	  predicting	  the	  amount	  
of	   slowing	   (Jahfari	   et	   al.,	   2010).	   These	   findings	   highlight	   that	   the	   aforementioned	  
network	  for	  response	  inhibition	  is	  not	  only	  recruited	  reactively	  by	  the	  occurrence	  of	  a	  
stop	  or	  nogo	  signal,	  but	  also	  proactively	  by	  the	  anticipation	  thereof.	  Another	  interesting	  
approach	   has	   been	   the	   inclusion	   of	   motivational	   incentives	   into	   response	   inhibition	  
paradigm.	   For	   instance,	   Boehler	   et	   al.	   (2012)	   demonstrated	   that	   the	   SSRT	   is	   reduced	  
when	   a	   stop	   signal	   indicates	   that	   a	   monetary	   reward	   can	   be	   gained	   via	   successful	  
stopping,	   presumably	   due	   to	   a	   stronger	   recruitment	   of	   brain	   areas	   implicated	   in	  
stopping	  (Boehler	  et	  al.,	  2014).	  Although	  both	  of	  these	  extensions	  of	  classical	  response	  
inhibition	   paradigms	   have	   yielded	   novel	   and	   valuable	   insights,	   some	   of	   the	  
aforementioned	   limitations	   of	   cognitive	   paradigms	   still	   apply.	   Most	   importantly,	   the	  
decision	  to	  act	  or	  inhibit	  in	  these	  paradigms	  is	  still	  entirely	  stimulus-­‐driven,	  limiting	  its	  
validity	  as	  a	  model	  of	  self-­‐control	  in	  everyday	  life.	  	  
As	  an	  alternative	  approach	  toward	  the	  study	  of	  the	  neural	  basis	  of	  self-­‐control,	  
the	  concept	  of	   intentional	   inhibition	  has	  been	   introduced	  to	  the	   literature.	   Intentional	  
inhibition	  describes	  the	  suppression	  of	  prepotent	  behavior	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  endogenous	  
decisions.	   Accordingly,	   this	   concept	   of	   inhibition	   is	   more	   closely	   related	   to	   social	  
psychological	  concepts	  of	  self-­‐control.	  To	  date,	  only	  a	   few	  studies	  have	  examined	  this	  
capacity,	   and	   the	   paradigms	   that	   have	   been	   employed	   are	   quite	   diverse.	   In	   the	   first	  
study	   by	   Brass	   &	   Haggard	   (2007),	   participants	   were	   required	   to	   press	   a	   button	   at	  
moment	  of	  their	  choosing	  (action	  trials),	  and	  to	  occasionally	  prepare	  a	  button	  press	  but	  
cancel	   it	   at	   the	   last	   possible	  moment	   (inhibition	   trials).	   Contrasting	   brain	   activity	   on	  
inhibition	   trials	   with	   action	   trials	   revealed	   no	   activation	   in	   the	   areas	   previously	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implicated	  in	   inhibition	  in	  the	  SST.	   Instead,	   inhibition-­‐related	  activity	  was	  found	  in	  the	  
dorsal	  frontal	  median	  cortex	  (dFMC),	  located	  in	  the	  anterior	  medial	  frontal	  wall	  rostral	  
and	   dorsal	   to	   the	   anterior	   cingulate,	   along	   with	   the	   anterior	   insula	   and	   the	   inferior	  
parietal	  cortex.	  This	  finding	  was	  interpreted	  as	  reflecting	  the	  existence	  of	  two	  inhibition	  
systems	   for	   externally	   guided	   and	   intentional	   inhibition	   respectively4.	   Importantly,	  
several	   follow-­‐up	   studies	   could	   replicate	   the	   involvement	   of	   the	   dFMC	   in	   intentional	  
inhibition	  using	  disparate	  experimental	  procedures	  such	  as	  omitting	  a	  prepotent	  button	  
press	  that	  could	  prevent	  an	  aversive	  glass-­‐breaking	  sound	  and	  a	  monetary	   loss	  (Kühn,	  
Haggard,	   &	   Brass,	   2009),	   or	   the	   voluntary	   suppression	   of	   negative	   emotions	   (Kühn,	  
Haggard,	   &	   Brass,	   2014).5	   Based	   on	   these	   findings,	   it	   was	   proposed	   that	   the	   dFMC	  
constitutes	  a	  “veto	  area”	  that	  serves	  the	  suppression	  of	  impulsive	  behavior	  on	  the	  basis	  
of	  endogenous	  decisions	  (Brass	  &	  Haggard,	  2007,	  2008).	  
However,	  although	   intentional	   inhibition	  studies	  certainly	  address	  some	  of	   the	  
shortcomings	  of	  previous	  response	  inhibition	  research,	  the	  transfer	  of	  these	  findings	  to	  
realistic	   instances	   of	   self-­‐control	   remains	   difficult.	   Most	   importantly,	   although	   the	  
decisions	   to	   inhibit	   were	   generated	   endogenously,	   they	   were	   often	   also	   rather	  
arbitrary.	   Neither	   option	   had	   a	   genuine	  motivational	   valence	   to	   the	   participant	   (e.g.,	  
choosing	  between	  pressing	  a	  button	  or	  refraining	  from	  pressing	  it),	  in	  striking	  contrast	  
to	  self-­‐control	  in	  real	  life,	  which	  is	  characterized	  by	  the	  presence	  of	  strong	  urges	  to	  act	  
that	   conflict	   with	   an	   individual’s	   goal	   or	   social	   norms.	   Accordingly,	   it	   remains	   to	   be	  
determined	   to	   what	   extent	   these	   findings	   would	   generalize	   to	   contexts	   in	   which	  
inhibition	   of	   a	   highly	   prepotent	   response	   is	   required.	   Moreover,	   the	   mechanism	  
through	  which	   intentional	   inhibition	   is	  achieved	  remains	  elusive.	  Does	   it	  reflect	  motor	  
suppression	   in	   a	   strict	   sense,	   or	   rather	   higher-­‐order	   self-­‐regulatory	   processes?	   The	  
paradigms	   that	   have	   been	   employed	   thus	   far	   suggest	   that	   it	   reflects	   a	   very	   general	  
mechanism	   that	  might	  also	   involve	  non-­‐motor	  processes,	  but	   further	   characterization	  
seems	  necessary.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  This	  distinction	  directly	  corresponds	  to	  the	  aforementioned	  idea	  that	  endogenous	  and	  exogenous	  
control	  rely	  more	  strongly	  on	  the	  medial	  and	  lateral	  frontal	  cortex	  respectively	  (Goldberg,	  1985;	  
Passingham	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  
5	  Note,	  however,	  that	  the	  precise	  anatomical	  location	  of	  the	  dFMC	  peak	  coordinates	  varied	  considerably	  




In	  summary,	  several	  novel	  and	  well-­‐motivated	  approaches	  have	  been	  employed	  
to	  relate	  the	  neuroscience	  of	  response	  inhibition	  more	  closely	  to	  self-­‐control	  in	  real	  life.	  
However,	   despite	   valuable	   advances	   from	   original	   designs,	   fundamental	   problems	  
remain.	   In	  particular,	   paradigms	  either	  provide	  participants	  with	  external	   information	  
that	  determines	  the	  decision	  to	  act	  or	  inhibit,	  or	  they	  employ	  rather	  arbitrary	  decision	  
scenarios,	  absent	  behavioral	  urges.	  Both	  of	  these	  aspects	  limit	  the	  ecological	  validity	  of	  
paradigms	  as	  a	  model	  of	   impulse	  control.	  Accordingly,	  one	  central	  aim	  of	   the	  present	  
thesis	   will	   be	   the	   development	   of	   a	   novel	   experimental	   paradigm	   that	   may	   help	   to	  
measure	   behavioral	   inhibition	   in	   a	   more	   valid	   and	   yet	   experimentally	   controlled	  
manner.	  
	  
Part	  II:	  Determinants	  of	  volitional	  engagement	  
The	  second	  part	  of	  my	  thesis	  shifts	  the	  focus	  from	  measuring	  and	  characterizing	  
volition	   itself	   towards	  delineating	   factors	   that	   impact	   the	  ability	  and/or	  motivation	   to	  
exert	   volitional	   control.	   This	   question	   has	   been	   addressed	   in	   different	   areas	   of	   social	  
and	  cognitive	  psychology	  that	  will	  be	  briefly	  reviewed	  in	  the	  following.	  
	  
Self-­‐regulatory	  abilities	  	  
A	  controversial	  debate	   in	   the	  social	  psychological	   literature	  has	  been	  centered	  
around	   the	   question	   of	   whether	   volition	   relies	   on	   a	   limited	   self-­‐regulatory	   resource	  
(willpower;	   Baumeister,	   2003;	   Baumeister,	   Bratslavsky,	   Muraven,	   &	   Tice,	   1998),	   a	  
capacity	   for	   volitional	   action	   capable	   of	   being	   depleted	   following	   repeated	   exertions	  
(ego	  depletion;	  Baumeister	  et	  al.,	  1998).	  Tasks	  requiring	  willpower	  include	  self-­‐control,	  
decision-­‐making,	   complex	   problem	   solving,	   and	   conflict	   resolution.	   From	   this	  
perspective	  there	  is	  not	  one	  task	  that	  depletes	  the	  human	  will,	  but	  rather	  a	  number	  of	  
tasks	   that	   draw	   more	   or	   less	   on	   this	   resource.	   In	   a	   series	   of	   behavioral	   studies,	  
Baumeister	  and	  colleagues	  showed	  that	  differing	  tasks	  presumed	  to	  rely	  on	  willpower	  
systematically	   interfered	  with	   each	   other	   (Baumeister,	   2003;	  Muraven	  &	  Baumeister,	  
2000).	   However,	   despite	   the	   diversity	   of	   studies	   investigating	   ego	   depletion,	   to	   date	  
little	  is	  known	  about	  what	  might	  constitute	  a	  biological	  substrate	  of	  willpower.	  Gailliot	  
&	   Baumeister	   (2007)	   proposed	   that	   consumption	   of	   glucose	   might	   underlie	   the	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depletion	  of	  self-­‐regulatory	  capacity.	  However,	   this	  proposal	  has	  been	   largely	   falsified	  
(Beedie	  &	  Lane,	  2011)	  and	  alternative	  proposals	  are	  lacking.	  
A	   related	   line	  of	   research	  has	   focused	  on	   stable	   inter-­‐individual	   differences	   in	  
self-­‐regulatory	  abilities	  rather	  than	  on	  its	  situational	  depletion	  (i.e.,	  on	  trait	  differences	  
in	   self-­‐regulation	   rather	   than	   state	   differences).	   Ample	   evidence	   suggests	   that	   stable	  
traits,	  reflecting	  self-­‐control	  abilities,	  build	  up	  early	  in	  development	  and	  are	  predictive	  
of	   various	   long-­‐term	   outcomes.	   The	   most	   striking	   evidence	   comes	   from	   the	   famous	  
delay	  of	   gratification	  experiments	   (Mischel,	   1974),	   in	  which	  preschoolers	   could	   chose	  
between	   an	   immediately	   available	   but	   small	   reward,	   and	   a	   larger	   reward	   with	   a	  
temporal	  delay.	  The	  researchers	  found	  marked	  differences	  in	  the	  ability	  to	  override	  the	  
impulse	   to	   give	   in	   the	   temptation	   of	   the	   immediate	   reward	   to	   obtain	   the	   favorable	  
long-­‐term	  outcome.	   Importantly,	   longitudinal	  assessments	   revealed	   that	   the	  ability	   to	  
delay	  gratification	  at	  preschool	  age	  were	  predictive	  of	  participants’	  success	  later	  in	  life,	  
determined	   by	   factors	   such	   as	   employment	   and	   standardized	   testing	   performance,	  
illustrating	   both	   the	   stability	   of	   trait	   self-­‐control	   and	   the	   ecological	   validity	   of	   its	  
measurement	  (see	  Mischel	  et	  al.,	  2011	  for	  a	  contemporary	  review).	  However,	  as	  in	  the	  
case	  of	  ego	  depletion,	   little	   if	   anything	   is	   known	  with	   regard	   to	   the	  mechanisms	   that	  
underlie	  different	   levels	  of	   self-­‐regulatory	  ability.	  Accordingly,	  one	  goal	  of	   the	   second	  
part	   of	   this	   thesis	  will	   be	   to	   examine	   the	   neural	   underpinnings	   of	   differences	   in	   self-­‐
regulatory	  abilities,	  both	  at	  the	  state	  level	  and	  at	  the	  trait	  level.	  	  
	  
High-­‐level	  beliefs	  
High-­‐level	  beliefs	  regarding	  volition	  (or	   free	  will)	  have	  also	  been	  related	  to	  the	  
magnitude	   of	   volitional	   engagement.	   The	   sensation	   of	   having	   free	   control	   over	   one’s	  
actions	   is	   an	   undeniably	   ubiquitous	   feature	   of	   human	   experience.	   Perception	   of	  
personal	   control	   is	   further	   considered	   to	   be	   intrinsic,	   biologically	   necessary,	   and	  
protective	  against	  environmental	  stressors	  (Leotti,	  Iyengar,	  &	  Ochsner,	  2010).	  A	  recent	  
line	   of	   research	   has	   examined	   the	   effects	   of	   undermining	   free	   will	   beliefs	   (FWBs)	  
experimentally.	   Typically,	   one	   group	   of	   participants	   is	   required	   to	   read	   an	   essay	   that	  
promotes	   a	   determinist	   perspective	   by	   questioning	   the	   concept	   of	   humans	   as	   self-­‐
determined	   intentional	   agents	   (e.g.,	   “all	   behavior	   is	   determined	   by	   our	   genes”),	  




statements	   about	   consciousness.	   A	   number	   of	   studies	   have	   shown	   that	   these	  
manipulations	  can	  not	  only	  reduce	  the	  strength	  of	  participants’	  self-­‐reported	  FWBs,	  but	  
also	   lead	   to	  a	  degradation	  of	  behavioral	   control	   in	   social	   contexts.	   For	   instance,	  Vohs	  
and	   Schooler	   (2008)	   found	   that	   participants	   whose	   FWBs	   were	   weakened	   paid	  
themselves	  a	  statistically	  improbable	  amount	  of	  money	  for	  performance	  on	  a	  problem-­‐
solving	   task,	   and	  more	   frequently	   permitted	   themselves	   to	   view	  answers	  when	   given	  
the	   opportunity	   to	   cheat.	   In	   the	   same	   vein,	   undermining	   FWBs	   has	   been	   shown	   to	  
increase	   aggressive	   behaviors	   and	   decrease	   pro-­‐social	   behavior	   (Baumeister	   et	   al.,	  
2009),	   promote	   mindless	   conformity	   (Alquist,	   Ainsworth,	   &	   Baumeister,	   2013)	   and	  
reduce	   counterfactual	   thinking	   (Baumeister,	   Crescioni,	   &	   Alquist,	   2010).	   Altogether,	  
these	   findings	   indicate	  that	  a	  stable	  belief	   in	   free	  will	  might	  be	  necessary	   to	  maintain	  
the	  motivation	  that	  is	  necessary	  to	  exert	  effortful	  control	  over	  selfish	  impulses	  in	  favor	  
of	  socially	  appropriate	  behavior	  that	  concurs	  with	  societal	  norms.	  	  
More	  recently,	  cognitive	  psychologists	  have	  revealed	  that	  the	  effects	  of	  free	  will	  
manipulations	  are	  not	  restricted	  to	  behavior	  in	  social	  contexts,	  but	  seem	  to	  propagate	  
to	   very	   basic	   and	   even	   unconscious	   stages	   of	   motor	   control.	   Rigoni	   et	   al.	   (2011)	  
employed	   a	   similar	   belief	  manipulation	   and	  measured	   its	   effects	   by	  means	  of	   a	   Libet	  
task,	  in	  which	  participants	  performed	  self-­‐initiated	  button	  presses	  and	  were	  required	  to	  
monitor	  the	  point	  in	  time	  at	  which	  they	  experienced	  the	  intention	  to	  move	  (see	  Libet	  et	  
al.,	  1983).	  Electroencephalographic	  recordings	  of	  scalp	  currents	  prior	  to	  the	  movements	  
revealed	   that	   participants	   whose	   FWBs	   had	   been	   perturbed	   exhibited	   a	   reduced	  
amplitude	   of	   the	   readiness	   potential,	   an	   electrophysiological	   marker	   of	   endogenous	  
motor	  preparation	  (Shibasaki	  &	  Hallett,	  2006),	  highlighting	  that	  FWBs	  may	  affect	  even	  
the	  most	  basic	  stages	  of	  action	  control.	  	  
Thus,	  a	  substantial	  body	  of	  evidence	  indicates	  that	  FWBs	  play	  an	  important	  role	  
in	  behavioral	  control.	  Yet,	  despite	  these	  convergent	  findings,	  it	  is	  still	  poorly	  understood	  
how	  weakening	  the	  strength	  of	  FWBs	  influences	  human	  behavior	  and	  how	  it	  can	  affect	  
such	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  control	  processes.	  Rigoni	  et	  al.	   (2011)	  speculated	  that	  reducing	  
FWBs	  might	  perturb	  participants’	  sense	  of	  agency	   (SoA),	   i.e.,	   their	   intrinsic	  experience	  
of	  being	  in	  control	  of	  their	  actions,	  which	  may	  then,	  in	  turn,	  reduce	  the	  recruitment	  of	  
intentional	   effort	   in	   action	   production	   and	   impulse	   control.	   	   However,	   although	   this	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view	  is	  principally	  plausible,	  a	  conclusive	  link	  between	  FWBs	  and	  agency	  remains	  to	  be	  
established	  and	  constitutes	  another	  goal	  of	  the	  present	  thesis.	  
	  
Agency	  
The	  sense	  of	  agency	   refers	   to	   the	  experience	  of	  being	   in	  control	  of	  one’s	  own	  
actions	   and,	   consequently,	   of	   events	   in	   the	   external	   world.	   It	   is	   an	   intrinsic	   and	  
ubiquitous	  experience	  that,	  when	  intact,	  rarely	  rises	  to	  the	  level	  of	  conscious	  awareness	  
(see	   Chambon,	   Filevich,	   &	   Haggard,	   2014;	   Haggard	   &	   Chambon,	   2012;	   Haggard	   &	  
Tsakiris,	  2009;	  Morsella,	  Berger,	  &	  Krieger,	  2010	  for	  recent	  reviews).	  However,	  several	  
clinical	  disorders	  are	  characterized	  by	  a	  perturbation	  of	  the	  SoA.	  For	  instance,	  patients	  
with	  psychosis	  often	  report	  experiencing	  abnormal	  intentions	  and	  causality	  attributions	  
(Jeannerod,	   2009;	   Kapur,	   2003).	   In	   the	   healthy	   population,	   deviating	   agentic	  
experiences	   can	   be	   witnessed	   in	   instances	   such	   as	   losing	   control	   over	   a	   car	   that	  
suddenly	  malfunctions.	  
Classical	   theoretical	   accounts	   of	   the	   SoA	   have	   proposed	   that	   it	   is	   based	   on	   a	  
mental	  “comparator”	  that	  constantly	  predicts	  the	  sensory	  outcomes	  of	  ongoing	  actions	  
and	   matches	   them	   with	   actual	   sensory	   input	   (Frith,	   Blakemore,	   &	   Wolpert,	   2000;	  
Wolpert,	  Ghahramani,	  &	   Jordan,	  1995).	  According	   to	   this	  view,	  we	  have	  a	  continuous	  
experience	  of	  being	  in	  control	  as	  long	  as	  predictions	  and	  sensory	  input	  correspond,	  but	  
in	  cases	  of	  a	  strong	  mismatch	  the	  default	  experience	  of	  “I	  did	  it”	  will	  suddenly	  become	  
disrupted.	  More	  recent	  models	  have	  extended	  the	  comparator	  metaphor	  and	  typically	  
distinguish	   between	   a	   nonconceptual	   or	   implicit	   component	   and	   a	   conceptual	   or	  
explicit	   component.	   The	   former	   is	   often	   referred	   to	   as	   a	   pre-­‐reflective	   and	   intrinsic	  
feeling	  of	  being	  in	  control,	  and	  as	  a	  fluid	  experience	  of	  causing	  one’s	  own	  actions	  and	  
their	   outcomes.	   The	   latter	   is	   often	   referred	   to	   as	   reflective	   or	   explicit	   judgment,	   or	  
attribution	   of	   authorship	   based	   on	   deliberate	   thought	   processes	   (e.g.,	   Synofzik,	  
Vosgerau,	  &	  Newen,	  2008).	  
	   This	  conceptual	  distinction	  between	  explicit	  and	  implicit	  components	  of	  agency	  
also	   reflects	   the	   types	   of	   paradigms	   that	   have	   been	   employed	   to	   measure	   the	   SoA.	  
Explicit	   agency	   components	   are	   typically	   measured	   in	   attribution	   tasks	   that	   require	  
participants	   to	   identify	   the	   generator	   of	   an	   “ambiguous”	   event	   in	   their	   environment.	  




changes	  on	  a	  video	  screen;	  occasionally	  they	  are	  asked	  about	  their	  certainty	  that	  they	  
have	  caused	  a	  particular	  change	  on	  the	  screen	  to	  appear.	  Research	  along	  these	  lines	  has	  
identified	  several	  factors	  that	  contribute	  to	  explicit	  attributions	  of	  agency,	  among	  them	  
the	   temporal	   proximity	   between	   an	   action	   and	   its	   outcome,	   or	   the	   consistency	  with	  
prior	   action-­‐outcome	   experiences	   (e.g.,	   Sato	   &	   Yasuda,	   2005).	   By	   contrast,	   implicit	  
agency	   components	   are	   typically	   measured	   indirectly,	   most	   commonly	   with	   the	   so-­‐
called	  intentional	  binding	  (IB)	  task	  (see	  Moore	  &	  Obhi,	  2012	  for	  a	  review).	  In	  this	  task,	  
participants	   perform	   temporal	   judgments	   about	  movements	   or	   about	   sensory	   events	  
when	  these	  events	  occur	   in	   isolation	   (baseline)	  or	   in	  combination	   (agency),	   i.e.,	  when	  
the	   tone	   follows	   shortly	   after	   and	   is	   contingent	   with	   the	   action.	   IB	   denotes	   the	  
observation	   that	   there	   is	   a	   systematic	   perceptual	   shift	   in	   the	   agency	   conditions.	  
Compared	   to	   the	   baseline	   conditions,	   actions	   are	   perceived	   as	   occurring	   later,	   and	  
sensory	   events	   as	   occurring	   earlier.	   In	   other	   words,	   the	   action	   and	   its	   outcome	   are	  
bound	  together	  in	  time.	  Importantly,	  ample	  evidence	  suggests	  that	  IB	  is	  sensitive	  to	  the	  
level	  of	  action	  intention,	  as	  it	  is	  reduced	  or	  even	  absent	  when	  movements	  are	  not	  self-­‐
initiated	   but	   rather	   guided	   by	   external	   stimuli	   or	   triggered	   by	   TMS	   (Engbert,	  
Wohlschlager,	   &	   Haggard,	   2008;	   Engbert,	   Wohlschlager,	   Thomas,	   &	   Haggard,	   2007;	  
Haggard,	  Clark,	  &	  Kalogeras,	  2002),	  motivating	  its	  common	  use	  as	  a	  measure	  of	  implicit	  
agency.	  
	  
Overview	  of	  the	  chapters	  
As	  outlined	  above,	  my	  thesis	  is	  structured	  into	  two	  distinct	  lines	  of	  research.	  The	  
first	   line	   deals	   with	   the	   neural	   basis	   of	   inhibitory	   self-­‐regulation,	   with	   the	   goal	   of	  
providing	  an	  ecologically	  valid	  way	  to	  investigate	  this	  capacity.	  To	  this	  end,	  in	  Chapter	  1,	  
I	   introduce	  a	  novel	  paradigm	  that	  assesses	  behavioral	   inhibition	  in	  the	  context	  of	  pain	  
avoidance	  behavior.	  Participants	  received	  thermal	  pain	  stimulation	  to	  alternating	  inner-­‐
wrists	  and	  could	  terminate	  the	  stimulation	  via	  a	  button	  press	  with	  the	  non-­‐stimulated	  
hand.	  On	   some	   trials,	   the	  decision	   to	  act	  or	   inhibit	  was	   indicated	  by	  an	  external	   cue,	  
whereas	   on	   other	   trials,	   participants	   could	   freely	   chose	   between	   both	   options.	   The	  
advantage	  of	  this	  paradigm	  is	  that	  it	  induces	  a	  strong	  urge	  to	  act	  in	  each	  participant	  and	  
on	  every	  trial.	  Response	   inhibition	  thus	  mirrors	  realistic	   instances	  of	  self-­‐control	  more	  
closely	   than	   in	   previous	   paradigms.	   Strikingly,	   under	   these	   motivationally	   salient	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conditions,	   inhibition	   relies	   on	   joint	   activation	   of	   the	   brain	   networks	   previously	  
implicated	   in	   externally-­‐guided	   and	   intentional	   inhibition.	   This	   finding	   casts	   doubt	   on	  
the	  original	  assumption	  that	  these	  networks	  serve	  independent	  functions	  and	  indicates	  
that	  they	  might	  operate	  in	  concert	  in	  the	  context	  of	  genuine	  self-­‐control.	  In	  Chapter	  2,	  I	  
integrate	  these	  and	  other	  recent	  neuroimaging	  findings	  into	  a	  novel	  theoretical	  account	  
of	   the	   role	   of	   the	   dorsal	   frontomedian	   cortex	   in	   intentional	   inhibition.	   Based	   on	   a	  
number	   of	   studies	   that	   have	   linked	   this	   region	   with	   non-­‐motor	   and	   self-­‐referential	  
processes,	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  contribution	  of	  this	  region	  to	  self-­‐regulation	  might	  be	  better	  
characterized	  as	  higher-­‐level	  disengagement	  from	  intentions	  and	  urges	  rather	  than	  as	  a	  
veto	  signal	  that	  cancels	  motor	  plans	  in	  a	  strict	  sense.	  	  
In	  the	  second	  line	  of	  research,	  I	  identify	  factors	  that	  perturb	  the	  ability	  to	  exert	  
volitional	  control.	  Having	  established	  the	  mechanisms	  involved	  in	  the	  inhibition	  of	  pain	  
avoidance	  behavior,	  Chapters	  3	  and	  4	  use	  an	  adapted	  version	  of	   the	  same	  paradigm.	  
Chapter	   3	   investigates	   the	   relation	   between	   inhibition-­‐related	   brain	   activity	   and	  
individual	  differences	  in	  self-­‐regulatory	  abilities	  (both	  at	  the	  state	  level	  and	  at	  the	  trait	  
level).	   Results	   indicate	   that	   a	   high	   trait	   level	   of	   self-­‐regulation	   is	   associated	   with	  
stronger	  activation	  of	  the	  inhibition	  network,	  as	  defined	  in	  the	  previous	  study,	  whereas	  
no	   effects	   of	   the	   state	   manipulation	   were	   found.	   Chapter	   4	   examines	   beliefs	   about	  
volition	   and	   their	   impact	   on	   behavioral	   control	   by	   investigating	   whether	   weakening	  
FWBs	  affects	  intentional	  engagement	  in	  self-­‐control.	  Some	  evidence	  indicates	  that	  this	  
might	  be	  the	  case.	  However,	  the	  effects	  are	  only	  found	  in	  a	  subset	  of	  the	  sample,	  i.e.,	  in	  
those	   participants	   who	   experience	   a	   sufficient	   amount	   of	   pain	   to	   necessitate	   self-­‐
control.	   Chapter	   5	   seeks	   to	   reveal	   how	   FWBs	   are	   able	   to	   affect	   various	   behavioral	  
parameters,	   ranging	   from	   the	   readiness	   potential	   to	   complex	   social	   behaviors.	  
Specifically,	   it	   tests	   the	   hypothesis	   that	   weakening	   FWBs	   diminishes	   the	   sense	   of	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Behavioral	   inhibition	   has	   classically	   been	   considered	   to	   rely	   upon	   a	   neural	  
network	   centered	   at	   the	   right	   inferior	   frontal	   cortex	   (rIFC;	   Aron,	   Robbins,	  &	   Poldrack,	  
2004;	  2014).	  However,	   the	  vast	  majority	  of	   inhibition	  studies	  have	  entailed	  exogenous	  
stop	   signals	   instructing	   participants	   to	   withhold	   responding.	   More	   recent	   work	   has	  
begun	   to	   examine	   the	   neural	   underpinnings	   of	   endogenous	   inhibition,	   revealing	   a	  
distinct	  cortical	  basis	  in	  the	  dorsal	  fronto-­‐median	  cortex	  (dFMC;	  Brass	  &	  Haggard,	  2007;	  
Kühn,	   Haggard,	   &	   Brass,	   2009).	   Yet,	   contrary	   to	   everyday	   experiences	   of	   voluntary	  
behavioral	   suppression,	   the	   paradigms	   employed	   to	   investigate	   action	   inhibition	   have	  
thus	   far	   been	   somewhat	   artificial,	   and	   involve	   little	   persuasive	   motivation	   to	   act.	  
Accordingly,	   the	   present	   fMRI	   study	   seeks	   to	   compare	   and	   contrast	   intentional	   with	  
instructed	   inhibition	   in	   a	   novel	   pain	   paradigm	   that	   recruits	   ‘hot’	   incentive	   response	  
systems.	  Participants	  received	   increasing	  thermal	  stimulation	  to	  their	   inner	  wrists,	  and	  
were	   required	   to	   occasionally	   withhold	   their	   natural	   impulse	   to	   withdraw	   from	   the	  
compelling	   pain	   sensation	   at	   peak	   temperature,	   in	   both	   instructed	   and	   free-­‐choice	  
conditions.	  Consistent	  with	  previous	  research,	  we	  observed	  inhibition-­‐related	  activity	  in	  
the	  dFMC	  and	  the	  rIFC.	  However,	  these	  regions	  displayed	  equivalent	  activation	  levels	  for	  
both	  inhibition	  types.	  These	  data	  extend	  previous	  research	  by	  demonstrating	  that	  under	  
ecologically	   valid	   conditions	  with	   a	   strong	  motivation	   to	   act,	   both	   stopping	   networks	  




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  In	  collaboration	  with	  Jelle	  Demanet,	  Ruth	  M.	  Krebs,	  Pieter	  Van	  Dessel,	  &	  Marcel	  Brass	  (under	  revision,	  





Self-­‐control	   permits	   individuals	   to	   fulfill	   their	   goals,	   keep	   their	   promises,	   and	  
conform	  to	  societal	  norms	  (Baumeister,	  Vohs,	  &	  Tice,	  2007).	  	  Successful	  self-­‐regulation	  
often	   depends	   on	   the	   ability	   to	   suppress	   the	   urge	   to	   act	   impulsively	   (Muraven	   &	  
Baumeister,	   2000).	   	   This	   can	   be	   witnessed	   in	   everyday	   examples	   ranging	   from	   the	  
relatively	  innocuous	  (e.g.,	  abstaining	  from	  eating	  a	  second	  donut)	  to	  the	  potentially	  dire	  
(e.g.,	   refraining	   from	   striking	   another	   person	   in	   a	   fit	   of	   rage).	   	   While	   failure	   at	   the	  
former	  example	  might	  prove	  disappointing	   for	   the	   individual,	  poor	   impulse	  control	  as	  
displayed	   in	   behaviors	   stemming	   from	   violence,	   addiction,	   or	   unconstrained	   emotion	  
can	  be	  particularly	  damaging	  on	  a	  broad	  social	  scale.	   	  The	  ability	  to	  successfully	  delay	  
gratification	   and	   inhibit	   one’s	   urges	   is	   predictive	   of	   long-­‐term	   outcomes	   such	   as	   job	  
success,	   health,	   self-­‐esteem,	   and	   helping	   behavior/aggression	   (Mischel	   et	   al.,	   2011;	  
Tangney,	  Baumeister,	  &	  Boone,	  2004).	  	  Crucially,	  this	  control	  must	  originate	  within	  the	  
person	  for	  it	  to	  be	  effective	  repeatedly	  and	  over	  time;	  merely	  adhering	  to	  external	  rules	  
and	  laws	  is	  insufficient	  when	  high	  levels	  of	  regulatory	  effort	  must	  be	  exerted.	  	  	  
At	  the	  neural	   level,	  behavioral	   inhibition	  has	  classically	  been	  considered	  to	  rely	  
upon	  a	  network	  centered	  at	  the	  right	  inferior	  frontal	  cortex	  (	  rIFC;	  	  see	  Aron,	  Robbins,	  &	  
Poldrack,	   2004;	   2014	   for	   reviews).	   In	   the	   vast	  majority	   of	   these	   studies,	   participants	  
were	  instructed	  to	  withhold	  a	  response	  upon	  the	  appearance	  of	  an	  external	  stop	  signal	  
(e.g.,	  Aron	  &	  Poldrack,	  2006;	  Chikazoe	  et	  al.,	  2007;	  2009;	  Garavan	  et	  al.,	  1999;	  2002).	  	  
Yet,	   in	   naturalistic	   settings,	   inhibition	   of	   unwanted	   behavior	   is	   typically	   based	   on	  
internal	   decisions	   rather	   than	   on	   external	   instructions.	   For	   instance,	   a	   person	  who	   is	  
trying	   to	  give	  up	   smoking	  will	   not	   rely	  on	  an	  external	   stop	   signal,	  but	   rather	  on	   their	  
internal	  willpower	  in	  order	  to	  resist	  the	  temptation	  to	  light	  a	  cigarette	  (Muraven,	  2010).	  
More	  recent	  studies	  have	  begun	  to	  address	   this	   issue	  by	  adding	  a	  choice	  condition	   in	  
which	   participants	   freely	   choose	   between	  performing	   or	  withholding	   a	   response	   (see	  
Filevich	  et	  al.,	  2012	  for	  a	  review).	  These	  studies	  have	  revealed	  a	  distinct	  cortical	  basis	  
for	  endogenous2	  inhibition	  in	  the	  dorsal	  fronto-­‐median	  cortex	  (dFMC;	  Brass	  &	  Haggard,	  
2007;	   2008;	   Kühn,	   Haggard,	  &	   Brass,	   2009).	   In	   their	   ‘What-­‐When-­‐Whether’	  model	   of	  
intentional	   action,	  Brass	  &	  Haggard	   (2008)	  proposed	   that	   the	  dFMC	  may	   constitute	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  We	  use	  the	  term	  ‘endogenous’	  synonymously	  with	  ‘voluntary’	  and	  ‘intentional’	  to	  denote	  an	  internal	  
locus	  of	  the	  decision	  to	  perform	  or	  withhold	  an	  action.	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‘veto	  area’	  serving	  a	  final	  decision	  as	  to	  whether	  or	  not	  to	  execute	  an	  already	  prepared	  
action	   plan,	   making	   this	   brain	   region	   essential	   for	   the	   exertion	   of	   self-­‐control.	  
Converging	  evidence	  suggests	   that	   these	  “veto”	  signals	  might	  be	   implemented	  by	   the	  
preSMA,	   which	   has	   been	   shown	   to	   be	   functionally	   connected	   with	   the	   dFMC	   during	  
intentional	  inhibition	  (Kühn	  et	  al.,	  2009;	  2013)	  and	  also	  plays	  a	  pivotal	  role	  in	  externally-­‐
guided	  response	  inhibition,	  presumably	  via	  direct	  and	  indirect	  projections	  to	  the	  motor	  
cortex	  (Cai	  et	  al.,	  2012;	  Nachev,	  Kennard,	  &	  Husain,	  2012;	  Swann	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  	  	  
However,	  although	  these	  studies	  were	  able	  to	  extend	  the	  scope	  of	  prior	  studies	  
involving	   purely	   externally-­‐guided	   response	   inhibition,	   the	   paradigms	   have	   thus	   far	  
employed	   relatively	   artificial	   experimental	   settings,	   lending	   participants	   little	   prior	  
motivation	  to	  act	  or	  inhibit.	  Decisions	  were	  thus	  based	  on	  rather	  arbitrary	  choices	  and	  
arguably	  might	  not	  have	   required	  genuine	   self-­‐control.	   	   It	   therefore	   remains	  an	  open	  
question	   whether	   the	   distinction	   between	   externally	   triggered	   and	   intentional	  
inhibition	   is	   also	   valid	   in	   situations	  where	  a	   very	   strong	   response	   tendency	  has	   to	  be	  
inhibited.	  One	   can	  argue	   that	   in	   such	   situations	   strong	   intentional	   control	   is	   required	  
regardless	  of	  whether	  one	  decides	  to	  inhibit	  or	  is	  externally	  cued.	  	  In	  the	  present	  study,	  
we	   sought	   to	   address	   this	   question	   and	   examine	   the	   neural	   basis	   of	   intentional	  
inhibition	   in	   a	   more	   ecologically-­‐valid	   setting	   that	   recruits	   ‘hot’	   incentive	   response	  
systems	   (Metcalfe	   &	   Mischel,	   1999).	   Pain	   was	   selected	   as	   the	   behaviorally	   relevant	  
stimulus	   for	   our	   purposes,	   as	   the	   organism	   is	   strongly	   motivated	   to	   avoid	   the	   pain	  
sensation	   (Campbell	   &	   Misanin,	   1969;	   Elliot,	   2006).	   Moreover,	   despite	   its	   strong	  
prepotency,	  the	  pain	  avoidance	  response	  can	  at	  times	  be	  voluntarily	  suppressed	  when	  
higher-­‐order	  goals	  call	  for	  such	  behavior	  (cf.	  Morsella,	  2005).	  Accordingly,	  management	  
of	  the	  pain	  avoidance	  response	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  classical	   instance	  of	  self-­‐control	  over	  
one’s	   basic	   drives.	   In	   the	   present	   study,	   participants	   received	   thermal	   stimulation	   to	  
alternating	   inner	   wrists,	   and	   were	   required	   to	   occasionally	   withhold	   their	   natural	  
impulse	  to	  withdraw	  from	  the	  compelling	  pain	  sensation	  at	  peak	  temperature,	  in	  both	  
instructed	  and	  free-­‐choice	  conditions.	  	  This	  allowed	  us	  to	  investigate	  the	  neural	  basis	  of	  
endogenous	  and	  exogenous	  inhibition	  of	  behavior	  under	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  strong	  urge	  
to	  act.	  Based	  on	  the	  aforementioned	  findings,	  we	  expected	  the	  dFMC	  to	  be	  involved	  in	  
endogenous	  inhibition,	  and	  the	  rIFC	  in	  exogenous	  inhibition.	  	  In	  addition,	  we	  wanted	  to	  




involved	   in	   these	   two	   forms	   of	   inhibition	   still	   holds	   under	   motivationally	   salient	  
conditions.	  	  
	  
METHODS	  AND	  MATERIALS	  
Participants	  
Twenty-­‐one	  native	  Dutch	  speakers	  (7	  males)	  participated	  in	  the	  study	  (mean	  age	  
=	  22.2	   years,	   SD	  =	  3.6);	   each	   reported	  as	  healthy	   and	  had	  no	  history	  of	   neurological,	  
pain,	   or	   circulatory	   disorders.	   The	   data	   from	   the	   second	   run	   of	   participant	   6	   were	  
excluded	  prior	  to	  analysis	  due	  to	  excessive	  head	  movements	  (>	  5	  mm).	  All	  participants	  
gave	   written	   informed	   consent,	   and	   the	   study	   was	   approved	   by	   the	  Medical	   Ethical	  
Review	  Board	  of	   the	  Ghent	  University	  hospital,	   in	   accordance	  with	   the	  declaration	  of	  
Helsinki.	   	   Participants	   were	   right-­‐handed,	   as	   assessed	   by	   the	   Edinburgh	   Inventory	  
(Oldfield,	  1971),	  and	  were	  compensated	  thirty-­‐five	  euros	  for	  their	  participation.	  	  	  
	  
Experimental	  Procedure	  
Pain	   tolerance	   threshold	   determination.	   Pain	   was	   induced	   via	   a	   thermode	  
connected	  to	  a	  Medoc	  PATHWAY	  device	  (MEDOC,	  Haifa,	  Israel),	  an	  apparatus	  designed	  
for	   the	   induction	   of	   thermal	   pain	   using	   cold	   or	   hot	   stimulation.	   The	   temperature	   at	  
which	   participants	   felt	   a	   sufficient	   amount	   of	   pain	  was	   determined	   during	   a	   pre-­‐test	  
session	  taking	  place	  one	  week	  prior	  to	  scanning.	  Participants	  were	  exposed	  to	  26	  trials	  
in	  which	   the	   thermal	   sensation	   gradually	   increased	   over	   five	   seconds	   from	  32°C	   to	   a	  
randomized	   destination	   temperature	   between	   45	   and	   50°C	   (in	   increments	   of	   .25	  
degrees),	  a	  slope	  comparable	  to	  the	  experimental	  trials.	  After	  each	  trial,	  the	  thermode	  
returned	   instantly	   to	  baseline	   temperature,	   and	  participants	  were	  asked	   to	   rate	   their	  
perceived	  pain	  on	  a	  scale	  from	  zero	  to	  eight,	  with	  zero	  being	  no	  pain	  and	  eight	  being	  
the	  worst	  possible	  pain.	  The	  destination	  temperature	  employed	  in	  the	  main	  experiment	  
was	  computed	  for	  each	  participant	  as	  the	  highest	  temperature	  at	  which	  they	  rated	  their	  
pain	   as	   a	   six3.	   This	   method	   was	   revealed	   during	   piloting	   to	   yield	   more	   accurate	  
tolerance	   threshold	  measurements	   than	  merely	   requiring	   participants	   to	   indicate	   the	  
maximum	   heat	   they	   could	   withstand	   when	   exposed	   to	   a	   steadily	   increasing	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  This	  temperature	  is	  henceforth	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  individual	  participant’s	  tolerance	  threshold.	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temperature.	  Importantly,	  participants	  were	  free	  to	  press	  a	  button	  at	  any	  point	  during	  
the	  threshold	  determination	  in	  order	  to	  terminate	  the	  trial.	  
Task	   and	   stimuli.	   Participants	   received	   thermal	   pain	   stimulation	   during	   each	  
trial,	  applied	  via	  a	  thermode	  to	  alternating	  inner	  wrists.	  The	  images	  of	  three	  geometric	  
shapes	  (triangle,	  square,	  circle)	  were	  used	  as	  cues	  to	  indicate	  the	  trial	  type.	  Depending	  
on	   the	   cue,	   participants	   were	   requested	   to	   select	   one	   of	   the	   following	   response	  
options:	  press	  the	  button	  as	  quickly	  as	  possible	  in	  order	  to	  terminate	  the	  trial	  (‘directed	  
action,’	  25%	  of	  trials),	   inhibit	   this	  response	  and	  endure	  the	  pain	  for	  an	  additional	  two	  
seconds	   (‘directed	   inhibition,’	   25%	   of	   trials),	   or	   make	   a	   voluntary	   decision	   to	   either	  
button	  press	  immediately	  or	  persist	  (‘choice	  action’	  and	  ‘choice	  inhibition,’	  respectively,	  
combined	   equaling	   50%	   of	   trials).	   In	   the	   latter	   case,	   participants	   were	   requested	   to	  
choose	   both	   options	   approximately	   equally	   often	  over	   the	   course	   of	   the	   experiment,	  
but	  not	  to	  use	  any	  particular	  strategies	  (e.g.,	  simple	  response	  alternations),	  or	  to	  decide	  
in	   advance	   of	   the	   presentation	   of	   the	   cue.	   Adherence	   to	   these	   instructions	   was	  
subsequently	  assessed	  by	  calculating	  each	  participant’s	  Random	  Number	  Generation	  2	  
(RNG2;	   an	   index	   optimized	   for	   two-­‐choice	   response	   sequences)	   score	   using	   the	  
program	  RgCalc	  (Towse	  &	  Neil,	  1998).	  RNG2	  scores	  range	  from	  0	  to	  1,	  with	  1	  indicating	  
complete	   sequence	   predictability.	   A	   pilot	   study	   had	   revealed	   that	   participants	   are	  
typically	   around	   200	   ms	   slower	   to	   respond	   on	   choice	   action	   trials	   than	   on	   directed	  
action	  trials,	  presumably	  reflecting	  the	  additional	  time	  needed	  for	  the	  decision	  process.	  
Accordingly,	  to	  make	  stimulation	  as	  similar	  as	  possible	  across	  action	  conditions,	  200	  ms	  
of	  thermal	  stimulation	  was	  added	  to	  directed	  action	  trials,	  following	  the	  button	  press.	  	  
Each	  trial	  began	  with	  the	  presentation	  of	  a	  fixation	  cross	  for	  five	  seconds,	  during	  
which	   time	   the	   temperature	   of	   the	   thermode	   began	   to	   gradually	   increase	   from	   a	  
baseline	   of	   32°C	   to	   the	   participant’s	   individually	   determined	   tolerance	   threshold.	  
Subsequently,	  one	  of	   the	   three	   task	  cues	  appeared	   in	  place	  of	   the	   fixation	  cross,	  and	  
persisted	   for	   the	   remainder	   of	   the	   pain	   stimulation.	   The	   temperature	   remained	   at	  
tolerance	   threshold	   for	   the	   next	   two	   seconds,	   or	   until	   the	   participant	   pressed	   the	  
button	   to	   terminate	   both	   the	   pain	   stimulation	   and	   the	   trial.	   	   Participants	   responded	  
with	   the	   index	  or	  middle	   finger	  of	   the	  arm	  not	  being	   stimulated	   (thereby	  providing	  a	  
response	   time	   for	   action	   trials).	   	   This	   was	   followed	   by	   a	   six	   second	   rest	   period.	  	  




verbal	   ratings	   (collected	  via	  a	  microphone	   inside	   the	  scanner	  bore)	  of	   their	  perceived	  
pain	  and	  their	  subjective	  ‘urge	  to	  terminate	  the	  trial	  by	  pressing	  the	  button’	  (both	  on	  a	  
scale	   of	   0	   –	   8).	   Participants	   were	   then	   cued	   to	   alternate	   the	   arm	   placed	   atop	   the	  
thermode,	   and	   were	   given	   10	   seconds	   in	   which	   to	   accomplish	   this	   task	   with	   the	  
assistance	  of	  an	  experimenter	  who	  stood	  near	  the	  scanner	  bore.	  The	  experimenter	  also	  
placed	   a	   small	   sandbag	   over	   the	   to-­‐be	   stimulated	   wrist	   in	   order	   to	   lend	   weight	   and	  
prevent	   the	   participant	   from	   inadvertently	   withdrawing	   from	   the	   pain	   source	   rather	  
than	   button	   pressing.	   	   Each	   trial	   ended	   with	   an	   additional	   six-­‐second	   rest	   period.	   A	  
schematic	  overview	  of	  a	  possible	  trial	   in	  the	  choice	  condition	  is	  presented	  in	  Figure	  1.	  
The	  assignment	  of	  geometric	  shapes	  to	  trial	  types	  was	  counterbalanced	  across	  subjects.	  
Each	   participant	   had	   to	   perform	   eighty	   trials	   in	   total,	   being	   divided	   into	   two	   runs	   of	  
forty	   trials	   presented	   in	   randomized	   sequence.	   In	   each	   run,	   participants	   were	   given	  
twenty	  trials	  in	  which	  they	  were	  cued	  to	  make	  a	  decision,	  ten	  trials	  in	  which	  they	  were	  
cued	   to	   push	   and	   ten	   trials	   in	   which	   they	   were	   cued	   to	   inhibit	   their	   withdrawal	  
response.	   Importantly,	   participants	   were	   free	   to	   press	   a	   button	   to	   immediately	  
terminate	  the	  thermal	  sensation	  at	  any	  point	  during	  the	  experiment.	  
	  
	  
Figure	  1.	  Schematic	  of	  a	  sample	  trial	  in	  the	  choice	  condition	  
VOLUNTARY	  INHIBITION	  OF	  PAIN	  AVOIDANCE	  BEHAVIOR	  
41	  
	  
Behavioral	  data	  preparation	  	  	  
Errors	  in	  the	  form	  of	  responding	  on	  a	  directed	  inhibition	  trial	  led	  to	  the	  exclusion	  
of	  0.77%	  of	  trials	  (13	  out	  of	  1680	  total	  trials;	  number	  of	  excluded	  trials	  per	  participant:	  
M	  =	  0.62,	  SD	  =	  0.92)	  from	  both	  behavioral	  and	  fMRI	  analysis.	  No	  errors	  were	  committed	  
via	  failing	  to	  press	  the	  response	  button	  on	  a	  directed	  press	  trial.	  Pain	  and	  urge	  ratings	  
were	   analyzed	   using	   a	   repeated-­‐measures	   ANOVA	   with	   INSTRUCTION	   (directed	   vs.	  
choice)	  and	  RESPONSE	  (action	  vs.	   inhibition)	  as	  within-­‐subjects	  factors.	  Reaction	  times	  
on	   action	   trials	   were	   analyzed	   as	   a	   function	   of	   INSTRUCTION	   via	   two-­‐tailed	   paired-­‐
samples	  t-­‐tests.	  
	  
fMRI	  data	  acquisition	  and	  preprocessing	  
Data	   were	   acquired	   with	   a	   3T	   Siemens	  Magnetom	   Trio	  MRI	   system	   (Siemens	  
Medical	   Systems,	   Erlangen,	   Germany)	   using	   a	   32-­‐channel	   radiofrequency	   head	   coil.	  
Subjects	   were	   positioned	   headfirst	   and	   supine	   in	   the	   magnet	   bore.	   First,	   176	   high-­‐
resolution	  anatomical	  images	  were	  acquired	  using	  a	  T1-­‐weighted	  3D	  MPRAGE	  sequence	  
(TR	  =	  2,250	  ms,	  TE	  =	  4.18	  ms,	  TI	  =	  900	  ms,	  image	  matrix	  =	  256	  x	  256,	  FOV	  =	  256	  mm,	  flip	  
angle	  =	  9°,	  and	  voxel	  size	  =	  1	  x	  1	  x	  1	  mm).	  Whole-­‐brain	  functional	  images	  were	  then	  col-­‐
lected	   using	   a	   T2-­‐weighted	   echo-­‐planar	   imaging	   (EPI)	   sequence,	   sensitive	   to	   blood-­‐
oxygen-­‐level	  dependent	  contrast	   (TR	  =	  2,000	  ms,	  TE	  =	  35	  ms,	   image	  matrix	  =	  64	  x	  64,	  
FOV	  =	  224	  mm,	  flip	  angle	  =	  80°,	  slice	  thickness	  =	  3.0	  mm,	  distance	  factor	  =	  17%,	  voxel	  
size	  3.5	  x	  3.5	  x	  3.0	  mm,	  and	  30	  axial	  slices).	  A	  varying	  number	  of	  images	  were	  acquired	  
per	  run	  due	  to	  individual	  differences	  in	  choice	  behavior	  and	  reaction	  times.	  
All	  data	  were	  preprocessed	  and	  analyzed	  using	  Matlab	  and	  the	  SPM8	  software	  
(Wellcome	  Department	  of	  Cognitive	  Neurology,	  London,	  UK).	  To	  account	  for	  possible	  T1	  
relaxation	   effects,	   the	   first	   four	   scans	   of	   each	   EPI	   series	   were	   excluded	   from	   the	  
analysis.	   First,	   a	   mean	   image	   for	   all	   scan	   volumes	   was	   created,	   to	   which	   individual	  
volumes	  were	  spatially	  realigned	  using	  rigid	  body	  transformation.	  Thereafter,	  they	  were	  
slice	   time	   corrected	   using	   the	   first	   slice	   as	   a	   reference.	   The	   structural	   image	   of	   each	  
subject	  was	   coregistered	  with	   their	  mean	   functional	   image	   after	  which	   all	   functional	  
images	   were	   normalized	   to	   the	   Montreal	   Neurological	   Institute	   (Montreal,	   Quebec,	  
Canada)	  T1	   template.	  The	   images	  were	  resampled	   into	  3.5	  x	  3.5	  x	  3.5	  mm
	  
voxels	  and	  




high-­‐pass	  filter	  of	  128	  Hz	  was	  applied	  during	  fMRI	  data	  analysis.	  
	  
Statistical	  analyses	  
The	  first-­‐level	  statistical	  analyses	  were	  performed	  using	  a	  general	   linear	  model	  
(GLM,	  Friston	  et	  al.,	  1995).	   	  Of	  primary	  interest	  were	  the	  brain	  regions	  involved	  in	  the	  
implementation	   of	   intentional	   inhibition,	   or	   the	   decision	   to	   intentionally	   inhibit.	   	  We	  
therefore	  used	  the	  onset	  of	  the	  task	  cue	  as	  the	  main	  event	  of	  interest	  in	  the	  GLM.	  	  It	  is	  
important	   to	   note	   that	   all	   trials	   were	   identical	   in	   terms	   of	   stimulation	   up	   to	   and	  
including	  cue	  onset,	  and	  for	  an	  average	  of	  750	  ms	  afterwards	  (i.e.,	  average	  time	  it	  took	  
to	  respond	  in	  action	  trials).	  Based	  on	  the	  factorial	  design,	  four	  regressors	  were	  defined	  
reflecting	   the	   experimental	   conditions	   (‘directed	   action,’	   ‘directed	   inhibition,’	   ‘choice	  
action,’	  and	  ‘choice	   inhibition’).	   	  Temporal	  derivatives	  of	  these	  regressors	  were	  added	  
to	   the	   model,	   and	   six	   additional	   regressors	   defining	   head	   movements	   were	   also	  
included	   to	   account	   for	   any	   residual	   movement-­‐related	   effects.	   All	   regressors	   were	  
convolved	   with	   a	   canonical	   hemodynamic	   response	   function	   (HRF).	   Contrast	   images	  
were	  computed	  separately	  for	  each	  participant	  to	  compare	  parameter	  estimates	  of	  the	  
relevant	  conditions.	  	  	  
These	   contrast	   images	   were	   advanced	   to	   the	   second	   level,	   using	   a	   random-­‐
effects	   within-­‐subject	   flexible-­‐factorial	   design	   as	   implemented	   in	   SPM8	   with	   factors	  
INSTRUCTION	   (directed	   vs.	   choice)	   and	   RESPONSE	   (action	   vs.	   inhibition).	   First,	   we	  
examined	   the	  main	  effects	   to	   reveal	  brain	  areas	   that	  are	   (i)	  more	  active	  on	   inhibition	  
trials	  than	  on	  action	  trials,	  and	  (ii)	  more	  active	  on	  choice	  trials	  than	  on	  directed	  trials.	  In	  
a	   second	   step,	   we	   directly	   contrasted	   intentional	   inhibition	   with	   externally	   guided	  
inhibition	  to	  reveal	  the	  brain	  areas	  that	  are	  specifically	  engaged	  in	  the	  internal	  decision	  
to	   inhibit	   the	   pain	   avoidance	   response.	   To	   control	   for	   false-­‐positive	   rates,	   combined	  
voxel	   activation	   intensity	   and	   cluster	   extent	   thresholds	   corrected	   for	   multiple	  
comparisons	   were	   determined	   using	   3dClustSim	  
(http://afni.nimh.nih.gov/pub/dist/doc/program_help/3dClustSim.html).	   This	   widely	  
used	  correction	  method	  is	  applied	  to	  statistical	  contrast	  images	  at	  the	  group	  level	  and	  
estimates	  the	  probability	  of	  observing	  false	  positive	  (random	  fields	  of	  noise)	  clusters	  of	  
a	   given	   size,	   as	   a	   function	   of	   a	   given	   voxelwise	   p	   value.	   The	   3dClustSim	   program	  
considers	  the	  size	  of	  the	  image	  (number	  of	  voxels),	  the	  voxelwise	  statistical	  values,	  and	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the	   spatial	   correlations	   over	   voxels	   (spatial	   smoothness)	   and	   runs	   a	   user-­‐specified	  
number	  of	  Monte	  Carlo	  simulations	  to	  generate	  an	  appropriate	  null-­‐distribution.	  Here,	  
ten	   thousand	  Monte	  Carlo	   simulations	  were	   run,	   taking	   into	  account	   the	  whole-­‐brain	  
search	  volume	  and	  the	  estimated	  smoothness	  of	  each	  axis	  (x,	  y,	  and	  z)	  of	  the	  respective	  
group	   SPMs.	   Probability	   estimates	   of	   a	   random	   field	   of	   noise	   were	   generated,	  
producing	  a	  cluster	  of	  voxels	  of	  a	  given	  extent	  for	  a	  set	  of	  voxels	  passing	  a	  voxelwise	  p	  
value	   threshold	  of	  0.001.	   	  Given	  this	  voxelwise	   threshold,	   the	  simulations	  determined	  
that	   cluster	   sizes	   of	   20.0	   –	   23.5	   voxels,	   depending	   on	   the	   specific	   contrast	   analysis,	  
corresponded	   to	   a	   combined	   threshold	   of	  p	   <	   0.05	   (corrected).	  Whole-­‐brain	   analyses	  
were	  supplemented	  with	  region-­‐of-­‐interest	   (ROI)	  analyses.	  ROIs	  were	  generated	  using	  




Proportion	   of	   choices.	   For	   choice	   trials,	   participants	   were	   able	   to	   follow	   the	  
instruction	   to	   choose	   both	   options	   equally	   often,	   and	   inhibited	   their	   response	   on	  
average	  in	  49.9%	  of	  the	  trials	  (Range	  =	  37.5%	  -­‐	  65%;	  SD	  =	  7.3%).	  
Randomness	  of	  choice	  response	  sequences.	  Participants	  displayed	  a	  mean	  RNG2	  
index	  of	  0.724	  (SD	  =	   .008).	   	   Individual	  scores	  were	  compared	  to	  twenty-­‐one	  randomly	  
generated	   sets	  of	   two-­‐choice	   response	   sequences	   (RNG2	  M	   =	  0.723,	  SD	   =	   .007)	   in	  an	  
independent	   samples	   t-­‐test.	   	   Participants’	   choice	   trial	   responses	   did	   not	   differ	  
significantly	   from	  the	  randomly	  generated	  samples	  [t(40)	  =	   .376,	  p	  =	   .709],	  suggesting	  
that	   they	   did	   not	   use	   simple	   alternation	   strategies	   as	   a	  means	   of	   conforming	   to	   the	  
experimental	  instructions.	  
Subjective	   pain	   ratings.	   The	   analysis	   of	   pain	   ratings	   revealed	   main	   effects	   of	  
INSTRUCTION	  [F(1,20)	  =	  7.205,	  p	  =	  .014,	  ηp	  =	  .265]	  and	  RESPONSE	  [F(1,20)	  =	  43.479,	  p	  <	  
.001,	  ηp	  =	  .685]	  as	  well	  as	  a	  significant	  interaction	  [F(1,20)	  =	  5.591,	  p	  =	  .028,	  ηp	  =	  .218].	  	  
Participants	  rated	  inhibit	  trials	  as	  more	  painful	  than	  action	  trials	  (presumably	  due	  to	  the	  
greater	   stimulation	   duration),	   with	   directed	   inhibit	   trials	   receiving	   the	   highest	   pain	  
ratings	   (Directed	   Action:	  M	   =	   4.24,	   SE	   =	   0.25;	   Choice	   Action:	  M	   =	   4.28,	   SE	   =	   0.25;	  




hoc	  t-­‐test	  revealed	  that	  pain	  ratings	  do	  not	  differ	  between	  directed	  action	  and	  choice	  
action	  trials,	  t(20)	  =	  .217,	  p	  =	  .831.	  
Subjective	   urge	   ratings.	   The	   analysis	   of	   urge	   ratings	   revealed	   a	   significant	  
interaction	  of	  INSTRUCTION	  and	  RESPONSE	  [F(1,20)	  =	  7.194,	  p	  =	  .014,	  ηp	  =	  .265],	  driven	  
by	   the	   choice	   condition	   and	   reflecting	   that	   participants	   experienced	   similar	   urges	   on	  
directed	   trials,	   but	   when	   given	   a	   choice,	   their	   urges	   were	   concordant	   with	   their	  
decisions	  (i.e.,	  a	  higher	  urge	  to	  press	  on	  action	  trials).	  No	  main	  effects	  were	  significant	  
(Directed	   Action:	  M	   =	   4.00,	   SE	   =	   0.34;	   Choice	   Action:	  M	   =	   4.23,	   SE	   =	   0.34;	   Directed	  
Inhibition:	  M	  =	  3.78,	  SE	  =	  0.33;	  Choice	  Inhibition:	  M	  =	  3.24,	  SE	  =	  0.24).	  	  
Objective	   thermal	   stimulation.	  Due	   to	   the	   constraints	  of	   the	  Medoc	   software,	  
some	  slight	  variation	  in	  thermode	  temperature	  is	  inherent	  throughout	  the	  course	  of	  the	  
experiment	  (see	  Figure	  2),	  yet	  participants	  did	  not	  appear	  to	  use	  either	  temperature	  at	  
cue	  onset	  or	  peak	  temperature	  (typically	  occurring	  100	  ms	  after	  cue	  onset)	  as	  factors	  in	  
their	   decision	   to	  press	  or	   inhibit.	   	  Mean	   thermode	   temperatures	  were	   computed	  per	  
participant	  at	  both	  cue	  onset	  and	  thermal	  peak	  for	  each	  of	  the	  choice	  conditions.	  	  Two-­‐
tailed	  paired-­‐samples	  t-­‐tests	  revealed	  that	  mean	  temperature	  at	  onset	  and	  peak	  did	  not	  
differ	   significantly	   between	   choice	   inhibit	   and	   press	   trials,	   t(20)	   =	   .037,	  p	   =	   .971	   and	  
t(20)	  =	  .142,	  p	  =	  .889	  respectively.	  	  Grand	  mean	  onset	  temperature	  was	  49.23	  degrees	  
Celsius	  (SD	  =	  0.45),	  while	  grand	  mean	  peak	  temperature	  was	  50.00	  degrees	  Celsius	  (SD	  
=	  0.47).	  Participants’	  tolerance	  thresholds	  did	  not	  correlate	  with	  reaction	  times,	  mean	  
reported	  pain,	  or	  proportion	  of	  inhibition	  on	  choice	  trials	  (all	  ps	  >	  .169).	  
Reaction	  times.	  As	  expected,	  response	  times	  were	  significantly	  slower	  on	  choice	  
trials	  than	  on	  directed	  trials,	  t(20)	  =	  6.68,	  p	  <.001	  (directed	  =	  597	  ms,	  choice	  =	  903	  ms),	  
suggesting	  that	  participants	  did	  not	  make	  their	  decisions	  in	  advance	  of	  the	  cue.	  
	  




Figure	   2.	   Composite	   of	   all	   80	   trials	   for	   an	   exemplar	   participant,	   representing	   actual	  
stimulation	  temperatures.	  Note	  each	  trial	  is	  displayed	  in	  a	  distinct	  color	  and	  the	  overlap	  of	  the	  
slope	  indicates	  equivalent	  stimulation	  across	  experimental	  trials.	  
	  
fMRI	  results	  
Whole-­‐brain	  analyses.	  We	  first	  analyzed	  the	  main	  effect	  of	  RESPONSE	  to	  reveal	  
the	  brain	  areas	  that	  exhibit	  stronger	  activation	  on	  inhibition	  trials	  than	  on	  action	  trials	  
(see	   Figure	   3).	   As	   expected,	   activity	  was	   found	  within	   the	   right	   inferior	   frontal	   gyrus	  
(rIFG)	   extending	   into	   the	   adjacent	   insular	   cortex.	   The	   location	   was	   similar	   to	   that	  
observed	   in	   previous	   studies	   investigating	   externally	   guided	   inhibition	   (e.g.,	   Aron	   &	  
Poldrack,	   2006;	   MNI	   x,	   y,	   z	   =	   44	   12	   8).	   Another	   cluster	   was	   located	   in	   the	   anterior	  
medial	  PFC	  (amPFC),	  encompassing	  the	  dFMC	  coordinates	  reported	  in	  previous	  studies	  
on	   intentional	   inhibition	   (Brass	   &	   Haggard,	   2007;	   Kühn	   et	   al.,	   2009).	   Two	   additional	  
clusters	  were	  located	  in	  the	  ventral	  part	  of	  the	  anterior	  supplementary	  motor	  area	  (pre-­‐
SMA)	  and	  the	  right	   inferior	  parietal	   lobule	  (IPL),	  both	  areas	  that	  have	  previously	  been	  
implicated	   in	   intentional	   and	   externally-­‐guided	   action	   inhibition	   (e.g.,	   Filevich	   et	   al.,	  




order	   to	   identify	  brain	   regions	   that	   show	   increased	  activity	  on	  choice	   trials	   compared	  
with	  directed	  trials	   (Figure	  3).	  Activity	  was	  found	   in	  the	  medial	   frontal	  wall,	  extending	  
from	   the	   pre-­‐SMA	   and	   with	   the	   majority	   of	   activation	   located	   within	   the	   rostral	  
cingulate	  zone	  (RCZ),	  bilaterally	  in	  the	  dorsolateral	  prefrontal	  cortex	  (dlPFC),	  and	  in	  the	  
right	   IPL.	   This	   is	   in	   accordance	   with	   previous	   descriptions	   of	   a	   frontoparietal	   ‘choice	  
network’	  engaged	  in	  internal	  action	  decisions	  (e.g.,	  Haggard,	  2008;	  Mueller	  et	  al.,	  2007).	  	  
Finally,	   we	   contrasted	   ‘choice	   inhibition’	   trials	   with	   ‘directed	   inhibition’	   trials	   to	  
examine	  which	  brain	  areas	  are	  specifically	  involved	  in	  intentional	  (vs.	  externally-­‐guided)	  
inhibition.	  This	  analysis	  revealed	  a	  single	  cluster	  of	  activity	  in	  the	  right	  dorsal	  pre-­‐SMA.	  	  
The	   reverse	   contrast	   (directed	  versus	   choice	   inhibition)	   yielded	  no	   significant	   activity.	  




Figure	  3.	  Activation	  maps	  of	  the	  whole-­‐brain	  contrasts,	  comparing	  a)	  inhibition	  versus	  action;	  
b)	   choice	   inhibition	   versus	   instructed	   inhibition;	   and	   c)	   choice	   versus	   instructed	   trials.	   Note	  
activation	  maps	  were	  thresholded	  at	  p	  <	  .001	  (uncorrected),	  with	  a	  minimum	  cluster	  size	  of	  22	  
contiguous	  voxels	  (see	  Methods	  section	  for	  details).	  








Overview	  of	  activation	  clusters	  revealed	  by	  the	  whole-­‐brain	  analyses.	  Montreal	  
Neurological	  Institute	  (MNI)	  coordinates	  reflect	  the	  peak	  voxel	  of	  a	  given	  cluster.	  
	  
	  
Region	  	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Voxels	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  MNI	  coordinates	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Tmax	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  x	   	  	  	  	  	  	  y	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  z	  
Main	  effect	  inhibition:	  inhibit	  >	  press	  
Right	  inferior	  frontal	  gyrus	   	   127	   	  	  	  	  	  41	   	  	  	  	  	  24	   	  	  	  	  	  6	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5.26	  
	   Anterior	  insula	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  38	   	  	  	  	  	  10	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4.33	  
Anterior	  median	  prefrontal	  cortex	   77	   	  	  	  	  	  10	   	  	  	  	  	  46	   	  	  	  	  	  10	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4.50	  
Inferior	  parietal	  lobule	   	   	   26	   	  	  	  	  	  52	   	  	  	  	  	  -­‐32	   	  	  	  	  	  30	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4.08	  
Pre-­‐supplementary	  motor	  area	   	   28	   	  	  	  	  	  10	   	  	  	  	  	  4	   	  	  	  	  	  48	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4.00	  
	  
Main	  effect	  choice:	  choice	  >	  directed	  
Pre-­‐supplementary	  motor	  area	   	   500	   	  	  	  	  	  16	   	  	  	  	  18	   	  	  	  	  	  66	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5.82	  
Rostral	  cingulate	  zone	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  -­‐4	   	  	  	  	  38	   	  	  	  	  	  34	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5.10	  
Rostral	  cingulate	  zone	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  6	   	  	  	  	  32	   	  	  	  	  	  30	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5.09	  
Left	  dlPFC	   	   	   	   	   77	   	  	  	  	  	  -­‐43	   	  	  	  	  10	   	  	  	  	  	  48	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5.53	  
Left	  inferior	  frontal	  gyrus	   	   	   67	   	  	  	  	  	  -­‐50	   	  	  	  	  24	   	  	  	  	  	  -­‐1	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4.69	  
Superior	  frontal	  gyrus	   	   	   23	   	  	  	  	  	  -­‐22	   	  	  	  	  60	   	  	  	  	  	  24	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3.69	  
Right	  dlPFC	  	   	   	   	   57	   	  	  	  	  	  44	   	  	  	  	  21	   	  	  	  	  	  48	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5.05	  
Inferior	  parietal	  lobule	   	   	   122	   	  	  	  	  	  55	   	  	  	  	  -­‐56	   	  	  	  	  	  38	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4.94	  
	  
Choice	  inhibit	  >	  directed	  inhibit	  
Pre-­‐supplementary	  motor	  area	   	   31	   	  	  	  	  	  16	   	  	  	  	  18	   	  	  	  	  	  66	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4.66	  
	  
Effect	  of	  pain	  level,	  median	  split:	  high	  pain	  >	  low	  pain	  
Anterior	  cingulate	  cortex	   	   	   41	   	  	  	  	  	  -­‐1	   	  	  	  	  10	   	  	  	  	  	  41	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3.85	  
Precentral	  gyrus	   	   	   	   28	   	  	  	  	  	  -­‐60	   	  	  	  	  -­‐4	   	  	  	  	  	  10	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4.54	  
	  
Main	  effect	  action:	  press	  >	  inhibit	  
Right	  motor	  cortex	   	   	   352	   	  	  	  	  	  48	   	  	  	  	  -­‐21	   	  	  	  	  	  62	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11.22	  








Region-­‐of-­‐interest	   (ROI)	   analyses.	   Based	   on	   the	   results	   of	   the	   whole-­‐brain	  
analysis,	  we	   conducted	   an	   additional	   series	   of	   ROI	   analyses.	   In	   the	   first	   set,	  we	  were	  
interested	  in	  further	  examining	  the	  role	  of	  the	  dFMC.	  Given	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  difference	  
in	  dFMC	  activity	  between	  the	  two	  inhibition	  conditions	  in	  the	  whole-­‐brain	  analysis,	  we	  
sought	   to	   test	   whether	   there	   was	   a	   sub-­‐threshold	   difference	   between	   inhibition	  
conditions	   that	   could	   not	   be	   detected	   in	   the	   whole-­‐brain	   contrast.	   To	   this	   end,	   we	  
generated	  a	  spherical	  ROI	  (radius	  =	  10	  mm,	  MNI	  peak	  -­‐7	  42	  21)	  centered	  on	  the	  peak	  
dFMC	   coordinate	   reported	   by	   Kühn	   et	   al.	   (2009)	   in	   order	   to	   provide	   an	   independent	  
non-­‐circular	   analysis	   (see	   Kriegeskorte	   et	   al.,	   2009).	   This	   analysis	   yielded	   a	   significant	  
main	  effect	  of	   INSTRUCTION,	  F(1,20)	  =	  9.663,	  p	  =	   .006,	  reflecting	   increased	  activity	  on	  
choice	   trials	   compared	  with	  directed	   trials.	  The	  effect	  of	  RESPONSE	  was	   significant	  as	  
well,	  F(1,20)	  =	  4.604,	  p	  =	  .044,	  indicating	  greater	  activation	  on	  inhibition	  trials	  than	  on	  
action	  trials4.	  Moreover,	  there	  was	  a	  significant	  interaction	  between	  the	  factors,	  F(1,20)	  
=	   4.554,	   p	   =	   .045	   (see	   Figure	   4).	   Post-­‐hoc	   comparisons	   revealed,	   however,	   that	   the	  
interaction	   was	   driven	   by	   increased	   activity	   on	   choice	   action	   trials	   compared	   with	  
directed	  action	  trials,	  t(20)	  =	  3.689,	  p	  =	  .001,	  whereas	  activity	  did	  not	  differ	  between	  the	  
two	   inhibition	  conditions,	   t(20)	  =	  1.000,	  p	   =	   .329.	   	  Altogether,	   the	  above	  ROI	  analysis	  
confirms	   that	   in	   the	   context	   of	   pain	   avoidance	   behavior,	   the	   dFMC	   showed	   reliable	  
activation	   related	   to	   behavioral	   inhibition,	   but	   did	   not	   furthermore	  depend	  upon	   the	  
level	  of	  instruction.	  	  
	  
Figure	  4.	  Results	  of	  the	  frontomedian	  ROI	  analysis.	  	  A	  spherical	  ROI	  (radius	  =	  10mm)	  was	  
centered	  at	  the	  peak	  dFMC	  coordinate	  (-­‐7	  42	  21)	  derived	  from	  the	  study	  of	  Kühn	  et	  al.	  (2009).	  
Values	  represent	  the	  mean	  percent	  signal	  change	  (beta	  values)	  and	  standard	  errors.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  A	  similar	  pattern	  of	  results	  was	  observed	  with	  a	  spherical	  ROI	  centered	  on	  the	  peak	  amPFC	  coordinate	  
derived	  from	  the	  present	  study.	  	  However,	  these	  results	  are	  not	  displayed	  here	  due	  to	  the	  non-­‐
independence	  of	  ROI	  selection	  and	  analysis.	  




The	  second	  set	  of	  ROI	  analyses	  elaborated	  on	  activity	  in	  the	  right	  insula,	  an	  area	  
that	  has	  been	  implicated	  in	  pain	  processing	  (e.g.,	  Ingvar,	  1999).	  In	  particular,	  we	  sought	  
to	  examine	  to	  what	  extent	  inhibition-­‐related	  activity	  in	  this	  region	  was	  in	  fact	  driven	  by	  
the	  demand	   to	   inhibit	   a	   response	   rather	   than	  merely	   a	   consequence	  of	   the	   lengthier	  
thermal	   stimulation	  on	   these	   trials,	   compared	  with	  press	   trials.	  With	   this	   in	  mind,	  we	  
performed	  two	  analyses.	   In	  a	   first	  step,	  we	  defined	  an	  ROI	  corresponding	  to	  the	  right	  
insula	  based	  on	  anatomical	  criteria	  drawn	  from	  the	  Anatomy	  toolbox	  for	  SPM	  (Eickhoff	  
et	  al.,	  2005).	  Thereafter,	  we	  computed	  each	  participant’s	  mean	  pain	  ratings	  separately	  
for	   each	   experimental	   condition	   and	   correlated	   these	   ratings	   with	   the	   respective	  
percent	   signal	   change	   within	   the	   ROI.	   	   Correlations	   were	   Bonferroni-­‐corrected	   for	  
multiple	  comparisons.	  If	  activity	  in	  the	  insula	  was	  driven	  by	  differences	  in	  the	  amount	  of	  
pain,	  then	   it	  should	  co-­‐vary	  with	  the	  subjective	  ratings	  regardless	  of	  the	  experimental	  
condition.	  	  Yet	  no	  such	  correlations	  were	  found	  between	  mean	  pain	  ratings	  and	  percent	  
signal	  change	  within	  any	  of	  the	  four	  conditions,	  ps	  >	  .240,	  suggesting	  that	  activity	  in	  the	  
insula	  was	  driven	  by	  the	  demand	  to	  inhibit	  a	  pain	  avoidance	  response	  and	  not	  by	  mere	  
differences	  in	  pain	  levels.	  	  
To	  further	  elaborate	  on	  this	  conclusion,	  we	  performed	  an	  additional	  whole-­‐brain	  
analysis	   contrasting	   high-­‐pain	   trials	   with	   low-­‐pain	   trials	   across	   all	   experimental	  
conditions,	  based	  on	  a	  median	  split	  of	  the	   individual	  pain	  ratings.	  This	  analysis	  should	  
reveal	   brain	   areas	   that	   are	   generally	   sensitive	   to	   the	   level	   of	   subjective	   pain,	  
irrespective	  of	  the	  experimental	  condition.	   Indeed,	  the	  anterior	  cingulate	  cortex	  (ACC,	  
MNI	   peak	   at	   -­‐1	   10	   41)	   and	   precentral	   gyrus	   (MNI	   peak	   at	   -­‐60	   -­‐4	   10)	   were	   the	   only	  
regions	   to	   exhibit	   stronger	   activity	   on	   high-­‐	   versus	   low-­‐pain	   trials;	   the	   ACC	   has	  
frequently	   been	   implicated	   in	   processing	   of	   pain	   (Rainville,	   Duncan,	   Price,	   Carrier,	   &	  
Bushnell,	  1997;	  Wager	  et	  al.,	  2004).	  In	  contrast,	  no	  difference	  was	  observed	  in	  the	  right	  
insula,	  confirming	  our	  conclusion	  that	  activity	  of	  this	  region	  was	  driven	  by	  the	  demand	  






Figure	  5.	  Main	  effect	  of	  high	  versus	   low	  pain,	  across	  conditions.	  Note	  activation	  maps	  were	  
thresholded	  at	  p	  <	   .001	  (uncorrected),	  with	  a	  minimum	  cluster	  size	  of	  22	  continguous	  voxels	  
(see	  Methods	  section	  for	  details).	  
	  
We	  conducted	  a	   third	   set	  of	  ROI	  analyses	   to	  address	   the	  post-­‐hoc	  question	  of	  
how	   inhibition	   in	   our	   paradigm	   should	   be	   characterized;	   does	   inhibition	   target	   the	  
response	  finger	  that	  can	  terminate	  the	  thermal	  stimulation	  via	  button	  press	  or	  instead	  
the	   stimulated	   hand	   (thereby	   maintaining	   the	   posture	   of	   the	   stimulated	   wrist	   and	  
avoiding	  withdrawal)?	   To	   answer	   this	   question,	  we	   first	   defined	   bilateral	   ROIs	   of	   the	  
motor	  hand	  area	  based	  on	  the	  main	  effect	  of	  action	  reported	  in	  Table	  1.	  	  Spherical	  ROIs	  
with	   a	   radius	   of	   10mm	   were	   defined	   over	   the	   peak	   left	   and	   right	   motor	   cortex	  
coordinates	   (left:	   -­‐46	   -­‐21	   62;	   right:	   48	   -­‐21	   62).	   Beta	   values	   were	   collapsed	   across	  
hemispheres	   (i.e.,	  a	   right	  hand	  response	  was	  coded	  as	   the	  stimulated	  hand	  and	  a	   left	  
hand	  response	  as	  the	  effector	  hand	  in	  the	  right	  hemisphere,	  while	  a	  left	  hand	  response	  
was	  coded	  as	  the	  stimulated	  hand	  and	  a	  right	  hand	  response	  as	  the	  effector	  hand	  in	  the	  
left	   hemisphere)	   and	   subjected	   to	   a	   repeated-­‐measures	   ANOVA	   with	   with	   factors	  
RESPONSE	   (Action	   vs.	   Inhibition)	   and	   HAND	   (Effector	   vs.	   Stimulated).	   This	   analysis	  
revealed	  a	  significant	  main	  effect	  of	  RESPONSE,	  F(1,	  20)	  =	  107.987,	  p	  <	  .001,	  reflecting	  
greater	  activity	  on	  action	  trials,	  a	  non-­‐significant	  main	  effect	  of	  HAND,	  F(1,	  20)	  =	  .335,	  p	  
=	   .569,	   and	   a	   significant	   interaction,	   F(1,	   20)	   =	   131.724,	   p	   <	   .001	   (see	   Figure	   6).	  We	  
conducted	  post-­‐hoc	  t-­‐tests	  between	  the	  effector	  hand	  and	  the	  stimulated	  hand	  on	  both	  
VOLUNTARY	  INHIBITION	  OF	  PAIN	  AVOIDANCE	  BEHAVIOR	  
51	  
	  
trial	  types	  to	  specify	  the	  interaction.	  	  As	  expected,	  on	  action	  trials	  activity	  was	  greater	  in	  
the	   effector	   hand	   than	   in	   the	   stimulated	   hand,	   t(20)	   =	   8.071,	   p	   <	   .001.	   Importantly,	  
however,	  on	  inhibition	  trials	  activity	  in	  the	  effector	  hand	  was	  reduced	  when	  compared	  
with	  the	  stimulated	  hand,	  t(20)	  =	  5.718,	  p	  <	  .001.	  Overall,	  activity	  did	  not	  differ	  between	  
action	   trials	   and	   inhibition	   trials	   in	   the	   stimulated	  hand,	   t(20)	  =	   .219,	  p	   =	   .829.	   These	  
results	   suggest	   that	   inhibition	   in	   our	   paradigm	   was	   directed	   only	   towards	   the	  
instrumental	   response	   that	   could	   terminate	   the	   pain	   indirectly	   via	   a	   button	   press,	  
rather	   than	   towards	   the	  “hard-­‐wired”	  withdrawal	   response	  of	   the	  stimulated	  hand.	   It	  
should	   be	   further	   noted	   that	   the	   weight	   of	   the	   sandbag	   placed	   over	   the	   stimulated	  
wrist	  would	  make	  the	  latter	  response	  option	  quite	  difficult.	  
	  
	  
Figure	  6.	  A)	  Motor	  cortex	  activation	  pattern	  for	  effector	  and	  stimulated	  hands.	  Values	  
represent	  the	  mean	  percent	  signal	  change	  (beta	  values)	  and	  standard	  errors.	  B)	  Activation	  
difference	  scores	  (press	  –	  inhibit)	  for	  each	  hand.	  C)	  Locations	  of	  the	  peak	  coordinates	  used	  to	  
draw	  motor	  cortex	  ROIs.	  
	  
DISCUSSION	  
The	  present	  study	  sought	  to	  investigate	  the	  neural	  basis	  of	  intentional	  inhibition	  




create	  an	  experimental	   setting	   that	   requires	  genuine	  self-­‐control	   in	  order	   to	  withhold	  
responding,	   representing	  a	  major	   step	   towards	  a	  more	  ecologically-­‐valid	   investigation	  
of	   the	   intentional	   inhibition	   of	   action.	   	   In	   this	   context,	   we	   observed	   brain	   activity	  
mirroring	   previous	   findings	   concerning	   both	   intentional	   and	   externally	   guided	  
inhibition.	  There	  was	  little	  overt	  difference	  between	  inhibition	  types,	  indicating	  that	  the	  
two	   forms	   of	   inhibition	   are	   more	   strongly	   linked	   under	   motivationally	   salient	  
conditions.	   Furthermore,	   inhibition	   seemed	   to	   be	   specifically	   directed	   towards	   the	  
effector	  implementing	  the	  instrumental	  response.	  Below	  we	  discuss	  the	  implications	  of	  
our	  findings	  for	  theories	  on	  the	  neural	  basis	  of	  action	  inhibition	  and	  self-­‐control.	  	  
	  
The	  role	  of	  the	  dFMC	  in	  self-­‐control	  	  
	   Our	  finding	  that	  the	  dFMC	  was	  activated	  more	  strongly	  for	  response	  omissions	  
than	  for	  response	  executions	  replicates	  a	  growing	  body	  of	  research	  that	  has	   indicated	  
the	  prominent	  role	  of	  this	  area	   in	  the	  withholding	  of	  actions	  (Filevich	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  As	  
our	  paradigm	  employed	  quite	  a	  different	  procedure	  than	  previous	  intentional	  inhibition	  
studies5,	  this	  finding	  strengthens	  the	  conclusion	  that	  the	  dFMC	  is	  in	  fact	  critical	  for	  the	  
voluntary	  cancellation	  of	  an	  action,	   independent	  of	  a	  particular	  experimental	  context.	  	  
Yet	   in	   contrast	   with	   previous	   studies,	   we	   found	   that	   the	   dFMC	   showed	   equivalent	  
activity	   for	   both	   intentional	   and	   externally-­‐guided	   inhibition.	   Given	   that	   the	   urge	   to	  
withdraw	  from	  a	  pain	  source	  is	  intrinsically	  very	  high,	  it	  seems	  plausible	  that	  the	  level	  of	  
instruction	  had	  a	  reduced	  impact	  upon	  the	  recruitment	  of	  self-­‐regulatory	  processes	   in	  
our	  paradigm.	  	  Rather,	  suppression	  of	  the	  pain	  avoidance	  urge	  might	  generally	  require	  a	  
high	   degree	   of	   self-­‐control,	   necessitating	   strong	   intentional	   engagement	   even	   under	  
externally-­‐guided	  instruction.	  	  
Interestingly,	   the	   dFMC	   activation	   in	   our	   study	   was	   located	   slightly	   more	  
rostrally	   than	   in	   previous	   inhibition	   studies,	   and	   was	   encompassed	   by	   parts	   of	   the	  
anterior	   medial	   PFC	   that	   have	   been	   implicated	   in	   self-­‐referential	   thought	   processes	  
(e.g.,	  Johnson	  et	  al.,	  2006;	  Mitchell	  et	  al.,	  2005).	   	  This	  could	  imply	  that	  the	  role	  of	  the	  
dFMC	   in	   intentional	   inhibition	   is	   more	   general	   than	   previously	   assumed.	   We	   have	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Previous	  studies	  employed	  either	  a	  modified	  version	  of	  the	  ‘Libet	  task’	  (Brass	  &	  Haggard,	  2007)	  in	  which	  
self-­‐paced	  button	  presses	   are	  occasionally	   omitted,	   or	   a	   ‘ramp	   task’	   (Kühn	  et	   al.,	   2009),	   also	   requiring	  
participants	  to	  occasionally	  withhold	  from	  responding.	  
VOLUNTARY	  INHIBITION	  OF	  PAIN	  AVOIDANCE	  BEHAVIOR	  
53	  
	  
recently	   proposed	   that	   its	   contribution	   should	   be	   characterized	   as	   general	  
disengagement	   from	   otherwise	   prepotent	   intentions,	   plans,	   and	   urges	   (Lynn,	  Muhle-­‐
Karbe,	  &	  Brass,	  2014)	  rather	  than	  as	  pure	  motor	  suppression.	  	  Cancelling	  an	  action	  that	  
has	   already	   been	   prepared	   is	   one	   such	   instance,	   requiring	   disengagement	   from	   the	  
motor	   intention	   (e.g.,	   Brass	   &	   Haggard,	   2007;	   Kühn	   et	   al.,	   2009).	   However,	   similar	  
activity	   has	   also	   been	   found	   when	   participants	   need	   to	   distance	   themselves	   from	  
negative	  emotions	  (Kühn	  et	  al.,	  2011)	  or	  cigarette	  cravings	  (Brody	  et	  al.,	  2007),	  and	  to	  
quit	  loss-­‐chasing	  (Campbell-­‐Meiklejohn	  et	  al.	  2008).	  In	  addition,	  the	  dFMC	  has	  also	  been	  
implicated	   in	   mentalizing,	   which	   is	   assumed	   to	   rely	   upon	   disengagement	   from	   the	  
otherwise	  dominant	  self-­‐perspective	   (e.g.,	  Brass,	  Derfuss,	  &	  von	  Cramon,	  2005;	  Brass,	  
Ruby,	  &	   Spengler,	   2009).	  We	   therefore	  believe	   that	   disengagement	  provides	   a	   useful	  
integrative	   concept	   for	  explaining	   the	  dFMC’s	   involvement	   in	   these	  diverse	   functions.	  
However,	  as	  this	  view	  is	  thus	  far	  based	  primarily	  on	  reverse	  inference,	  further	  research	  




	   The	  only	  region	  that	  exhibited	  stronger	  activity	  for	  intentional	  inhibition	  than	  for	  
externally-­‐guided	   inhibition	   was	   the	   pre-­‐SMA.	   	   This	   region	   has	   been	   shown	   to	   be	  
connected	  with	   the	   dFMC	   anatomically	   (Johansen-­‐Berg	   et	   al.,	   2004)	   and	   functionally	  
(Kühn	   et	   al.,	   2009),	   typically	   with	   the	   assumption	   that	   the	   dFMC	   feeds	   top-­‐down	  
stopping	   signals	   to	   the	  pre-­‐SMA,	  which	   in	   turn	   implements	   inhibition	   via	   connections	  
with	  motor	  areas	  (Cai,	  George,	  Verbruggen,	  Chambers,	  &	  Aron,	  2012;	  Kühn	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  
The	   differential	   activation	   levels	   in	   the	   pre-­‐SMA	   for	   the	   two	   inhibition	   types	   are	  
therefore	  likely	  related	  to	  differences	  in	  the	  way	  that	  suppression	  of	  the	  pain	  avoidance	  
response	   is	   implemented	   in	   the	   respective	   trials.	   The	   immediacy	   of	   action	   decisions	  
could	   be	   of	   particular	   importance	   in	   this	   respect.	   In	   externally	   guided	   trials,	   the	   cue	  
directly	   informs	   participants	   about	   the	   outcome,	   thereby	   triggering	   an	   instantaneous	  
cancellation	  of	  the	  response	  (Verbruggen	  &	  Logan,	  2008).	  In	  choice	  trials,	  on	  the	  other	  
hand,	   participants	   may	   implement	   a	   continual	   delay	   of	   the	   response	   rather	   than	   a	  
singular	  decision	  not	  to	  act,	  as	  the	  veto	  can	  theoretically	  be	  implemented	  at	  any	  time	  




inhibition	  could	  be	  related	  to	  decision	  uncertainty	  on	  choice	  trials,	  and	  the	  continuous	  
rather	  than	   instantaneous	  suppression	  of	  the	  pain	  avoidance	  response.	  Examining	  the	  
preSMA’s	  connectivity	  with	  other	  regions	  implicated	  in	  inhibition	  may	  help	  to	  clarify	  its	  
contributions	  to	  different	  types	  of	  behavioral	  inhibition	  (similar	  to	  Herz	  et	  al.,	  2014).	  
	  
Insular	  cortex	  
An	  interesting	  aspect	  of	  our	  results	   involves	  the	  activation	  of	  the	  right	  anterior	  
insula,	  which	  we	  found	  in	  conjunction	  with	  the	  rIFG	  related	  to	  both	  types	  of	  behavioral	  
inhibition.	   	   Given	   the	   numerous	   processes	   to	   which	   this	   region	   has	   been	   linked,	   a	  
conclusive	  interpretation	  of	  its	  role	  in	  our	  paradigm	  seems	  difficult	  to	  obtain.	  Previous	  
studies	   have	   shown	   that	   the	   insula	   might	   be	   involved	   in	   inhibitory	   control	   (e.g.,	  
Forstmann	  et	  al.,	  2008;	  Hodgson	  et	  al.,	  2007),	  yet	   is	  also	  a	  well-­‐known	  component	  of	  
the	  pain	  matrix	  (Garcia-­‐Larrea	  &	  Peyron,	  2013;	  Ingvar,	  1999;	  Peyron,	  Laurent,	  &	  García-­‐
Larrea,	   2000),	   and	   as	   such,	   activation	   of	   this	   region	   might	   be	   considered	   a	   mere	  
consequence	  of	  the	  longer	  stimulation	  duration	  in	  inhibition	  trials	  compared	  with	  press	  
trials.	  	  However,	  several	  points	  related	  to	  the	  design	  and	  analysis	  of	  our	  study	  suggest	  
that	   this	   is	   not	   entirely	   the	   case.	   First,	   our	  model	   was	   based	   on	   brain	   activity	   time-­‐
locked	   to	   the	   instructional	   cue,	   thus	   a	   time	   point	   at	   which	   all	   conditions	   were	  
equivalent	   in	  terms	  of	  pain	  stimulation,	  and	  remained	  so	  for	  an	  additional	  750	  ms,	  on	  
average.	   Second,	   contrasting	   trials	  with	   high	   vs.	   low	   levels	   of	   subjective	   pain	   yielded	  
only	   activity	  within	   the	   ACC,	   another	  well	   established	   component	   of	   the	   pain	  matrix	  
(e.g.,	  Garcia-­‐Larrea	  &	  Peyron,	  2013),	  but	  no	  differential	  activity	  in	  the	  insula.	  Third,	  the	  
ROI	   analysis	   of	   the	   right	   insula	   (applying	   a	  median	   split	   based	  on	   the	   subjective	   pain	  
ratings)	   revealed	  no	   significant	   correlations	  between	  mean	  pain	   ratings	  per	   condition	  
and	   percent	   signal	   change	   within	   each	   region	   of	   the	   insula.	   Accordingly,	   we	   are	  
confident	   that	   the	   inhibition-­‐related	   activation	   of	   the	   insula	   in	   our	   study	   is	   not	  
exclusively	   related	   to	   the	   differential	   levels	   of	   pain	   that	   accompanied	   those	   trials.	  
Importantly,	   previous	   intentional	   inhibition	   studies	   that	   did	   not	   involve	   somatic	  
stimulation	  have	  also	  reported	  activity	  in	  the	  insula	  (Brass	  &	  Haggard,	  2007;	  Campbell-­‐
Meiklejohn	  et	  al.,	  2008;	  Kühn	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  Although	  only	  speculative	  at	  this	  point,	  this	  
could	   imply	   that	   the	   role	  of	   the	   insula	   in	   the	   context	   of	   self-­‐control	   reflects	   affective	  
evaluation	  of	  the	  behavioral	  outcome	  (see	  Brass	  &	  Haggard,	  2010).	  	  




A	  hierarchical	  model	  of	  motivated	  self-­‐control	  
On	  a	  larger	  scale,	  the	  findings	  of	  the	  present	  study	  indicate	  that	  previous	  views	  
on	  the	  structure	  of	  behavioral	   inhibition	  must	  be	  reconsidered	  in	   light	  of	  motivational	  
factors.	  In	  particular,	  the	  co-­‐activation	  of	  both	  previously	  described	  inhibition	  networks	  
could	   imply	   that	   self-­‐control	   involves	   two	   stopping	   systems	   that	   rely	   on	   external	  
components	   and	   internal	   components	   respectively,	   and	   that	   the	   degree	   of	   their	  
interplay	   depends	   on	   the	   individual’s	   motivational	   state.	   In	   ‘cold’	   or	   urge-­‐free	  
situations,	  the	  two	  systems	  operate	   in	   isolation	  and	  are	   largely	  distinguishable.	   In	  this	  
context,	   intentional	   inhibition	   reflects	  primarily	   the	  endogenous	  decision	   to	  cancel	  an	  
ongoing	   behavior,	   and	   it	   is	   less	   clear	   to	  what	   extent	   such	   inhibition	   reflects	   genuine	  
motor	   suppression	  or	   rather	  higher-­‐order	  disengagement	   (see	  Lynn	  et	  al.,	  2014,	   for	  a	  
theoretical	  account	  of	  the	  latter	  view).	  Externally	  guided	  inhibition,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  
assesses	   the	   rapid	   implementation	   of	   behavioral	   suppression,	   absent	   decisional	  
aspects,	   as	   the	   response	   outcome	   is	   fully	   determined	   by	   the	   environment.	   However,	  
given	   the	   presence	   of	   a	   strong	   behavioral	   urge,	   such	   as	   the	   desire	   to	   avoid	   physical	  
pain,	  the	  two	  systems	  must	  necessarily	  interact	  to	  enable	  successful	  suppression	  of	  the	  
urge,	  regardless	  of	  the	  level	  of	  instruction.	  In	  this	  context,	  both	  the	  decisional	  and	  the	  
implementation	   aspects	   of	   behavioral	   inhibition	   must	   continuously	   be	   reinforced	   in	  
order	   to	   adhere	   to	   the	   circumstantial	   demands.	   Future	   research	  will	   be	   necessary	   to	  
test	  this	   idea	  more	  directly.	  For	   instance,	  comparing	   intentional	  and	  externally	  guided	  
inhibition	   in	   both	   ‘hot’	   and	   ‘cold’	   response	   systems	   within	   the	   same	   subjects	   could	  
provide	  direct	  evidence	  for	  the	  aforementioned	  view.	  
	  
Conclusion	  
	   The	  present	   study	   investigated	   the	  neural	  basis	  of	   the	   intentional	   inhibition	  of	  
pain	   avoidance	   behavior.	   Replicating	   previous	   work,	   we	   found	   the	   dFMC,	   rIFG	  
extending	  into	  the	  insula,	  and	  pre-­‐SMA	  to	  exhibit	  activity	  related	  to	  suppression	  of	  the	  
pain	  withdrawal	  urge,	  when	  compared	  with	  executing	  an	  abating	  response.	  	  However,	  
this	  pattern	  was	  observed	  regardless	  of	  the	  locus	  of	  the	  inhibit	  decision,	  suggesting	  that	  
the	   degree	   of	   intentional	   engagement	   depends	   on	   one’s	   motivational	   state.	   Our	  




of	   intentional	   inhibition,	   but	   future	   studies	   will	   be	   needed	   to	   determine	   whether	  
everyday	  instances	  of	  exogenous	  and	  endogenous	  inhibition	  are	  dissociable.	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Intentional	   inhibition	   refers	   to	   the	   suppression	   of	   ongoing	   behavior	   on	   the	   basis	   of	  
internally-­‐generated	  decisions.	  This	  ability	  to	  cancel	  planned	  actions	  at	  the	  last	  moment	  
is	   thought	   to	   be	   critical	   for	   self-­‐control	   and	   has	   been	   related	   to	   activation	   in	   a	  
circumscribed	  region	  of	  the	  dorsal	  frontomedian	  cortex	  (dFMC).	  Preliminary	  theories	  of	  
intentional	   inhibition	  were	  based	  on	  studies	  that	  exclusively	  examined	  the	  cancellation	  
of	  motor	  responses,	  and	  consequently	  concluded	  that	  this	  region	  serves	  the	  suppression	  
of	   motor	   output.	   Yet	   recent	   evidence	   suggests	   that	   the	   dFMC	   is	   also	   involved	   in	  
inhibitory	   control	   over	  more	   abstract	   internal	   states	   such	   as	   emotions	   or	   desires	   that	  
have	  no	   immediate	  behavioral	  output.	   In	  this	  review,	  we	  therefore	  wish	  to	  put	   forth	  a	  
new	   integrative	   perspective	   on	   the	   role	   of	   the	   dFMC	   in	   human	   self-­‐control.	   We	   will	  
argue	  that	  by	  virtue	  of	  its	  anatomical	  location	  and	  functional	  connections,	  this	  area	  may	  
subserve	   the	   disengagement	   from	   current	   urges	   and	   impulses,	   thus	   facilitating	  
successful	  exertions	  of	  self-­‐control	  across	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  contexts	  by	  overcoming	  a	  self-­‐
focused	  perspective.	  We	  will	   discuss	   the	   fit	  of	   this	   view	  of	   the	  dFMC	  with	   the	  existing	  
literature,	   identify	   critical	   experimental	   determinants	   for	   engaging	   the	   dFMC	   in	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  P.S.,	  &	  Brass,	  M.	  (2014).	  Controlling	  the	  self:	  The	  role	  of	  the	  dorsal	  






	   The	   ability	   to	   withhold	   behavioral	   impulses	   in	   favor	   of	   higher-­‐order	   goals	   is	  
central	  to	  human	  self-­‐regulatory	  behavior	  (Baumeister	  et	  al.,	  2007).	  To	  date,	  this	  ability	  
has	   been	   investigated	   in	   two	   distinct	   research	   domains,	   namely	   cognitive	   and	   social	  
psychology.	   In	   cognitive	   psychology,	   research	   on	   inhibitory	   control	   typically	   employs	  
experimental	   paradigms	   that	   require	   participants	   to	   withhold	   simple	   key	   presses	   in	  
response	   to	   pre-­‐instructed	   stop	   or	   nogo	   signals	   (henceforth	   referred	   to	   as	   externally	  
guided	   inhibition,	   Chikazoe	   et	   al.,	   2007;	   Logan	  &	   Cowan,	   1984;	   Verbruggen	  &	   Logan,	  
2008,	  2009).	  While	  this	  research	  has	  the	  advantage	  of	  providing	  maximal	  experimental	  
control,	   the	   transfer	   to	   inhibition	   and	   self-­‐control	   in	   everyday	   life	   is	   limited.	   In	  
particular,	  most	  situations	  that	  require	  self-­‐control	  do	  not	  provide	  external	  signals	  that	  
indicate	  whether	  or	  not	  to	  withhold	  a	  specific	  behavior.	  By	  contrast,	  social	  psychological	  
research	  on	  self-­‐control	  has	  investigated	  behavioral	  inhibition	  under	  more	  complex	  and	  
ecologically	  valid	  circumstances	   (see	  Hagger	  et	  al.,	  2010	   for	  a	   review).	  Because	  of	   the	  
complex	   experimental	   settings	   that	   are	   used,	   however,	   it	   is	   often	   very	   difficult	   to	  
determine	   the	   exact	   neurocognitive	  mechanisms	   that	   are	   involved	   in	   these	   forms	   of	  
self-­‐control.	   Recently,	   the	   theoretical	   concept	   of	   intentional	   inhibition	   has	   been	  
introduced	   to	   combine	   elements	   of	   both	   research	   traditions	   (Brass	  &	  Haggard,	   2007;	  
Brass	   &	   Haggard,	   2008;	   Filevich	   et	   al.,	   2012).	   	   Intentional	   inhibition	   refers	   to	   the	  
voluntary	   and	   internal	   decision	   to	   withhold	   from	   executing	   a	   prepotent	   action	  
tendency.	   In	   this	   sense,	   the	   concept	   of	   intentional	   inhibition	   is	  much	   closer	   to	   social	  
psychological	  conceptions	  of	  self-­‐control.	  	  
In	  the	  current	  review,	  we	  will	  first	  give	  an	  overview	  of	  research	  in	  the	  domain	  of	  
intentional	  inhibition.	  We	  will	  argue	  that	  the	  concept	  strongly	  relies	  on	  the	  assumption	  
that	  intentional	  inhibition	  can	  be	  distinguished	  from	  externally	  guided	  inhibition	  on	  the	  
basis	   of	   its	   functional	   neuroanatomy.	   In	   particular,	   intentional	   inhibition	   has	   been	  
related	   to	   a	   specific	   part	   of	   the	   medial	   prefrontal	   cortex,	   namely	   the	   dorsal	  
frontomedian	  cortex	  (dFMC),	  although	  the	  precise	  functional	  contribution	  of	  this	  region	  
remains	  elusive.	  Therefore	  we	  will	   try	   to	  explore	  the	  role	  of	   the	  dFMC	   in	  the	  broader	  
context	  of	  self-­‐control.	  Thereafter	  we	  will	  argue,	  based	  on	  the	   location	  of	  this	  area	  at	  
the	  intersection	  of	  brain	  areas	  involved	  in	  cognitive	  motor	  control	  and	  those	  involved	  in	  
more	  complex	  self-­‐reflective	  and	  social	  cognitive	  processes,	  that	   it	  contributes	  to	  self-­‐
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control	   by	   facilitating	   disengagement	   from	   impulses	   and	   urges2.	   On	   the	   basis	   of	   this	  
new	   conception,	   we	   will	   outline	   crucial	   experimental	   determinants	   for	   investigating	  
intentional	  inhibition	  and	  sketch	  future	  perspectives	  in	  this	  research	  domain.	  
	  
Previous	  findings:	  What	  do	  we	  know	  about	  intentional	  inhibition?	  
The	  concept	  of	   intentional	   inhibition	   is	  relatively	  young	  and	  only	  dates	  back	  a	  few	  
years.	  As	  outlined	  above,	   it	   evolved	  as	  an	  extension	  of	   classical	   inhibition	   research	   in	  
cognitive	  psychology,	  which	  focused	  primarily	  on	  externally	  guided	  inhibition.	  Following	  
the	  logic	  of	  intentional	  action	  research,	  in	  which	  intentional	  action	  is	  usually	  contrasted	  
with	   stimulus-­‐guided	   action	   (e.g.,	   Passingham	   et	   al.,	   2000;	   Toni	   et	   al.,	   2001),	   early	  
paradigms	   tried	   to	   introduce	   a	   choice	   component	   preceding	   the	   inhibition	   process.	  
From	   this	   perspective,	   intentional	   inhibition,	   like	   intentional	   action,	   is	   internally	  
generated.	  Yet	  because	  intentional	  inhibition	  paradigms	  do	  not	  present	  a	  stop	  signal,	  it	  
becomes	  difficult	   to	  derive	   chronometric	  measures	   such	  as	   stop	   signal	   reaction	   times	  
(SSRTs).	   Thus,	   the	   only	   behavioral	   dependent	   measure	   that	   can	   be	   used	   is	   the	  
proportion	  of	   inhibition	  trials	   (e.g.	  Brass	  &	  Haggard,	  2007;	  Lynn	  et	  al.,	  2013;	  Rigoni	  et	  
al.,	  2012).	  Brain	  imaging	  techniques	  such	  as	  fMRI	  therefore	  provide	  valuable	  tools	  that	  
permit	   the	   delineation	   of	   neural	   activity	   preceding	   intentional	   decisions	   to	   inhibit	  
behavior.	  
In	  the	  first	  study	  to	  introduce	  the	  concept	  of	  intentional	  inhibition,	  Brass	  &	  Haggard	  
(2007)	  employed	  a	  modified	   version	  of	   the	  method	   introduced	  by	   Libet	  et	   al.	   (1983),	  
which	  required	  participants	  to	  perform	  self-­‐paced	  button	  presses	  (i.e.,	  action	  trials)	  and	  
to	  monitor	  the	  moment	  in	  time	  when	  they	  felt	  the	  intention	  to	  execute	  the	  movement.	  
In	  addition,	  participants	  were	   instructed	   to	  occasionally	  prepare	  such	  movements	  but	  
cancel	   them	   at	   the	   very	   last	   moment	   prior	   to	   execution	   (i.e.,	   inhibition	   trials).	  
Contrasting	   brain	   activity	   on	   inhibition	   trials	   with	   action	   trials	   yielded	   increased	  
activation	  in	  the	  dFMC,	  as	  well	  as	  in	  the	  left	  and	  right	  anterior	  insula,	  and	  the	  superior	  
temporal	  sulcus.	  This	  neural	  signature	  was	  in	  striking	  contrast	  to	  findings	  resulting	  from	  
externally	  guided	  response	  inhibition,	  which	  typically	  engages	  a	  neural	  network	  around	  
the	  right	   inferior	   frontal	  gyrus,	   the	  pre-­‐supplementary	  motor	  area	  (pre-­‐SMA),	  and	  the	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basal	   ganglia	   (rIFG;	   see	  Aron	   et	   al.,	   2004;	   2014	   for	   reviews),	   implying	   that	   these	   two	  
types	  of	  behavioral	  inhibition	  rely	  on	  largely	  different	  control	  mechanisms.	  	  
Importantly,	   a	   number	   of	   follow-­‐up	   studies	   that	   employed	   quite	   disparate	  
experimental	   procedures	   could	   replicate	   the	   involvement	   of	   the	   dFMC	   in	   intentional	  
inhibition.	   For	   instance,	   Kühn	   et	   al.	   (2009)	   introduced	   the	   so-­‐called	   “ramp	   task”	   in	  
which	   participants	   saw	   the	   image	   of	   a	   marble	   moving	   downwards	   on	   a	   ramp	   and	  
breaking	   into	   pieces	   when	   it	   reached	   the	   end	   of	   the	   ramp.	   Participants	   could	   freely	  
choose	  between	  preventing	  the	  marble	  from	  breaking	  via	  a	  button	  press,	  and	  inhibiting	  
their	  urge	   to	  do	  so.	   Importantly,	   the	  shattering	  of	   the	  marble	  was	  associated	  with	  an	  
aversive	   glass-­‐breaking	   sound	   and	   a	  monetary	   loss	   in	   order	   to	   create	   an	   incentive	   of	  
responses	   over	   response	   omissions,	   which	   ties	   intentional	   inhibition	  more	   closely	   to	  
realistic	   scenarios	   of	   self-­‐control	   in	   which	   highly	   prepotent	   behavior	   needs	   to	   be	  
suppressed.	  As	  in	  the	  study	  by	  Brass	  &	  Haggard	  (2007),	  inhibition-­‐related	  brain	  activity	  
was	  found	  in	  the	  dFMC,	  leading	  to	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  dFMC	  constitutes	  a	  “veto	  area”	  that	  
generates	  endogenous	  top-­‐down	  signals	  in	  the	  service	  of	  the	  intentional	  cancellation	  of	  
behavior.	   However,	   this	   interpretation	   of	   the	   dFMC	   as	   being	   involved	   in	   intentional	  
inhibition	  rests	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  activity	  in	  this	  brain	  area	  precedes	  the	  inhibition	  
process.	   Given	   that	   the	   temporal	   resolution	   of	   fMRI	   is	   rather	   poor,	   this	   assumption	  
requires	  independent	  proof.	  A	  recent	  EEG	  study	  addressed	  this	  question	  (Walsh	  et	  al.,	  
2010)	   using	   a	   variant	   of	   the	   Libet	   task	   similar	   to	   Brass	  &	  Haggard	   (2007).	   Frequency	  
analyses	   of	   brain	   oscillations	   shortly	   after	   the	   experience	   of	   an	   intention	   to	   move	  
revealed	  an	  increase	  in	  spectral	  power	  over	  frontal	  electrodes	  that	  was	  specific	  for	  trials	  
in	  which	   the	  movement	  was	   then	   inhibited,	   highlighting	   that	   the	   neural	   signature	   of	  
intentional	  inhibition	  has	  a	  plausible	  time	  course	  during	  motor	  preparation.	  
	  
The	  role	  of	  the	  dFMC	  in	  intentional	  inhibition	  
	   Despite	   this	   converging	   evidence	   for	   the	   general	   importance	   of	   the	   dFMC	   in	  
intentional	   inhibition,	   it	   is	   still	   largely	   unknown	   how	   this	   area	   exerts	   control	   over	  
behavioral	   impulses.	   Recently,	   Filevich	   et	   al.	   (2012)	   embedded	   the	   concept	   of	  
intentional	   inhibition	   in	   a	   more	   general	   model	   of	   motor	   control,	   based	   on	   internal	  
feedback	  loops.	  This	  model	  includes	  an	  inner	  loop	  that	  continuously	  adjusts	  movement	  
parameters	  based	  on	  a	  comparison	  between	  predicted	  and	  perceived	  sensory	  feedback,	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and	  an	  outer	   loop	   that	  monitors	   the	   long-­‐term	  consequences	  of	  ongoing	  actions	   and	  
compares	   them	   with	   general	   goals.	   Intentional	   inhibition	   is	   conceived	   as	   a	   braking	  
mechanism	  that	   links	  both	   loops	  by	  cancelling	  ongoing	  behavior	  when	  the	  anticipated	  
outcome	  seems	  no	  longer	  desirable.	  In	  line	  with	  this	  idea,	  the	  dFMC	  has	  been	  shown	  to	  
exhibit	  increased	  functional	  connectivity	  with	  the	  pre-­‐SMA	  during	  intentional	  inhibition	  
(Kühn	  et	  al.,	  2009;	  2013).	  This	  finding	  is	  of	  particular	  interest,	  given	  that	  the	  pre-­‐SMA	  is	  
involved	  in	  action	  planning	  (e.g.,	  Cunnington	  et	  al.,	  2002;	  2003)	  as	  well	  as	  in	  externally	  
guided	  response	  inhibition	  (e.g.,	  Simmonds	  et	  al.,	  2008).	  Accordingly,	  the	  pre-­‐SMA	  may	  
constitute	   a	   common	   pathway	   for	   the	   implementation	   of	   different	   types	   of	   motor	  
decisions,	  with	  the	  dFMC	  directing	  the	  outcome	  of	  this	  decision.	  
	   Additional	  research	  has	  concurrently	  shown	  that	  the	  dFMC	  is	  not	  only	  involved	  
in	   the	   inhibition	  of	  overt	  behavior,	  but	   also	   in	   the	   suppression	  of	  other	  psychological	  
states	  such	  as	  emotions	  (Kühn	  et	  al.,	  2011;	  2013),	  cigarette	  cravings	  (Brody	  et	  al.,	  2007;	  
Hanlon	  et	  al.,	  2013;	  Hartwell	  et	  al.,	  2012),	  or	  gambling	  desires	  (Campbell-­‐Meiklejohn	  et	  
al.,	  2008).	  While	  these	  findings	  strengthen	  the	  general	  notion	  that	  the	  dFMC	  is	  a	  crucial	  
brain	   region	   for	   the	   successful	   exertion	   of	   self-­‐control,	   they	   also	   indicate	   that	   the	  
functional	  contribution	  of	  this	  region	  might	  be	  more	  general	  than	  previously	  assumed,	  
and	  extend	  beyond	  the	  suppression	  of	  motor	  output.	  	  
	   In	  the	  following,	  we	  will	  put	  forth	  a	  broader	  perspective	  of	  the	  role	  of	  the	  dFMC	  
in	   self-­‐control,	   arguing	   that	   this	   area	   allows	   for	   disengagement	   from	   one’s	   current	  
impulses	  and	  urges.	  We	  will	   first	   review	   literature	   from	  social	  psychology	   to	  highlight	  
that	  such	  disengagement	  strategies	  are	  an	  effective	  functional	  mechanism	  for	  exerting	  
self-­‐control.	   Thereafter	  we	  will	  outline	   that	   the	  dFMC	   is	  well	   situated	   to	  perform	   this	  
self-­‐regulatory	  function	  because	  of	   its	  anatomical	   location	  and	  functional	  connections.	  
Finally,	  we	  will	  illustrate	  that	  this	  new	  conception	  of	  intentional	  inhibition	  is	  capable	  of	  
explaining	  seemingly	  inconsistent	  findings	  in	  the	  literature,	  and	  helps	  to	  further	  bridge	  
the	  gap	  between	  cognitive	  and	  social	  psychological	  conceptions	  of	  inhibition.	  	  
	  
Disengagement	  as	  a	  functional	  mechanism	  for	  self-­‐control	  
Evidence	  for	  the	  role	  of	  disengagement	  in	  self-­‐control	  dates	  back	  to	  the	  famous	  
delay-­‐of-­‐gratification	  experiments	  (e.g.,	  Mischel,	  1974)	  in	  which	  preschoolers	  were	  able	  




with	  a	  temporal	  delay.	  	  Successful	  delay	  strategies	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  children	  included	  
self-­‐distraction	  or	  redirection	  of	  attention	  (e.g.,	  hiding	  their	  faces)	  and	  altering	  the	  way	  
they	  mentally	  represented	  the	  desired	  object	  (i.e.,	  reappraisal	  or	  reframing;	  see	  Mischel	  
et	  al.,	  2011	  for	  a	  recent	  review).	  Interestingly,	  such	  distancing	  strategies	  do	  not	  appear	  
to	   be	   used	   exclusively	   by	   children,	   but	   persist	   into	   adulthood.	   For	   example,	   while	  
engaged	   in	   a	   smoking	   cessation	   program,	   smokers	   tend	   to	   initially	   psychologically	  
distance	  themselves	  from	  their	  archetype	  of	  the	  typical	  smoker,	  until	  such	  time	  as	  they	  
have	   successfully	   broken	   their	   habit	   (Gibbons	   et	   al.,	   1991).	   Likewise,	   in	   the	   realm	   of	  
emotion	   suppression,	   it	   is	   well	   known	   that	   people	   employ	   specific	   reappraisal	  
strategies,	   most	   notably	   distancing,	   when	   attempting	   to	   decrease	   their	   emotional	  
response	   to	   stimuli	   (e.g.,	   Gross,	   1998;	   1999).	   Indeed,	   participants	   in	   several	   emotion	  
suppression	   studies	  were	   specifically	   trained	   and	   instructed	   to	  maintain	   an	   objective	  
viewpoint	  by	  detaching	  themselves	  from	  the	  emotional	  target	  stimulus	  during	  inhibition	  
trials	  (Kühn	  et	  al.,	  2013;	  Lévesque	  et	  al.,	  2003;	  Ochsner	  et	  al.,	  2004).	  
	   Conversely,	  when	  the	  capacity	  for	  self-­‐control	  is	  impaired,	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  ego	  
depletion	   (Baumeister	   et	   al.,	   1998),	   people	   tend	   to	   adopt	   a	   self-­‐focused,	   first-­‐person	  
perspective.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Achtziger	  et	  al.	  	  (2011),	  ego	  depleted	  participants	  engaged	  in	  
an	  Ultimatum	  game	  employed	  maladaptive	  and	  self-­‐centered	  strategies	   in	  which	  they	  
not	  only	  proposed	  lower	  amounts	  for	  their	  partner,	  but	  rejected	  low	  offers	  themselves,	  
accepting	   instead	   zero	   financial	   reward	   for	   both	   players,	   rather	   than	   attending	   to	   an	  
absolute	  monetary	  calculation	  or	  value.	  	  Similarly,	  Macrae	  et	  al.	  (2014)	  found	  that	  self-­‐
regulatory	   failures	  were	   exacerbated	   both	  when	   adopting	   a	   first-­‐	   versus	   third-­‐person	  
perspective,	   and	   when	   adopting	   a	   near	   versus	   far	   distal	   perspective	   (under	   both	  
temporal	  and	  physical	  conditions).	  	  	  
Altogether,	  these	  findings	  indicate	  that	  disengagement	  from	  one’s	  current	  urges	  
and	   impulses	   is	   indeed	   an	  effective	  means	  of	   boosting	  one’s	   regulatory	   abilities.	   This	  
idea	  is	  furthermore	  in	  line	  with	  recent	  theoretical	  work	  on	  self-­‐control	  by	  Fujita	  (2011),	  
who	  describes	  it	  as	  “the	  general	  process	  by	  which	  people	  advance	  abstract,	  distal	  over	  
concrete,	   proximal	   motives	   in	   judgment,	   decisions,	   and	   behavior.”	   Accordingly,	   to	  
successfully	   self-­‐regulate,	   one	  must	   achieve	   a	  measure	   of	  mental	   remove	   from	   their	  
present	  circumstances.	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The	  dFMC	  is	  well	  situated	  to	  support	  disengagement	  from	  urges	  
Having	   illustrated	   that	   distancing	   is	   an	   adaptive	   self-­‐regulatory	   strategy,	   this	  
section	   will	   describe	   why	   the	   dFMC	   is	   a	   brain	   region	   particularly	   well	   situated	   to	  
perform	  this	  function.	  	  The	  past	  two	  decades	  of	  brain	  imaging	  research	  have	  yielded	  a	  
general	   consensus	   that	   endogenous	   control	   processes	   rely	   most	   critically	   upon	   the	  
integrity	  of	   the	  medial	   frontal	   cortex	   (MFC;	   see	  Amodio	  &	  Frith,	  2006;	  Passingham	  et	  
al.,	   2010;	   Rushworth	   et	   al.,	   2004	   for	   reviews).	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   the	  MFC	   does	   not	  
constitute	   a	   functional	   unit,	   but	   rather	   consists	   of	   distinct	   sub-­‐regions	   that	   serve	  
dissociable	   functions	   (see	   Fig.	   1).	   As	   such,	   the	   posterior	   parts	   of	   the	  MFC	   are	   clearly	  
implicated	  in	  cognitive	  motor	  control	  (Krieghoff	  et	  al.,	  2011;	  Nachev	  et	  al.,	  2008).	  Two	  
regions	  have	  been	  of	  particular	  interest	  in	  this	  respect:	  the	  rostral	  cingulate	  zone	  (RCZ),	  
a	  region	  extending	  dorsally	  and	  caudally	  from	  the	  anterior	  cingulate	  cortex	  (ACC),	  and	  
the	   supplementary	  and	  pre-­‐supplementary	  motor	  areas	   (SMA/pre-­‐SMA).	   The	  RCZ	  has	  
been	   identified	   in	   disparate	   lines	   of	   research	   and	   linked	   with	   both	   resolving	   conflict	  
between	   incompatible	   response	   tendencies	   (Botvinick	   et	   al.,	   2004;	   Lau	   et	   al.,	  
2004;2006;	   Ridderinkhof	   et	   al.,	   2004),	   and	   in	   the	   intentional	   selection	   of	  movements	  
(Krieghoff	  et	  al.,	  2009;	  Müller	  et	  al.,	  2007;	  Walton	  et	  al.,	  2004)	  and	  tasks	  (Demanet	  et	  
al.,	   2013;	   Forstmann	   et	   al.,	   2006).	   Brass	   &	   Haggard	   (2008)	   argued	   that	   the	   RCZ’s	  
sensitivity	   to	   both	   conflict	   and	   volition	  might	   reflect	   a	   common	   process	   of	   choosing	  
between	  different	  response	  alternatives.	  This	  integrative	  perspective	  has	  recently	  been	  
formalized	   in	   a	   computational	  model	   (Holroyd	  &	   Yeung,	   2012).	   The	   SMA/pre-­‐SMA	   is	  
also	  critical	  for	  the	  planning	  and	  control	  of	  movements,	  yet	  its	  contribution	  seems	  to	  be	  
more	  closely	  related	  to	  the	  implementation	  of	  motor	  decisions.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  this	  
area	   has	   been	   linked	   to	   the	   planning	   and	   generation	   of	   self-­‐initiated	   movements	  
(Cunnington	  et	  al.,	  2002;	  2003;	  Debaere	  et	  al.,	  2003;	  Deiber	  et	  al.,	  1999).	   In	   line	  with	  
this,	   electrical	   stimulation	   of	   the	   pre-­‐SMA	   can	   induce	   the	   sensation	   of	   an	   “urge	   to	  
move”	   (Fried	  et	  al.,	   1991).	  At	   the	   same	   time,	   the	  SMA/pre-­‐SMA	   is	  also	   critical	   for	   re-­‐
programming	   and	   inhibiting	   movements	   (Nachev	   et	   al.,	   2008;	   Neubert	   et	   al.,	   2010;	  
Sumner	  et	  al.,	  2007).	  This	  is	  also	  illustrated	  by	  the	  so-­‐called	  “anarchic	  hand	  syndrome”	  
that	   can	   result	   from	   unilateral	   lesions	   to	   the	   pre-­‐SMA.	   Patients	   with	   anarchic	   hand	  
syndrome	   exhibit	   an	   inability	   to	   inhibit	   stimulus-­‐induced	   action	   tendencies	   with	   the	  




intention	   to	   do	   so	   (Della	   Sala	   et	   al.,	   1991;	   Kritikos	   et	   al.,	   2005;	   Pacherie,	   2007).	  
Accordingly,	   the	   SMA/pre-­‐SMA	   may	   be	   critical	   for	   adjusting	   the	   degree	   of	   action	  
readiness	  (Cunnington	  et	  al.,	  2005;	  Forstmann	  et	  al.,	  2008)	  that	  can	  yield	  facilitation	  or	  
suppression	  of	  motor	  output,	  presumably	  via	  projections	   to	   the	  basal	  ganglia	  and	  the	  
primary	  motor	  cortex	  (Picard	  &	  Strick,	  2001).	  It	  is	  currently	  unclear	  to	  what	  extent	  the	  
SMA/pre-­‐SMA	  itself	  is	  the	  generator	  of	  top-­‐down	  motor	  control,	  and	  to	  what	  extent	  it	  
relies	  on	  input	  from	  other	  areas,	  such	  as	  the	  dFMC	  or	  the	  rIFG.	  
	  
Figure	   1.	   Schematic	   overview	   of	   brain	   regions	   in	   the	   medial	   frontal	   wall,	   along	   with	   their	  
assumed	  functions.	  
	  
In	  contrast	  to	  these	  motor	  control	  functions	  of	  the	  posterior	  MFC,	  the	  anterior	  
MFC	   is	   involved	   in	   higher-­‐order	   self-­‐referential,	   social-­‐cognitive,	   and	   emotional	  
processes.	   The	   anterior	  MFC	   is	   typically	   divided	   into	   a	   ventral	   part	   and	   a	   dorsal	   part	  
(Amodio	  &	  Frith,	  2006;	  Forbes	  &	  Grafman,	  2010;	  Lieberman,	  2007;	  Mitchell	  et	  al.,	  2006;	  
Van	  Overwalle,	   2009).	   The	   ventral	   part	   has	   been	   associated	  with	   automatic	   affective	  
evaluations	  and	   the	  computation	  of	   reward	  values	   in	  decision	  making	   (Bechara	  et	  al.,	  
1999;	  Bechara,	  2005;	  Kolling	  et	  al.,	   2012;	  Mauss	  et	  al.,	   2007;	  Reuter	  et	  al.,	   2005;	  van	  
den	  Bos	   et	   al.,	   2007).	   The	  dorsal	   part,	   on	   the	  other	   hand,	   has	   been	   linked	  with	  both	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mentalizing	  about	  other	  people’s	  internal	  states	  (Frith	  &	  Frith,	  2003;	  Gallagher	  &	  Frith,	  
2003;	  Gilbert	  et	  al.,	  2006;	  Zaki	  et	  al.,	  2009)	  and	  active	  self-­‐referential	  thought	  processes	  
(Andrews-­‐Hanna	  et	  al.,	  2010;	  Whitfield-­‐Gabrieli	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  	   	  This	  raises	  the	  question	  
of	  how	  the	  very	  abstract	  role	  of	  the	  dFMC	  in	  social	  cognition	  can	  be	  reconciled	  with	  its	  
role	  in	  intentional	  inhibition	  (see	  Fig.	  2	  for	  an	  illustration	  of	  the	  overlap).	  Although	  it	  is	  
possible	  that	  different	   functions	  co-­‐exist	  within	  the	  dFMC,	  we	  believe	  that	   intentional	  
inhibition	   and	  mental	   state	   attribution	   share	   a	   common	   functional	  mechanism;	   both	  
require	   disengagement	   from	   a	   strong	   self-­‐perspective.	   In	   mental	   state	   attribution,	  
overcoming	  the	  self-­‐perspective	  is	  needed	  to	  attribute	  mental	  states	  to	  others	  that	  are	  
inconsistent	   with	   one’s	   own	   perspective.	   In	   intentional	   inhibition	   and	   self-­‐control,	  
overcoming	  the	  self-­‐perspective	  is	  necessary	  for	  successfully	  disengaging	  from	  a	  strong	  
impulse	  or	  urge	  to	  act.	  	  
Within	   the	   what-­‐when-­‐whether	   (WWW)	  model	   of	   intentional	   action	   (Brass	   &	  
Haggard,	  2008;	  Brass	  et	  al.,	  2013),	  the	  dFMC	  would	  serve	  a	  regulatory	  function	  between	  
areas	   that	   are	   involved	   in	   intentional	   choice	   (RCZ)	   and	   areas	   involved	   in	   the	  
implementation	  of	  such	  choices	  (pre-­‐SMA).	  The	  dFMC	  would	  enable	  the	  overcoming	  of	  
a	   strong	   impulse	   or	   urge	   by	   down-­‐regulating	   brain	   areas	   that	   are	   involved	   in	   the	  
formation	  and	  implementation	  of	  such	  impulses,	  leading	  to	  a	  disengagement	  from	  the	  
self-­‐perspective.	   This	   is	   consistent	  with	   the	   functional	   connectivity	   data	   of	   the	   dFMC	  
and	   pre-­‐SMA	   outlined	   above.	   Furthermore,	   from	   this	   perspective,	   the	   frequent	   co-­‐
activation	  of	   the	  dFMC	  with	   the	  anterior	   insula	   in	   intentional	   inhibition	   (e.g.,	  Brass	  &	  
Haggard,	  2007;	  Campbell-­‐Meiklejohn	  et	  al.,	  2008;	  Lynn	  et	  al.,	   in	  revision)	  might	  be	  re-­‐
evaluated.	  Thus	  far,	  the	  involvement	  of	  the	  insula	  has	  primarily	  been	  linked	  to	  a	  “feeling	  
of	   let	  down”	  that	  may	  result	  from	  negative	  evaluations	  of	  not	  carrying	  out	  a	  response	  
after	   preparing	   it	   (see	   Brass	   &	   Haggard,	   2007).	   However,	   the	   prominent	   role	   of	   this	  
region	  in	  awareness	  (see	  Craig,	  2009	  for	  a	  review)	  could	  also	  imply	  that	  the	  role	  of	  the	  





Figure	  2.	  Overlap	  of	  brain	  activation	  related	  to	  mentalizing	  and	  intentional	  inhibition.	  The	  red	  
cluster	  represents	  the	  results	  of	  an	  activation-­‐likelihood	  estimation	  meta-­‐analysis	  of	  38	  theory	  
of	  mind	  studies	  (including	  47	  peaks)	  taken	  from	  Amodio	  &	  Frith,	  2006	  and	  Gilbert	  et	  al.,	  2006.	  	  
Peaks	  from	  four	  intentional	  inhibition	  studies	  are	  represented	  as	  dots.	  	  Dark	  blue	  =	  Brass	  &	  
Haggard	  2007;	  light	  blue	  =	  Kühn	  et	  al.,	  2009;	  light	  green	  =	  Kühn	  et	  al.,	  2013;	  dark	  green	  =	  Lynn	  
et	  al.,	  in	  revision.	  	  The	  former	  two	  studies	  were	  motoric	  in	  nature,	  while	  the	  latter	  two	  
involved	  emotions	  and	  urges,	  respectively.	  
	  
Critical	  determinants	  for	  engaging	  the	  dFMC	  
We	  will	  next	  revisit	  existing	   literature	  on	   intentional	   inhibition	  and	  evaluate	  to	  
what	  extent	   the	  disengagement	  account	   is	   capable	  of	  explaining	   the	  data.	   Intentional	  
inhibition	  has	  been	  applied	  to	  various	  contexts	  and	  experimental	  procedures,	  resulting	  
in	  a	  heterogeneous	  pattern	  of	  findings	  with	  some	  studies	  replicating	  the	  involvement	  of	  
the	  dFMC	  and	  others	  not.	  Based	  on	   the	   idea	   that	   this	   region	   supports	   the	  process	  of	  
disengagement,	  we	  will	  first	  propose	  crucial	  determinants	  that	  experimental	  paradigms	  
might	   need	   to	   satisfy	   in	   order	   to	   tap	   into	   this	   self-­‐regulatory	   function.	   To	   elicit	  
intentional	  disengagement	   it	   seems	  critical	   that	   the	  experimental	   setting	  meets	   three	  
principle	   demands:	   First,	   participants	   must	   be	   operating	   under	   the	   circumstances	   of	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choice,	  and	  have	  to	  make	  an	  explicit	  decision	  to	  stop	  the	  behavior.	  Second,	  there	  must	  
be	  enough	  time	   in	  which	  to	  form	  and	   implement	  this	  decision.	  Otherwise	  participants	  
might	   decide	   to	   act	   or	   inhibit	   in	   advance	   of	   the	   trial	   (pre-­‐decision)	   or,	   conversely,	  
generally	   omit	   responding	   first	   and	   thereafter	   decide	   (post-­‐decision).	   Finally,	   the	  
decision	  to	   inhibit	  must	  be	   imposed	   in	  the	  context	  of	  a	  strong	  urge	  or	   impulse	   to	  act.	  
Choice,	  temporal	  considerations,	  and	  urges	  may	  also	  interact;	  for	  example,	  the	  strength	  
of	  a	  behavioral	  urge	  can	  modulate	   the	   impact	  of	  an	   internal	   choice,	  as	   in	   the	  case	  of	  
holding	  one’s	  breath.	  The	  body	  will	  permit	  oxygen	  starvation	  only	  up	  to	  a	  point,	  after	  
which	  the	  urge	  to	  inhale	  will	  overcome	  all	  other	  response	  options.	  	  Similarly,	  choice	  can	  
be	   implicitly	   biased	   via	   reward	   incentives.	   Below	  we	  will	   revisit	   existing	   literature	   on	  
intentional	   inhibition	   and	   examine	   to	   what	   extent	   these	   paradigms	   have	   met	   the	  
hypothesized	  determinants.	  	  
	  
Paradigms	  that	  identified	  dFMC	  activity	  with	  intentional	  inhibition	  
So	   far,	   three	   studies	   that	   were	   explicitly	   designed	   to	   investigate	   intentional	  
inhibition	  have	  revealed	  inhibition-­‐related	  activity	  in	  the	  dFMC.	  As	  described	  above,	  the	  
study	  by	  Brass	  &	  Haggard	  (2007)	  employed	  a	  variant	  of	  the	  Libet	  task,	  a	  paradigm	  that	  
clearly	  provides	  both	  a	  free	  choice	  between	  acting	  and	  not	  acting,	  and	  sufficient	  time	  to	  
make	   this	   decision.	   Importantly,	   participants	   were	   asked	   to	   monitor	   the	   moment	   in	  
time	  when	   they	   felt	   the	   intention	   to	   press	   the	   button.	   This	   likely	   increased	   the	   self-­‐
reflective	  engagement	  in	  the	  task	  and	  discouraged	  participants	  from	  pre-­‐deciding	  to	  act	  
or	  inhibit	  in	  advance	  of	  the	  trial.	  The	  only	  caveat	  of	  this	  paradigm	  resides	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  
the	   choice	   between	   acting	   and	   not	   acting	   is	   relatively	   arbitrary,	   since	   there	   is	   no	  
genuine	   incentive	   for	   either	   option.	   Nevertheless,	   dFMC	   activity	   was	   found	   when	  
contrasting	  omissions	  versus	  action	  trials,	   located	  in	  the	  medial	  frontal	  gyrus	  dorsal	  to	  
the	  anterior	  cingulate.	  	  	  
The	   second	   intentional	   inhibition	   paradigm,	   the	   ramp-­‐task,	   subsequently	  
introduced	  by	  Kühn	  et	  al.	  (2009),	  sought	  to	  overcome	  the	  problem	  of	  arbitrary	  response	  
options	  and	  created	  a	  prepotency	  of	  acting	  over	  inhibiting.	  This	  was	  achieved	  by	  linking	  
actions	  to	   instrumental	  outcomes	   (i.e.,	   the	  avoidance	  of	   the	  aversive	  marble	  breaking	  
sound,	  and	  a	  trial-­‐based	  monetary	  reward).	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  ramp	  task	  was	  a	  clear	  step	  




impulse	   to	   act.	  Moreover,	   this	   paradigm	   provided	   a	   free	   choice	   between	   acting	   and	  
inhibiting.	  Consistent	  with	  the	  aforementioned	  determinants,	  dFMC	  activity	  was	  found	  
for	   intentional	   inhibition,	   located	   slightly	  more	  ventrally	   than	   in	   the	   study	  by	  Brass	  &	  
Haggard	  (2007).	  However,	  this	  paradigm	  has	  a	  number	  of	   limitations	  compared	  to	  the	  
Libet	  task;	  the	  timing	  of	  the	  decision	  to	  act	  or	  inhibit	  is	  linked	  to	  the	  external	  event	  of	  
the	   marble	   beginning	   to	   move,	   and	   participants	   were	   not	   required	   to	   monitor	   their	  
internal	   states	   (e.g.,	   their	   intention/urge	   to	   press	   the	   button),	   thus	   making	   pre-­‐
decisions	   on	   the	   participants’	   part	   more	   likely.	   Finally,	   the	   paradigm	   introduced	  
substantial	  time	  pressure	  on	  the	  decision	  to	  inhibit	  or	  to	  act.	  These	  aspects	  may	  explain	  
why	   the	   original	   findings	   resulting	   from	   this	   task	   have	   proven	   somewhat	   difficult	   to	  
replicate	  absent	   reward.	   	   Schel	  et	  al.	   (2014)	   compared	   the	   ramp	   task	   to	  a	   stop-­‐signal	  
task,	  and	  found	  dFMC	  activation	  in	  the	  former	  task	  not	  for	  intentional	  inhibition	  versus	  
stimulus-­‐driven	   action,	   as	   in	   the	   previous	   study,	   but	   in	   a	   parametric	   analysis	   of	   the	  
number	  of	  preceding	  go	  trials.	  Here,	  stronger	  dFMC	  activity	  (at	  a	  location	  similar	  to	  that	  
of	   Kühn	   et	   al.,	   2009),	   a	   higher	   proportion	   of	   inhibition	   trials,	   and	   slower	   RTs	   were	  
observed	   for	   choice	   trials	   when	   there	   were	   fewer	   preceding	   go	   trials.	   One	  
interpretation	  (supported	  by	  the	  reaction	  times	  in	  particular)	  could	  be	  that	  responding	  
becomes	  more	  automated	  following	  long	  sequences	  of	   instructed	  trials,	  and	  the	  more	  
demanding	  decisions	  arise	  when	  alternating	  rapidly	  between	  instructed	  and	  free-­‐choice	  
scenarios,	   or	   when	   trying	   to	   keep	   one’s	   decisions	   random	   in	   an	   extended	   choice	  
scenario.	  	  
Another	   context	   to	   which	   intentional	   inhibition	   has	   been	   applied	   is	   emotion	  
regulation	   (Kühn	   et	   al.,	   2013).	   Highly	   arousing	   images	   with	   negative	   valence	   were	  
presented	  for	  a	  duration	  of	  two	  seconds	  before	  a	  cue	  appeared	  that	  either	   instructed	  
participants	  to	  inhibit	  their	  emotional	  response	  to	  these	  images	  by	  means	  of	  distancing	  
(exogenous	   inhibit),	   to	   allow	   their	   feelings	   to	   unfold	   (exogenous	   feel),	   or	   to	   chose	  
between	   one	   of	   the	   two	   options	   (endogenous	   inhibit,	   endogenous	   feel).	   Thus,	   in	  
contrast	   with	   previous	   emotion	   regulation	   literature,	   this	   study	   provided	   a	   condition	  
that	  allowed	  participants	  to	  engage	   in	  emotion	  regulation	  on	  the	  basis	  of	   free	  choice.	  
Moreover,	  participants	  were	  asked	  to	  rate	  the	  intensity	  of	  the	  emotions	  that	  they	  felt	  
on	   each	   trial,	   making	   pre-­‐decision	   strategies	   rather	   unlikely.	   Accordingly,	   the	   dFMC	  
activation,	   observed	   for	   endogenous,	   but	   not	   exogenous,	   emotion	   inhibition	   is	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consistent	  with	  our	  proposal.	  Here,	   the	   focus	  of	  activation	  was	   located	  more	  rostrally	  
than	  in	  previous	  studies,	  clearly	  beyond	  the	  cingulate	  gyrus.	  	  
	  
Studies	  that	  identified	  dFMC	  activity	  with	  externally	  guided	  inhibition	  	  
Interestingly,	   there	  are	  also	  a	  few	  studies	  that	  have	  found	  dFMC	  activation	  for	  
externally	   guided	   inhibition.	   We	   presume	   that	   this	   is	   due	   to	   the	   fact	   that,	   although	  
participants	  were	  cued	  to	  inhibit,	  the	  urge	  to	  act	  in	  these	  paradigms	  was	  so	  strong	  that	  
even	   in	   the	  presence	  of	  a	  stop	  signal	   they	  had	   to	  explicitly	  decide	   to	   inhibit.	  The	   first	  
study	  tried	  to	  introduce	  a	  more	  ecologically	  valid	  experimental	  setting	  by	  examining	  the	  
suppression	  of	  an	  extremely	  strong	  behavioral	  urge,	  namely	  the	  avoidance	  of	  pain	  (Lynn	  
et	   al.,	   in	   revision).	  Here,	   participants	   received	   thermal	  pain	   stimulation	   to	   alternating	  
inner	  wrists	  and	  could	  terminate	  the	  stimulation	  via	  button	  presses	  with	  the	  opposing	  
hand.	  The	  benefit	  of	  this	  study	  was	  that	  the	  urge	  to	  inhibit	  built	  organically	  over	  time,	  
and	   was	   present	   in	   each	   trial.	   In	   addition,	   participants	   were	   given	   sufficient	   time	   to	  
make	  a	  decision	  on	  choice	  trials,	  with	  an	  equivalent	  proportion	  of	  choice	  and	  directed	  
trials,	   discouraging	   them	   from	   pre-­‐deciding.	   Accordingly,	   this	   paradigm	   could	   be	  
expected	   to	   elicit	   a	   strong	   urge	   to	   act	   and	   to	   trigger	   disengagement	   in	   order	   to	  
successfully	   inhibit	  the	  urge.	   Indeed,	  dFMC	  activation	  was	  observed	  when	  participants	  
inhibited	   their	   pain	   avoidance	   response	   (peaking	   more	   ventrally	   in	   the	   amPFC	   but	  
extending	  dorsally	  into	  the	  dFMC).	  However,	  in	  this	  study,	  equivalent	  dFMC	  activity	  was	  
observed	  for	  both	  intentional	  and	  externally	  guided	  inhibition.	  This	  may	  reflect	  that	  the	  
suppression	  of	  very	  strong	  urges	  relies	  on	  intentional	  disengagement	  regardless	  of	  how	  
the	  decision	  to	  inhibit	  is	  initially	  determined.	  
This	   interpretation	   is	   bolstered	   by	   similar	   findings	   in	   the	   realm	   of	   addiction	  
research,	  particularly	  the	  suppression	  of	  cigarette	  cravings	  (Brody	  et	  al.,	  2007,	  Hanlon	  
et	   al.,	   2013,	   Hartwell	   et	   al.,	   2013).	   In	   these	   studies,	   participants	   were	   instructed	   to	  
apply	   different	   strategies	  when	   faced	  with	   craving-­‐inducing	   stimuli,	   namely	   either	   to	  
resist	   the	   craving	   via	   self-­‐distraction	   or	   other	   strategies,	   or	   to	   permit	   the	   craving	  
sensation	  to	  unfold.	  Although	  the	  response	  was	  entirely	  determined	  by	  the	  instruction,	  
reliable	  activity	  was	  found	  in	   large	  clusters	  along	  the	  dFMC	  and	  the	  anterior	  cingulate	  
when	  contrasting	  resist	  with	  permit	  conditions.	  Accordingly,	  when	  faced	  with	  extremely	  




needs),	  the	  difference	  between	  intentional	  and	  externally	  guided	  inhibition	  seems	  to	  be	  
diminished	   because	   the	   demand	   to	   override	   prepotent	   response	   tendencies	   requires	  
strong	  activation	  of	  the	  goal	  to	   inhibit.	   Instruction	  alone	   is	   insufficient	  to	  achieve	  that	  
end,	  so	  internal	  resources	  must	  be	  recruited	  in	  order	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  experimental	  
constraints.	  
	  
Studies	  that	  did	  not	  identify	  dFMC	  activity	  with	  intentional	  inhibition	  
Finally,	   we	   would	   like	   to	   also	   mention	   two	   studies	   that	   did	   not	   identify	  
inhibition-­‐related	   dFMC	   activity,	   despite	   superficially	   appearing	   to	   involve	   similar	  
demands.	   The	   first	   study	   was	   designed	   to	   mimic	   a	   stop	   signal	   paradigm	   but	   with	   a	  
choice	  cue	  that	  left	  it	  open	  to	  participants	  whether	  to	  inhibit	  the	  response	  or	  not	  (Kühn	  
&	  Brass,	  2009).	  In	  75%	  of	  trials,	  participants	  were	  instructed	  to	  press	  one	  of	  four	  keys	  in	  
response	  to	  a	  stimulus	   in	  order	  to	   induce	  a	  very	  strong	  response	  tendency.	  When	  the	  
color	  of	  the	  stimulus	  changed	  they	  either	  had	  to	  withhold	  the	  key	  press	  or	  to	  decide	  to	  
press	   or	   inhibit	   depending	   on	   the	   color.	   When	   comparing	   trials	   where	   participants	  
decided	   to	   inhibit	   (decide	   nogo)	   with	   trials	   where	   a	   stimulus	   indicated	   not	   to	   act	  
(instructed	  nogo),	  massive	  activation	  in	  the	  RCZ	  was	  found,	  but	  no	  activation	  in	  dFMC.	  
When	  comparing	  the	  decide	  nogo	  with	  the	  instructed	  nogo,	  no	  activation	  was	  found	  at	  
all.	   SSRTs	   for	   instructed	  nogo	   and	  decide	  nogo	  were	   very	   similar,	   indicating	   that	   in	   a	  
situation	  where	  the	  time	  pressure	  to	  decide	  between	  inhibiting	  and	  acting	  is	  very	  high,	  
participants	  first	   inhibit	  the	  response	  and	  then	  decide	  whether	  or	  not	  to	  reinitiate	  the	  
response.	   This	   later	   decision,	   however,	   does	   not	   require	   any	   disengagement	   from	   a	  
strong	   impulse	   because	   the	   action	   had	   been	   inhibited	   beforehand.	   Therefore,	   no	  
activation	  of	  the	  dFMC	  could	  in	  fact	  be	  expected.	  
Another	   study	   that	   tried	   to	   investigate	   intentional	   inhibition	   in	   a	   more	  
ecologically-­‐valid	  context	  examined	  the	   inhibition	  of	   taboo	  word	  utterances	   (Severens	  
et	   al.,	   2012).	   Participants	   completed	   a	   word	   reading	   task	   with	   stimulus	   pairs	   that	  
frequently	   elicit	   spoonerisms.	   For	  half	   of	   the	  word	  pairs,	   spoonerisms	   resulted	   in	   the	  
utterance	   of	   socially	   inappropriate	   taboo	   words,	   and	   for	   the	   other	   half	   in	   neutral	  
expressions.	   The	   authors	   contrasted	   taboo	  with	   neutral	   trials,	   under	   the	   assumption	  
that	  taboo	  word	  pairs	  would	  elicit	  additional	  inhibition	  processes	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  the	  
utterance	  of	  socially	  inappropriate	  expressions.	  This	  contrast	  yielded	  activity	  in	  the	  right	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IFG,	   but	   not	   in	   the	   dFMC.	   Thus,	   although	   this	   paradigm	   did	   not	   entail	   any	   explicit	  
external	   stop	   signals,	   the	   observed	   brain	   activity	   was	   very	   similar	   to	   studies	  
investigating	   externally	   guided	   inhibition.	   This	   could	   be	   related	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   there	  
was	  no	   real	   choice	   for	   participants	   in	   this	   study	   (both	   the	   explicit	   instruction	   to	   read	  
word	  pairs	  and	  the	  implicit	   instruction	  to	   inhibit	  spoonerisms	  were	  constant	  across	  all	  
trials).	  In	  addition,	  the	  speeded	  nature	  of	  the	  task	  did	  not	  leave	  any	  time	  for	  decision-­‐
making.	  Finally,	   it	  needs	  to	  be	  considered	  that	   in	  this	  case	  a	  social	  norm	  (not	  to	  utter	  
socially	  undesirable	  expressions)	  might	  be	  internalized	  and	  act	  as	  a	  stop	  signal.	  	  
To	   summarize,	   it	   appears	   rather	   difficult	   to	   define	   a	   priori	   properties	   of	   tasks	  
that	   can	   be	   used	   to	   predict	   dFMC	   activation	   in	   intentional	   inhibition,	   yet	   the	   criteria	  
based	  on	   the	  disengagement	  account	  appear	   to	  provide	  a	   stable	  means	  of	  navigating	  
existing	  data.	  Paradigms	  that	  have	  been	  successful	  in	  revealing	  dFMC	  activation	  balance	  
different	  characteristics.	  First,	  as	  outlined	  above,	  inhibition	  must	  be	  based	  on	  a	  decision	  
to	   disengage	   from	   a	   strong	   impulse	   or	   urge.	   However,	   such	   a	   decision	   does	   not	  
necessarily	   have	   to	  be	   an	  explicit	   requirement	  of	   the	  experimental	   paradigm	  but	   can	  
also	  be	   induced	  by	  a	  very	  strong	  impulse	  to	  act.	   In	  situations	  where	  the	  urge	  to	  act	   is	  
extremely	  strong,	  participants	  might	  be	  involved	  in	  a	  decision	  process	  even	  when	  they	  
are	  explicitly	  told	  to	  inhibit	  and	  therefore	  formally	  do	  not	  have	  to	  decide.	  On	  the	  other	  
hand,	   in	  situations	  where	  no	  explicit	   instruction	  to	   inhibit	   is	  given,	   inhibition	  might	  be	  
nevertheless	   automatically	   induced	   by	   contextual	   information	   affording	   inhibition	   of	  
the	   action	   (e.g.	   the	   inhibition	   of	   taboo	  words).	   Secondly,	   the	   timing	   of	   the	   inhibition	  
process	  is	  crucial,	  with	  too	  much	  time	  pressure	  leading	  to	  ‘offline’	  decisions	  to	  inhibit.	  
However,	   if	   participants	   are	   not	   engaged	   in	   a	   specific	   behavior	   at	   the	  moment	   they	  
decide	  to	  inhibit,	  no	  disengagement	  is	  required.	  
Given	   the	   above	   critical	   determinants	   of	   disengagement,	   and	   taking	   into	  
account	   the	   varied	   paradigms	   employed	   thus	   far	   to	   investigate	   intentional	   inhibition,	  
one	   may	   directly	   assess	   the	   intersection	   of	   self-­‐control	   strategies	   and	   intentional	  
inhibition	  by	  optimizing	  experimental	  designs	   to	  more	  closely	   test	   the	  disengagement	  
hypothesis.	  It	  would	  also	  be	  useful	  to	  manipulate	  the	  disengagement	  strategy	  itself,	  by	  
inducing	  a	  first-­‐	  or	  third-­‐person	  perspective	  prior	  to	  an	   intentional	   inhibition	  task	  that	  




first-­‐person	  perspective,	  an	  objective	  stance	  promotes	  both	  behaviorally	  measured	  self-­‐
control,	  and	  dFMC	  activation.	  
	  
Distinguishing	  intentional	  inhibition	  from	  proactive	  inhibition	  
Finally,	  we	  would	   like	   to	  distinguish	   the	  concept	  of	   intentional	   inhibition	   from	  the	  
related	   concept	   of	   proactive	   inhibition.	   Recently,	   proactive	   inhibition	   has	   been	  
introduced	   in	   an	   attempt	   to	   relate	   stop-­‐signal	   response	   inhibition	   more	   closely	   to	  
impulse	  control	  in	  realistic	  scenarios	  (see	  Aron,	  2011	  for	  a	  review).	  To	  this	  end,	  studies	  
have	   examined	   how	   participants	   adjust	   their	   motor	   preparation	   when	   advance	  
information	   is	   given	   about	   either	   the	   likelihood	   of	   a	   stop	   signal	   (e.g.,	   by	   comparing	  
blocks	  with	  and	  without	  stop	  signals)	  or	   its	  specificity	   (e.g.,	  by	  comparing	  stop	  signals	  
that	  apply	  to	  all	  vs.	  only	  certain	  possible	  responses).	  Accordingly,	  this	  setup	  allows	  for	  
the	   investigation	  of	   how	  one	   “proactively”	   adjusts	   their	   response	  preparation	   for	   the	  
possibility	  of	  a	  stop	  signal,	  rather	  than	  only	  focusing	  on	  the	  “reactive”	  implementation	  
of	   inhibition	   in	   response	   to	   it.	   Preliminary	   evidence	   resulting	   from	   this	   procedure	  
indicates	  that	  participants	  are	  able	  use	  the	  advance	   information	  provided	  by	  the	  cues	  
(i.e.,	  their	  SSRTs	  on	  nogo	  trials	   is	  reduced	  and	  their	  RTs	  on	  go-­‐trials	   is	   increased	  when	  
they	  know	  a	  stop	  may	  occur),	  and	  these	  adjustments	  seem	  to	  rely	  on	  similar	  brain	  areas	  
as	  the	  reactive	  implementation	  of	  inhibition	  (Chikazoe	  et	  al.,	  2009;	  Jahfari	  et	  al.,	  2010;	  
Zandbelt	  et	  al.,	  2013).	  This	  underscores	  the	  notion	  that	  the	  external	  inhibition	  network	  
(i.e.,	   the	  rIFG,	  the	  pre-­‐SMA,	  and	  the	  basal	  ganglia)	   is	  not	  only	  activated	  bottom-­‐up	  by	  
the	   appearance	   of	   a	   stop	   signal,	   but	   also	   top-­‐down	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   strategic	  
adjustments.	  
However,	   although	   proactive	   inhibition	   can	   be	   considered	   as	   resulting	   from	  
endogenous	   preparation	   processes,	   it	   still	   differs	   from	   the	   scope	   of	   intentional	  
inhibition	   as	   outlined	   in	   this	   review.	   Most	   importantly,	   proactive	   inhibition	   is	   still	  
concerned	   with	   stimulus-­‐guided	   behavior	   in	   which	   the	   outcome	   (action	   or	   omission	  
thereof)	  will	  be	  determined	  by	  external	  events,	  whereas	  intentional	  inhibition	  refers	  to	  
the	  cancellation	  of	  behavior	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  free	  choice	  and	  internal	  states.	  In	  addition,	  
proactive	   inhibition	   influences	  primarily	   the	  readiness	   to	  perform	  or	   inhibit	  an	  action,	  
whereas	  intentional	  inhibition	  operates	  on	  ongoing	  behavior.	  Nevertheless,	  it	  could	  be	  
an	   interesting	   perspective	   for	   future	   research	   to	   examine	   how	   the	   brain	   networks	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involved	   in	   proactive	   and	   intentional	   inhibition	   may	   interact,	   especially	   under	  
motivationally	  salient	  circumstances.	  	  
	  
CONCLUSION	  
	   In	  this	  review,	  we	  have	  summarized	  previous	  literature	  on	  intentional	  inhibition,	  
highlighting	   that	   this	   capacity	   has	   been	   frequently	   linked	  with	   the	   dFMC,	   though	   the	  
precise	  role	  of	  this	  region	  has	  been	  elusive.	  	  We	  propose	  a	  disengagement	  hypothesis,	  
whereby	   the	   dFMC	   contributes	   to	   self-­‐control	   by	   separating	   a	   person	   from	   their	  
immediate	  urges.	   This	   assumption	   is	   consistent	  with	   the	   location	  of	   the	  dFMC	  at	   the	  
interface	  of	  motor	  control	  and	  social	  cognition.	  Furthermore,	  this	  hypothesis	  provides	  
the	  means	   for	   an	   integrative	   account	   of	   intentional	   inhibition,	  moving	   beyond	  motor	  
control	  and	  encompassing	  social	  psychological	  conceptions	  of	  self-­‐regulation.	  Attending	  
to	  the	  critical	  determinants	  of	  intentional	  inhibition	  would	  permit	  direct	  testing	  of	  this	  
hypothesis,	   and	   likely	   inform	   future	   research	   on	   the	   core	   mechanisms	   underlying	  
endogenous	  control	  of	  prepotent	  impulses.	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Neural	  underpinnings	  of	  intentional	  inhibition	  reflect	  





Behavioral	   inhibition	   is	   thought	   to	   be	   pivotal	   for	   successful	   self-­‐regulation.	   Although	   the	   past	  
decade	   has	   seen	   extensive	   research	   on	   the	   neural	   basis	   of	   inhibitory	   control,	   little	   is	   known	  
about	   how	   findings	   from	   the	   laboratory	   relate	   to	   self-­‐regulatory	   behaviors	   in	   real	   life.	   This	   is	  
because	  most	  experimental	  paradigms	  either	  provide	  external	  information	  that	  fully	  determines	  
the	   decision	   to	   act	   or	   inhibit,	   or	   employ	   rather	   arbitrary	   decision	   scenarios	   absent	   subjective	  
behavioral	  urges,	  limiting	  their	  ecological	  validity.	  We	  recently	  introduced	  a	  novel	  paradigm	  that	  
sought	  to	  overcome	  these	  limitations	  by	  requiring	  participants	  to	  intentionally	  inhibit	  the	  highly	  
prepotent	  pain	  avoidance	  response.	  Having	  characterized	  the	  neural	  mechanisms	  involved	  in	  the	  
inhibition	  of	  pain	  avoidance	  behavior,	  we	  now	  examine	  to	  what	  extent	   inhibition-­‐related	  brain	  
activity	   in	   our	   paradigm	   is	   related	   to	   individual	   differences	   in	   self-­‐regulatory	   abilities.	   To	   this	  
end,	  we	  examined	  self-­‐regulatory	  abilities	  both	  at	  the	  trait	  level	  (by	  means	  of	  self-­‐report)	  and	  at	  
the	  state	   level	  (by	  means	  of	  an	  ego	  depletion	  manipulation).	  Replicating	  our	  previous	  findings,	  
we	   found	   that	   inhibition	   of	   the	   pain	   avoidance	   response	   recruits	   a	   widespread	   network	   of	  
inferior	  frontal,	  medial	  frontal,	   insular	  and	  posterior	  brain	  regions.	  Importantly,	  activity	  in	  core	  
components	  of	   this	  network	  was	  modulated	  by	   trait	   levels	  of	   self-­‐control.	  That	   is,	  participants	  
with	  high	  self-­‐regulatory	  abilities	  recruited	  these	  areas	  more	  strongly	  for	  inhibition.	  By	  contrast,	  
no	   effect	   of	   our	   state	   manipulation	   was	   evident,	   potentially	   indicating	   problems	   with	  
transference	   of	   ego	   depletion	  manipulations	   to	   the	   scanner	   environment.	   Implications	   of	   our	  





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





Behavioral	   inhibition	   is	   a	   prominent	  means	  by	  which	   successful	   self-­‐regulation	  
can	  be	  expressed	  (Baumeister,	  2014).	  Not	  only	  are	  such	  omissions	  a	  daily	  struggle	   for	  
every	  human	  being,	  but	  a	  number	  of	  neuropsychiatric	  conditions	  are	  also	  characterized	  
by	   a	   lack	   of	   inhibitory	   control	   over	   unwanted	   yet	   strong	   behavioral	   impulses	   (e.g.,	  
Tourette’s	   syndrome,	   Kwak,	   Dat	   Vuong,	   &	   Jankovic,	   2003;	   anarchic	   hand	   syndrome,	  
Marchetti	  &	  Della	  Sala,	  1998;	  and	  addiction,	  Smith,	  Mattick,	  Jamadar,	  &	  Iredale,	  2014).	  
Thus,	  revealing	  the	  neural	  basis	  of	  inhibitory	  control	  over	  impulsive	  behavior	  is	  key	  both	  
for	   understanding	   the	   mechanisms	   of	   adaptive	   self-­‐regulation,	   and	   for	   advancing	  
clinical	  interventions.	  That	  being	  said,	  behavioral	  inhibition	  is	  a	  concept	  that	  has	  proven	  
notoriously	  challenging	  to	  study.	  
In	  cognitive	  neuroscience,	   inhibitory	  control	  has	  classically	  been	   related	   to	   the	  
integrity	  of	  the	  right	  inferior	  frontal	  gyrus	  (rIFG,	  see	  Aron,	  Robbins,	  &	  Poldrack,	  2014	  for	  
a	  recent	  review).	  A	  host	  of	  evidence	   indicates	  that	  the	  rIFG	  plays	  a	  pivotal	   role	   in	  the	  
suppression	  of	  prepared	  actions	  in	  response	  to	  the	  occurrence	  of	  external	  stop	  or	  no-­‐go	  
signals	   (e.g.,	  Chambers,	  Garavan,	  &	  Bellgrove,	  2009;	  Forstmann	  et	  al.,	  2008;	  Wiecki	  &	  
Frank,	   2013),	   presumably	   in	   conjunction	   with	   the	   pre-­‐supplementary	   motor	   area	  
(preSMA)	  and	  the	  subthalamic	  nucleus	  (Aron	  &	  Poldrack,	  2006).	  However,	  the	  transfer	  
of	   these	   findings	   to	   self-­‐regulation	   in	  everyday	   life	   is	  questionable,	   as	   the	  decision	   to	  
inhibit	  is	  fully	  determined	  by	  external	  stimuli	  in	  these	  paradigms	  (henceforth	  referred	  to	  
as	  externally	  guided	  inhibition).	  In	  realistic	  scenarios,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  decision	  to	  
withhold	   an	   impulsive	   act	   must	   typically	   originate	   endogenously.	   In	   an	   attempt	   to	  
overcome	   this	   limitation,	   the	   concept	   of	   intentional	   inhibition	   has	   recently	   been	  
introduced	  to	  the	  literature	  (Brass	  &	  Haggard,	  2007).	  Intentional	  inhibition	  refers	  to	  the	  
cancellation	  of	  behavior	  on	   the	  basis	  of	   free	  choice	  and	  thus	  strongly	  emphasizes	   the	  
intentionality	   of	   inhibitory	   control.	   In	   the	   first	   studies	   to	   investigate	   this	   capacity,	  
participants	   were	   asked	   to	   chose	   between	   either	   performing	   a	   simple	   action	   (e.g.,	  
pressing	   a	   button)	   or	   preparing	   the	   same	   movement	   but	   withholding	   it	   at	   the	   last	  
possible	   moment	   (e.g.,	   Kühn,	   Haggard,	   &	   Brass,	   2009).	   Under	   these	   conditions,	  
inhibition-­‐related	  brain	  activity	  was	  found	  in	  the	  dorsal	   frontal	  median	  cortex	  (dFMC),	  
but	  not	  in	  the	  rIFG,	  indicating	  that	  intentional	  inhibition	  may	  rely	  on	  neural	  mechanisms	  
distinct	   from	   those	   of	   externally	   guided	   inhibition.	   However,	   the	   transfer	   of	   these	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findings	  to	  self-­‐regulation	  is	  still	  a	  difficult	  gap	  to	  bridge.	  Although	  decisions	  to	  suppress	  
behavior	  were	  generated	  endogenously,	  they	  were	  also	  rather	  arbitrary	  (e.g.,	  pressing	  a	  
button	  or	  not),	   leaving	  participants	  with	   little	  prior	  motivation	  to	  act.	  This	   is	   in	  strong	  
contrast	   with	   self-­‐regulation	   in	   real	   life,	   which	   is	   characterized	   by	   the	   presence	   of	   a	  
strong	  behavioral	  urge	  that	  is	  in	  conflict	  with	  individual	  goals	  (see	  Lynn,	  Muhle-­‐Karbe,	  &	  
Brass,	  2014;	  Lynn,	  Van	  Dessel,	  &	  Brass,	  2013).	  	  
We	   recently	   introduced	   a	   novel	   paradigm	   that	   aimed	   at	   combining	   these	   two	  
critical	   aspects	   of	   behavioral	   inhibition	   in	   self-­‐regulation:	   intentionality	   and	   the	  
presence	  of	  behavioral	  urges	  (Lynn	  et	  al.,	  2013;	  Lynn	  et	  al.,	  under	  revision).	  To	  this	  end,	  
we	   investigated	   the	   suppression	   of	   the	   pain	   avoidance	   response	   (PAR).	   Thermal	   pain	  
stimulation	  was	  applied	  to	  alternating	  inner	  wrists	  and	  participants	  could	  terminate	  the	  
stimulation	   via	   a	   button	   press	   with	   the	   non-­‐stimulated	   hand.	   On	   some	   trials,	   an	  
external	   cue	   informed	   participants	   about	   the	   required	   response	   (externally	   guided	  
trials),	  whereas	  on	  other	  trials	  participants	  could	  freely	  chose	  whether	  or	  not	  to	  persist	  
terminating	   the	   stimulation	   (choice	   trials).	   The	   advantage	   of	   this	   paradigm	   is	   that	  
Inhibition	  requires	  the	  suppression	  of	  a	  strong	  behavioral	  urge	  that	  is	  present	  on	  each	  
trial	  and	  in	  each	  participant.	  Intriguingly,	  under	  these	  motivationally	  salient	  conditions,	  
inhibition-­‐related	   activation	   was	   found	   in	   the	   rIFG	   and	   in	   the	   dFMC,	   regardless	   of	  
whether	  the	  decision	  to	  inhibit	  the	  PAR	  was	  externally	  guided	  or	  intentionally	  chosen.	  
This	   finding	   strongly	   indicates	   that	   the	   motivational	   context	   is	   crucial	   when	  
investigating	   behavioral	   inhibition.	   Moreover,	   it	   emphasizes	   that	   the	   brain	   regions	  
implicated	   in	   externally	   guided	   and	   intentional	   inhibition,	   previously	   thought	   to	   be	  
involved	  in	  largely	  independent	  functions,	  might	  operate	  in	  concert	  when	  genuine	  self-­‐
control	  needs	  to	  be	  exerted.	  	  
In	   the	  present	  study,	  we	  wanted	  to	  elaborate	  on	  this	  notion	   in	  more	  depth	  by	  
relating	  inhibition-­‐related	  activity	  in	  our	  paradigm	  to	  inter-­‐individual	  differences	  in	  self-­‐
regulation.	   To	   this	   end,	   we	   employed	   two	   experimental	   approaches	   examining	   self-­‐
control	  both	  at	   the	  state	   level	  and	  the	   trait	   level.	  First,	   to	  examine	  self-­‐control	  at	   the	  
state	   level,	   we	   employed	   an	   ego	   depletion	  manipulation.	   Ego	   depletion	   is	   a	   concept	  
from	  social	  psychology	  and	  refers	   to	   the	  process	  by	  which	  depletion	  of	  a	   limited	  self-­‐
regulatory	   resource	  during	  one	  effortful	   task	   leads	   to	   impediment	  of	   self-­‐control	   in	   a	  




prior	   to	   scanning,	   half	   of	   our	   participants	   we	   assigned	   to	   an	   effortful	   depletion	  
condition,	  whereas	   the	  other	  half	   completed	  a	   less	  demanding	   control	   condition	   (see	  
methods	   section).	   Second,	   to	   examine	   self-­‐control	   at	   the	   trait	   level,	  we	   administered	  
the	   Self-­‐Regulation	   Questionnaire	   (Brown,	   Miller,	   &	   Lawendowski,	   1999)	   to	   all	  
participants	   one	   week	   before	   scanning.	   This	   questionnaire	   encompasses	   seven	  
processes	  subserving	  successful	  self-­‐regulatory	  behaviors	  in	  everyday	  life	  as	  defined	  by	  
Miller	  &	  Brown	  (1991).	  We	  hypothesized	  that	  higher	  degrees	  of	  self-­‐regulatory	  ability,	  
both	  at	  the	  state	  level	  and	  at	  the	  trait	  level,	  would	  be	  reflected	  in	  stronger	  activation	  of	  
self-­‐control	  related	  brain	  regions	  when	  inhibiting	  the	  PAR.	  	  	  	  
	  
METHODS	  AND	  MATERIALS	  
Participants	  
Forty	  Dutch-­‐speaking	  participants	  (15	  males)	  took	  part	  in	  the	  study	  (mean	  age	  =	  
22.38	  years,	  SD	  =	  4.07);	  each	  reported	  as	  healthy	  and	  with	  no	  history	  of	  neurological,	  
pain,	  or	   circulatory	  disorders.	  All	  participants	  gave	  written	   informed	  consent,	  and	   the	  
study	   was	   approved	   by	   the	   Medical	   Ethical	   Review	   Board	   of	   the	   Ghent	   University	  
hospital,	   in	   accordance	   with	   the	   declaration	   of	   Helsinki.	   	   Participants	   were	   right-­‐
handed,	   as	   assessed	   by	   the	   Edinburgh	   Inventory	   (Oldfield,	   1971),	   and	   were	  
compensated	   thirty-­‐five	   euros	   for	   their	   participation.	   	   Two	   participants	   had	   to	   be	  
removed	  from	  all	  analyses	  due	  to	  severe	  head	  movement	  artefacts	  (>5mm).	  
	  
Experimental	  procedure	  
	   Methods	   were	   similar	   to	   those	   of	   Lynn	   et	   al.	   (under	   revision),	   with	   two	  
important	   exceptions.	   First,	   because	   no	   substantial	   differences	   were	   found	   between	  
intentional	  and	  externally-­‐guided	  inhibition	  in	  the	  prior	  study,	  we	  opted	  to	  use	  only	  free	  
choice	   trials	  here	   to	   increase	   the	   statistical	  power	  of	  our	  design.	   	   This	   also	   raises	   the	  
interesting	   question	   of	   whether	   similar	   results	   would	   be	   found	   in	   an	   unconstrained	  
context	   of	   exclusively	   free	   choice	   trials,	   or	   whether	   a	   mixture	   of	   endogenous	   and	  
exogenous	  decisions	  are	  necessary	  to	  elicit	  the	  activation	  patterns	  found	  in	  Lynn	  et	  al.	  
(under	   revision).	   	   Second,	   the	   data	   of	   the	   present	   study	   were	   collected	   as	   part	   of	   a	  
larger	   experimental	   endeavor,	   in	   which	   the	   action-­‐outcome	   contingency	   was	  
manipulated	   in	   one	   of	   the	   two	   blocks	   (counterbalanced).	   	   In	   this	   second	   ‘non-­‐
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contingent’	  block,	  the	  outcome	  of	  a	  response	  was	  determined	  randomly,	  such	  that	  the	  
pain	   stimulation	   would	   occasionally	   persist	   following	   a	   button	   press,	   or	   conversely,	  
terminate	  early	  despite	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  response,	  thus	  eliminating	  the	  expected	  response	  
contingency2.	  This	  paper	  is	  based	  only	  on	  the	  data	  of	  the	  contingent	  block	  because	  here	  
we	   are	   interested	   in	   relating	   the	   previously	   established	   patterns	   of	   inhibition-­‐related	  
activity	   to	   self-­‐control.	   	   Data	   of	   the	   non-­‐contingent	   block	   will	   be	   presented	   in	   an	  
independent	  report.	  
Pain	   tolerance	   threshold	   determination.	   Pain	   was	   induced	   via	   a	   thermode	  
connected	  to	  a	  Medoc	  PATHWAY	  device	  (MEDOC,	  Haifa,	  Israel),	  an	  apparatus	  designed	  
for	   the	   induction	   of	   thermal	   pain	   using	   cold	   or	   hot	   stimulation.	   The	   temperature	   at	  
which	   participants	   felt	   a	   sufficient	   amount	   of	   pain	  was	   determined	   during	   a	   pre-­‐test	  
session	  taking	  place	  one	  week	  prior	  to	  scanning.	  Participants	  were	  exposed	  to	  26	  trials	  
in	  which	   the	   thermal	   sensation	   gradually	   increased	   over	   five	   seconds	   from	  32°C	   to	   a	  
randomized	   destination	   temperature	   between	   45	   and	   50°C	   (in	   increments	   of	   .25	  
degrees),	   a	   slope	   comparable	   to	   that	   of	   the	   experimental	   trials.	   After	   each	   trial,	   the	  
thermode	   returned	   instantly	   to	  baseline	   temperature,	  and	  participants	  were	  asked	   to	  
rate	   their	   perceived	   pain	   on	   a	   scale	   from	   zero	   to	   eight,	  with	   zero	   being	   no	   pain	   and	  
eight	  being	  the	  worst	  possible	  pain.	  The	  destination	  temperature	  employed	  in	  the	  main	  
experiment	   was	   computed	   for	   each	   participant	   as	   the	   highest	   temperature	   at	   which	  
they	  rated	  their	  pain	  as	  a	  six3.	  This	  method	  was	  revealed	  during	  piloting	  to	  yield	  more	  
accurate	   tolerance	   threshold	   measurements	   than	   merely	   requiring	   participants	   to	  
indicate	  the	  maximum	  heat	  they	  could	  withstand	  when	  exposed	  to	  a	  steadily	  increasing	  
temperature.	  Importantly,	  participants	  were	  free	  to	  press	  a	  button	  at	  any	  point	  during	  
the	  threshold	  determination	  in	  order	  to	  terminate	  the	  trial.	  
Depletion	  manipulation.	   	  The	  day	  of	  scanning,	  participants	  were	  asked	  to	   rate	  
their	  affect	  and	  tiredness	  upon	  arrival.	   	  Valence	  of	  affect	  was	  measured	  with	  the	  Self-­‐
Assessment	  Manikin	  (SAM;	  Lang,	  1980),	  while	  tiredness	  was	  rated	  on	  a	  scale	  of	  0	  to	  10,	  
with	   0	   indicating	   “not	   tired	   at	   all”	   and	   10	   indicating	   “very	   tired.”	   	   Participants	   then	  
completed	   either	   a	   depletion	   task,	   designed	   to	   exhaust	   limited	   self-­‐regulatory	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resources,	   or	   a	   control	   task,	   described	   below.	   	   Following	   the	   task,	   they	   rated	   how	  
difficult	  the	  task	  was,	  and	  how	  much	  effort	  it	  took	  to	  complete	  the	  task	  (both	  on	  a	  scale	  
of	   0	   to	   10,	   with	   0	   indicating	   “not	   difficult/no	   effort	   at	   all”	   and	   10	   indicating	   “very	  
difficult/very	   much	   effort”).	   	   The	   efficacy	   of	   the	   depletion	   manipulation	   was	   then	  
evaluated	   prior	   to	   scanning	   with	   an	   anagram	   task	   (see	   Baumeister	   et	   al.,	   1998,	  
experiment	   3,	   for	   a	   similar	   task).	   	   Participants	   were	   asked	   to	   solve	   ten	   six-­‐letter	  
anagrams,	   two	   of	   which	   were	   unsolvable	   nonsense	   words.	   Briefer	   persistence	   at	   an	  
unsolvable	   task	  and	  a	   reduced	  number	  of	  anagrams	   solved	  are	   taken	  as	   indicators	  of	  
depletion.	   Again,	   following	   completion	   of	   the	   anagram	   task,	   participants	   rated	   the	  
task’s	  difficulty	  and	  effort.	  
When	   selecting	   a	   depletion	   task,	   our	   primary	   concern	   was	   finding	   a	   way	   to	  
exhaust	   participants’	   self-­‐regulatory	   resources	   without	   using	   what	   would	   strictly	   be	  
classified	  as	  an	  inhibition	  task.	  	  Traditionally,	  ego	  depletion	  studies	  most	  often	  employ	  
tasks	   such	   as	   suppressing	   thoughts	   and	   emotions	   (see	   Hagger,	   Wood,	   Stiff,	   &	  
Chatzisarantis,	  2010	  for	  a	  review).	  However,	  these	  tasks	  would	  introduce	  a	  confound	  to	  
our	   design	   when	   examining	   inhibition-­‐related	   brain	   activation	   as	   the	   dependent	  
measure.	   Based	   on	   several	   pilot	   studies4,	   we	   therefore	   chose	   a	   different	   depletion	  
method:	  participants	  solved	  math	  problems,	  consisting	  of	  addition	  and	  multiplication	  of	  
one-­‐	  to	  three-­‐digit	  numbers.	  They	  were	  instructed	  to	  solve	  as	  many	  math	  problems	  as	  
possible	  within	  a	  twenty-­‐minute	  time	  period.	  	  Those	  in	  the	  depletion	  group	  were	  given	  
several	  additional	  instructions:	  they	  should	  complete	  the	  problems	  in	  order	  (no	  skipping	  
to	  the	  easiest	  problems),	  they	  should	  only	  write	  solutions	  on	  the	  paper,	  not	  their	  work	  
(this	  should	  be	  maintained	  in	  working	  memory),	  and	  finally	  they	  were	  given	  headsets	  to	  
wear	   through	  which	  they	  heard	  a	  computer-­‐generated	  voice	  randomly	  naming	  single-­‐
digit	  numbers.	  This	  was	  meant	  to	  increase	  the	  cognitive	  load	  for	  ego	  depleted	  but	  not	  
control	  participants.	  	  
Task	   and	   stimuli.	   Participants	   received	   thermal	   pain	   stimulation	   during	   each	  
trial,	   applied	   via	   a	   thermode	   to	   alternating	   inner	   wrists.	   Each	   trial	   began	   with	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  We	  also	  piloted	  a	  depletion	  manipulation	  with	  a	  variant	  of	  the	  so-­‐called	  “e-­‐hunting”	  task	  where	  
participants	  are	  asked	  to	  cross	  out	  all	  instances	  of	  the	  letter	  ‘e’	  in	  a	  printed	  narrative	  for	  a	  longer	  time	  
period	  (see	  Debey,	  Verschuere,	  &	  Crombez,	  2012).	  However,	  as	  the	  manipulation	  with	  the	  math	  
problems	  was	  rated	  as	  more	  difficult	  and	  produced	  stronger	  effects	  on	  the	  anagram	  task,	  we	  opted	  to	  
use	  the	  math	  task	  as	  the	  depletion	  manipulation	  in	  the	  present	  study.	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presentation	  of	  a	  fixation	  cross	  for	  five	  seconds,	  during	  which	  time	  the	  temperature	  of	  
the	  thermode	  began	  to	  gradually	   increase	  from	  a	  baseline	  of	  32°C	  to	  the	  participant’s	  
individually	  determined	  tolerance	  threshold.	  Subsequently,	  a	  cue	  appeared	  in	  place	  of	  
the	   fixation	   cross,	   and	   persisted	   for	   the	   remainder	   of	   the	   pain	   stimulation.	   This	   cue	  
indicated	  that	  participants	  should	  select	  one	  of	  the	  two	  possible	  response	  options,	  and	  
either	   press	   the	   response	   button	   immediately,	   or	   persist	   and	   suppress	   the	   urge	   to	  
withdraw	  from	  the	  pain	  sensation	  (‘choice	  action’	  and	  ‘choice	  inhibition,’	  respectively).	  
Participants	   were	   requested	   to	   make	   their	   response	   decision	   at	   the	   moment	   of	   cue	  
onset	  and	  to	  choose	  both	  options	  approximately	  equally	  often	  over	  the	  course	  of	   the	  
experiment,	  but	  not	  to	  use	  any	  particular	  strategies	  (e.g.,	  simple	  response	  alternations)	  
or	  decide	   in	   advance	  of	   the	  presentation	  of	   the	   cue.	  Adherence	   to	   these	   instructions	  
was	   subsequently	   assessed	   by	   calculating	   each	   participant’s	   Random	   Number	  
Generation	   2	   (RNG2;	   an	   index	   optimized	   for	   two-­‐choice	   response	   sequences)	   score	  
using	  the	  program	  RgCalc	  (Towse	  &	  Neil,	  1998).	  RNG2	  scores	  range	  from	  0	  to	  1,	  with	  1	  
indicating	   complete	   sequence	   predictability.	   The	   temperature	   remained	   at	   tolerance	  
threshold	   for	   the	   next	   three	   seconds,	   or	   until	   the	   participant	   pressed	   the	   button	   to	  
terminate	   both	   the	   pain	   stimulation	   and	   the	   trial.	   	   Participants	   responded	   with	   the	  
index	  or	  middle	   finger	  of	   the	  arm	  not	  being	  stimulated	   (thereby	  providing	  a	   response	  
time	   for	   action	   trials).	   	   This	   was	   followed	   by	   a	   six	   second	   rest	   period.	   	   Afterwards,	  
prompts	  were	   presented	   for	   two	   seconds	   each,	   asking	   participants	   for	   verbal	   ratings	  
(collected	  via	  a	  microphone	   inside	  the	  scanner	  bore)	  of	  their	  perceived	  pain	  and	  their	  
subjective	  ‘urge	  to	  terminate	  the	  trial	  by	  pressing	  the	  button’	  (both	  on	  a	  scale	  of	  0	  –	  8).	  
Participants	  were	  then	  cued	  to	  alternate	  the	  arm	  placed	  atop	  the	  thermode,	  and	  were	  
given	   10	   seconds	   in	   which	   to	   accomplish	   this	   task	   with	   the	   assistance	   of	   an	  
experimenter	   who	   stood	   near	   the	   scanner	   bore.	   An	   experimenter,	   present	   in	   the	  
scanner	   room	   throughout	   the	   session,	   also	   placed	   a	   small	   sandbag	   over	   the	   to-­‐be	  
stimulated	  wrist	  in	  order	  to	  lend	  weight	  and	  prevent	  the	  participant	  from	  inadvertently	  
withdrawing	  from	  the	  pain	  source	  rather	  than	  button	  pressing.	  	  Each	  trial	  ended	  with	  an	  
additional	   six-­‐second	   rest	   period.	   A	   schematic	   overview	   of	   the	   trial	   structure	   is	  
presented	   in	   Figure	   1.	   Each	   participant	   had	   to	   perform	   forty	   trials	   per	   block.	  
Importantly,	   participants	   were	   free	   to	   press	   a	   button	   to	   immediately	   terminate	   the	  





Figure	  1.	  Schematic	  of	  a	  single	  trial.	  
	  
Post-­‐experimental	   debriefing	   and	   questionnaires.	   Following	   the	   scanning	  
session,	   participants	   were	   asked	   to	   again	   rate	   their	   mood	   and	   tiredness.	   	   They	   also	  
completed	   a	   funneled	   debriefing,	   which	   probed	   whether	   they	   used	   any	   particular	  
strategies	  during	  the	  experiment,	  whether	  they	  made	  their	  decisions	  in	  advance	  of	  the	  
cue,	  what	  proportion	  of	   inhibition	   they	  believed	   they	  performed,	  and	   their	   subjective	  
impression	  of	  the	  sensations	  elicited	  by	  the	  thermal	  stimulation.	  
	  
Behavioral	  data	  preparation	  	  	  
Trials	   in	  which	   participants	   did	   not	   place	   their	  wrist	   directly	   on	   the	   thermode	  
were	   indicated	  with	  pain	  and	  urge	  ratings	  of	  zero	  and	  were	  excluded	  from	  behavioral	  
and	  fMRI	  analysis.	  Likewise	  trials	  with	  reaction	  times	  above	  2000	  ms	  were	  removed,	  in	  
order	   to	   use	   a	   response	   window	   comparable	   to	   that	   of	   Lynn	   et	   al.	   (in	   revision)	   and	  
because	   we	   assume	   that	   such	   extremely	   lengthy	   delays	   before	   responding	   do	   not	  
reflect	  accurate	  following	  of	  the	  instructions	  to	  decide	  spontaneously	  and	  immediately	  
at	  the	  occurrence	  of	  the	  cue.	  Errors	  in	  the	  form	  of	  null	  ratings	  led	  to	  the	  exclusion	  of	  18	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trials	  (1520	  overall),	  all	  but	  one	  classified	  as	  inhibition	  trials	  (number	  of	  excluded	  trials	  
per	  participant:	  M	  =	  0.47,	  SD	  =	  1.25)	  from	  both	  behavioral	  and	  fMRI	  analysis.	  Errors	  in	  
the	  form	  of	  delayed	  response	  times	  led	  to	  the	  exclusion	  of	  65	  action	  trials	  (number	  of	  
excluded	   trials	   per	   participant:	  M	   =	   1.71,	   SD	   =	   2.80)	   from	   both	   behavioral	   and	   fMRI	  
analysis.	   Pain	   and	  urge	   ratings	  were	   analyzed	  using	   repeated-­‐measures	  ANOVAs	  with	  
RESPONSE	  (action	  vs.	  inhibition)	  as	  a	  within-­‐subjects	  factor	  and	  DEPLETION	  (control	  vs.	  
depleted)	  as	  a	  between-­‐subjects	  factor.	  Reaction	  times	  on	  action	  trials	  and	  the	  relative	  
proportion	  of	  inhibition	  trials	  were	  analyzed	  as	  a	  function	  of	  DEPLETION	  via	  two-­‐tailed	  
independent-­‐samples	  t-­‐tests.	  
	  
fMRI	  data	  acquisition	  and	  preprocessing	  
Data	   were	   acquired	   with	   a	   3T	   Siemens	  Magnetom	   Trio	  MRI	   system	   (Siemens	  
Medical	   Systems,	   Erlangen,	   Germany)	   using	   a	   32-­‐channel	   radiofrequency	   head	   coil.	  
Subjects	   were	   positioned	   headfirst	   and	   supine	   in	   the	   magnet	   bore.	   First,	   176	   high-­‐
resolution	  anatomical	  images	  were	  acquired	  using	  a	  T1-­‐weighted	  3D	  MPRAGE	  sequence	  
(TR	  =	  2,250	  ms,	  TE	  =	  4.18	  ms,	  TI	  =	  900	  ms,	  image	  matrix	  =	  256	  x	  256,	  FOV	  =	  256	  mm,	  flip	  
angle	  =	  9°,	  and	  voxel	  size	  =	  1	  x	  1	  x	  1	  mm).	  Whole-­‐brain	  functional	  images	  were	  then	  col-­‐
lected	   using	   a	   T2-­‐weighted	   echo-­‐planar	   imaging	   (EPI)	   sequence,	   sensitive	   to	   blood-­‐
oxygen-­‐level	  dependent	  contrast	   (TR	  =	  2,000	  ms,	  TE	  =	  35	  ms,	   image	  matrix	  =	  64	  x	  64,	  
FOV	  =	  224	  mm,	  flip	  angle	  =	  80°,	  slice	  thickness	  =	  3.0	  mm,	  distance	  factor	  =	  17%,	  voxel	  
size	  3.5	  x	  3.5	  x	  3.0	  mm,	  and	  30	  axial	  slices).	  A	  varying	  number	  of	  images	  were	  acquired	  
per	  run	  due	  to	  individual	  differences	  in	  choice	  behavior	  and	  reaction	  times.	  
All	  data	  were	  preprocessed	  and	  analyzed	  using	  Matlab	  and	  the	  SPM8	  software	  
(Wellcome	  Department	  of	  Cognitive	  Neurology,	  London,	  UK).	  To	  account	  for	  possible	  T1	  
relaxation	   effects,	   the	   first	   four	   scans	   of	   each	   EPI	   series	   were	   excluded	   from	   the	  
analysis.	   First,	   a	   mean	   image	   for	   all	   scan	   volumes	   was	   created,	   to	   which	   individual	  
volumes	  were	  spatially	  realigned	  using	  rigid	  body	  transformation.	  Thereafter,	  they	  were	  
slice	   time	   corrected	   using	   the	   first	   slice	   as	   a	   reference.	   The	   structural	   image	   of	   each	  
subject	  was	   coregistered	  with	   their	  mean	   functional	   image	   after	  which	   all	   functional	  
images	   were	   normalized	   to	   the	   Montreal	   Neurological	   Institute	   (Montreal,	   Quebec,	  
Canada)	  T1	   template.	  The	   images	  were	  resampled	   into	  3.5	  x	  3.5	  x	  3.5	  mm
	  
voxels	  and	  




high-­‐pass	  filter	  of	  128	  Hz	  was	  applied	  during	  fMRI	  data	  analysis.	  
	  
Statistical	  analyses	  
The	  first-­‐level	  statistical	  analyses	  were	  performed	  using	  a	  general	   linear	  model	  
(GLM,	  Friston	  et	  al.,	  1995).	  	  In	  order	  to	  distinguish	  the	  pre-­‐cue	  buildup	  of	  urge	  from	  the	  
moment	   of	   decision	   and	   subsequent	   inhibition,	   we	  modeled	   the	   five-­‐second	   pre-­‐cue	  
epoch	  and	  used	  the	  onset	  of	  the	  task	  cue	  as	  the	  main	  event	  of	  interest	  in	  the	  GLM.	  	  It	  is	  
important	   to	   note	   that	   all	   trials	   were	   identical	   in	   terms	   of	   stimulation	   up	   to	   and	  
including	  cue	  onset,	  and	  for	  an	  average	  of	  740	  ms	  afterwards	  (i.e.,	  average	  time	  it	  took	  
to	   respond	   in	   action	   trials).	   Four	   regressors	  were	  defined	   reflecting	   the	   experimental	  
conditions	   and	   the	   pre-­‐cue	   epochs	   for	   each	   experimental	   condition	   (i.e.,	   ‘action	   pre-­‐
cue,’	   ‘inhibition	   pre-­‐cue,’	   ‘action	   cue	   onset,’	   ‘inhibition	   cue	   onset’).	   	   Six	   regressors	  
defining	  head	  movements	  were	  included	  to	  account	  for	  any	  residual	  movement-­‐related	  
effects.	  All	  regressors	  were	  convolved	  with	  a	  canonical	  hemodynamic	  response	  function	  
(HRF).	   Contrast	   images	   were	   computed	   separately	   for	   each	   participant	   to	   compare	  
parameter	  estimates	  of	  the	  relevant	  conditions.	  	  
These	  contrast	  images	  were	  then	  advanced	  to	  the	  second	  level,	  using	  a	  one-­‐way	  
ANOVA	   design	   as	   implemented	   in	   SPM8	   with	   the	   factor	   RESPONSE	   (action	   vs.	  
inhibition).	  We	  examined	  the	  main	  effect	  of	   inhibition	  to	  reveal	  brain	  areas	  that	  were	  
more	  active	  on	  inhibition	  trials	  than	  on	  action	  trials.	  To	  control	  for	  false-­‐positive	  rates,	  
combined	  voxel	  activation	  intensity	  and	  cluster	  extent	  thresholds	  corrected	  for	  multiple	  
comparisons	   were	   determined	   using	   3dClustSim	  
(http://afni.nimh.nih.gov/pub/dist/doc/program_help/3dClustSim.html).	   This	   widely	  
used	  correction	  method	  is	  applied	  to	  statistical	  contrast	  images	  at	  the	  group	  level	  and	  
estimates	  the	  probability	  of	  observing	  false	  positive	  (random	  fields	  of	  noise)	  clusters	  of	  
a	   given	   size,	   as	   a	   function	   of	   a	   given	   voxelwise	   p	   value.	   The	   3dClustSim	   program	  
considers	  the	  size	  of	  the	  image	  (number	  of	  voxels),	  the	  voxelwise	  statistical	  values,	  and	  
the	   spatial	   correlations	   over	   voxels	   (spatial	   smoothness)	   and	   runs	   a	   user-­‐specified	  
number	  of	  Monte	  Carlo	  simulations	  to	  generate	  an	  appropriate	  null-­‐distribution.	  Here,	  
ten	   thousand	  Monte	  Carlo	   simulations	  were	   run,	   taking	   into	  account	   the	  whole-­‐brain	  
search	  volume	  and	  the	  estimated	  smoothness	  of	  each	  axis	  (x,	  y,	  and	  z)	  of	  the	  respective	  
group	   SPMs.	   Probability	   estimates	   of	   a	   random	   field	   of	   noise	   were	   generated,	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producing	  a	  cluster	  of	  voxels	  of	  a	  given	  extent	  for	  a	  set	  of	  voxels	  passing	  a	  voxelwise	  p	  
value	   threshold	  of	  0.001.	   	  Given	  this	  voxelwise	   threshold,	   the	  simulations	  determined	  
that	   cluster	   sizes	   of	   20.0	   –	   23.5	   voxels,	   depending	   on	   the	   specific	   contrast	   analysis,	  
corresponded	   to	   a	   combined	   threshold	   of	  p	   <	   0.05	   (corrected).	  Whole-­‐brain	   analyses	  
were	  supplemented	  with	  region-­‐of-­‐interest	   (ROI)	  analyses.	  ROIs	  were	  generated	  using	  




Depletion	  manipulation.	  Participants	  in	  the	  depletion	  group	  rated	  the	  depletion	  
manipulation	   itself	   (math	   problems)	   as	   more	   difficult,	   t(36)	   =	   3.290,	   p	   =	   .002,	   	   and	  
requiring	  more	  effort	  than	  did	  those	  in	  the	  control	  group,	  t(36)	  =	  2.158,	  p	  =	  .038	  (Math	  
difficulty:	  Depleted	  M	  =	  7.353,	  SD	  =	  1.295;	  Control	  M	  =	  5.774,	  SD	  =	  1.643;	  Math	  effort:	  
Depleted	  M	  =	  7.763,	  SD	  =	  1.336;	  Control	  M	  =	  6.690,	  SD	  =	  1.708).	  	  However,	  there	  were	  
no	   significant	   differences	   between	   groups	   in	   terms	   of	   anagram	   difficulty	   and	   effort,	  
pretest	   mood	   and	   tiredness,	   or	   posttest	   mood	   and	   tiredness,	   all	   p-­‐values	   >	   .370.	  	  
Computing	   difference	   scores	   for	   posttest	   –	   pretest	   mood	   and	   tiredness	   yielded	   no	  
significant	   effect	   of	   tiredness,	  p	   =	   .715.	   	   There	  was	   a	   trend	   for	   a	   difference	   between	  
groups	  in	  the	  mood	  difference	  score,	  such	  that	  ego	  depleted	  participants	  exhibited	  less	  
reduction	  in	  mood	  over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  experiment,	  t(36)	  =	  1.952,	  p	  =	  .059	  (Depleted	  
M	   =	   .526,	   SD	   =	   1.429;	   Control	   M	   =	   1.368,	   SD	   =	   1.223).	   	   In	   terms	   of	   anagram	  
performance,	   there	   were	   no	   significant	   differences	   between	   groups	   in	   terms	   of	  
persistence	  at	  unsolvable	  anagrams	  (Depleted	  RT	  M	  =	  63.068	  s,	  SD	  =	  37.122;	  Control	  RT	  
M	  =	  67.099	  s,	  SD	  =	  23.388),	  or	  in	  number	  of	  solvable	  anagrams	  completed	  (Depleted	  M	  
=	  5.737,	  SD	  =	  1.593;	  Control	  M	  =	  6.053,	  SD	  =	  1.268),	  both	  p-­‐values	  >	  .503.	  Overall,	  this	  
pattern	  indicates	  that	  the	  manipulation	  was	  not	  effective	  at	  depleting	  participants’	  self-­‐
regulatory	  resources.	  
Proportion	   of	   choices.	   Participants	   chose	   to	   inhibit,	   on	   average,	   in	   60.32%	   of	  
trials	   (Range	  =	  45.0%	  -­‐	  97.3%;	  SD	  =	  11.64).	   	  Ego	  depleted	  and	  control	  participants	  did	  
not	  differ	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  proportion	  of	  inhibition,	  t(36)	  =	  .408,	  p	  =	  .686.	  	  
Randomness	  of	  choice	  response	  sequences.	  Participants	  displayed	  a	  mean	  RNG2	  




generated	   sets	  of	   two-­‐choice	   response	   sequences	   (RNG2	  M	   =	  0.723,	  SD	   =	   .010)	   in	  an	  
independent	   samples	   t-­‐test.	   	   Participants’	   choice	   trial	   responses	   differed	   significantly	  
from	  the	  randomly	  generated	  samples	  [t(51)	  =	  2.020,	  p	  =	  .049;	  Levene’s	  test	  indicated	  
unequal	  variances,	  so	  degrees	  of	  freedom	  were	  adjusted	  from	  74],	  in	  that	  their	  choices	  
were	   slightly	   more	   predictable.	   However,	   these	   values	   are	   comparable	   to	   previous	  
studies	  on	  intentional	  inhibition	  (e.g.,	  Schel	  et	  al.,	  2014),	  and	  indicate	  that	  participants’	  
choice	  behavior,	  albeit	  not	  entirely	  random,	  cannot	  be	  explained	  by	  simple	  alternation	  
strategies.	   	   Ego	  depleted	  and	   control	  participants	  did	  not	  differ	   in	   their	  RNG2	   scores,	  
t(36)	  =	  .009,	  p	  =	  .993	  (Depleted	  M	  =	  .732,	  SD	  =	  .029;	  Control	  M	  =	  .732,	  SD	  =	  .018).	  
Reaction	   times.	  Participants	  had	  a	  grand	  mean	   reaction	   time	  of	  739.76	  ms	  on	  
action	   trials.	   Depleted	   and	   control	   participants	   did	   not	   differ	   significantly	   in	   their	  
reaction	  times,	  t(36)	  =	  1.081,	  p	  =	  .287	  (Depleted	  M	  =	  696.71,	  SD	  =	  208.46;	  Control	  M	  =	  
782.80,	  SD	  =	  277.49).	  
Subjective	  pain	  ratings.	  The	  main	  effect	  of	  RESPONSE	  (Action	  vs.	  Inhibition)	  was	  
not	   significant,	   F(36)	   =	   .019,	   p	   =	   .892	   (Action	  M	   =	   4.780,	   SD	   =	   1.155;	   Inhibition	  M	   =	  
4.820,	  SD	  =	  1.016).	  	  However,	  there	  was	  a	  trend	  for	  an	  interaction	  between	  RESPONSE	  
and	   DEPLETION	   (Depleted	   vs.	   Control),	   F(36)	   =	   3.848,	   p	   =	   .058,	   such	   that	   depleted	  
participants	  rated	  action	  trials	  as	  more	  painful	  than	  inhibit	  trials	  (Action	  M	  =	  4.982,	  SD	  =	  
1.127;	  Inhibition	  M	  =	  4.706,	  SD	  =	  0.942),	  and	  control	  participants	  rated	  inhibit	  trials	  as	  
more	  painful	  than	  action	  trials	  (Action	  M	  =	  4.617,	  SD	  =	  1.183;	  Inhibition	  M	  =	  4.934,	  SD	  =	  
1.100).	  	  This	  might	  indicate	  that	  depleted	  participants	  were	  slightly	  more	  likely	  to	  make	  
their	  choices	  according	  to	  pain	  at	  the	  moment	  of	  decision.	  
Subjective	  urge	  ratings.	  There	  was	  a	  significant	  main	  effect	  of	  RESPONSE,	  F(36)	  
=	  13.272,	  p	  =	  .001,	  such	  that	  participants	  rated	  their	  urge	  to	  press	  the	  response	  button	  
in	  order	  to	  terminate	  the	  trial	  in	  accordance	  with	  their	  decisions	  (Action	  M	  =	  4.610,	  SD	  =	  
.280;	   Inhibition	   M	   =	   3.865,	   SD	   =	   .207).	   	   The	   interaction	   between	   RESPONSE	   and	  
DEPLETION	  was	  not	  significant,	  p	  =	  .478.	  
	  
fMRI	  results	  
Whole-­‐brain	  analyses.	  We	  first	  analyzed	  the	  main	  effect	  of	  RESPONSE	  to	  reveal	  
the	  brain	  areas	  that	  exhibit	  stronger	  activation	  on	  inhibition	  trials	  than	  on	  action	  trials	  
(see	   Figure	   2).	   Activity	   was	   found	   bilaterally	   within	   the	   IFG	   and	   the	   adjacent	   insular	  
NEURAL	  UNDERPINNINGS	  OF	  INTENTIONAL	  INHIBITION	  REFLECT	  INDIVIDUAL	  DIFFERENCES	  IN	  SELF-­‐REGULATION	  
97	  
	  
cortex.	   	   Additional	   clusters	   were	   located	   in	   the	   anterior	   cingulate	   cortex,	   preSMA,	  
inferior	  parietal	  lobule	  (IPL),	  and	  right	  dorsolateral	  prefrontal	  cortex	  (dlPFC),	  as	  well	  as	  
in	  the	  globus	  pallidus	  and	  thalamus.	  	  For	  a	  complete	  overview	  of	  significant	  activations,	  





Figure	  2.	  Activation	  map	  of	  the	  whole-­‐brain	  contrast	  comparing	  inhibition	  versus	  action.	  Note	  
the	   map	   was	   thresholded	   at	   p	   <	   .001	   (uncorrected),	   with	   a	   minimum	   cluster	   size	   of	   22	  













Overview	  of	  activation	  clusters	  revealed	  by	  the	  whole-­‐brain	  analyses.	  Montreal	  
Neurological	  Institute	  (MNI)	  coordinates	  reflect	  the	  peak	  voxel	  of	  a	  given	  cluster.	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  4.55	  
Putamen	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  18	   	  	  	  	  	  8	   	  	  	  	  	  -­‐5	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3.99	  
Thalamus	   	   	   	   	   51	   	  	  	  	  	  6	   	  	  	  	  	  -­‐16	   	  	  	  	  	  1	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4.19	  
Red	  nucleus	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  6	   	  	  	  	  	  -­‐16	   	  	  	  	  	  8	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4.11	  
Right	  inferior	  occipital	  gyrus	   	   431	   	  	  	  	  	  45	   	  	  	  	  	  -­‐73	   	  	  	  	  	  -­‐5	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8.05	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Region-­‐of-­‐interest	  (ROI)	  analyses.	  Next,	  we	  conducted	  a	  series	  of	  ROI	  analyses	  
in	   order	   to	   examine	   trait	   self-­‐regulatory	   effects.	   We	   selected	   only	   ROIs	   that	   were	  
observed	   in	   both	   the	   present	   study	   and	   that	   of	   Lynn	   et	   al.	   (under	   revision)	   for	   the	  
whole-­‐brain	  inhibition	  vs.	  action	  contrast,	  resulting	  in	  the	  following	  ROIs:	  the	  insula	  and	  
IFG	   (each	  bilateral	   in	   the	  present	  study),	   right	   IPL,	  and	  preSMA.	  Spherical	  ROIs	  with	  a	  
radius	   of	   6mm	  were	   drawn	   for	   the	   smaller	   clusters	   (i.e.,	   IFG	   and	   IPL),	   while	   ROIs	   of	  
larger	  clusters	  had	  a	  radius	  of	  10mm	  (i.e.,	   insula	  and	  preSMA).	  ROIs	  were	  centered	  on	  
the	  peak	  MNI	   coordinates	   reported	   in	  Table	  1.	  We	  also	   created	  an	  ROI	   for	   the	  dFMC	  
based	  on	  the	  coordinate	  reported	  by	  Kühn	  et	  al.	  (2009;	  radius	  =	  6	  mm,	  MNI	  peak	  -­‐7	  42	  
21),	   given	   the	   consistent	   role	   of	   this	   region	   in	   previous	   intentional	   inhibition	   studies.	  
Each	   participant’s	   SRQ	   score	   was	   then	   computed	   and	   used	   as	   a	   between-­‐subjects	  
factor,	  dividing	  participants	  into	  quartiles	  of	  low	  to	  high	  trait	  self-­‐regulatory	  ability.	  For	  
each	  ROI,	  a	  repeated-­‐measures	  ANOVA	  was	  conducted,	  with	  percent	  signal	  change	  on	  
inhibition	   and	   action	   trials	   as	   a	   within-­‐subjects	   factor	   and	   the	   SRQ	   Quartile	   as	   a	  
covariate.	   Significance	   thresholds	   were	   corrected	   for	  multiple	   comparisons	   using	   the	  
Holm-­‐Bonferroni	  method	  (Holm,	  1979).	  The	  left	  IFG	  showed	  a	  main	  effect	  of	  Response,	  
F(1,34)	   =	   36.046,	   p	   <	   .001,	   and	   an	   interaction	   between	   Response	   and	   SRQ	   Quartile,	  
F(3,34)	  =	  6.539,	  p	  =	  .001,	  wherein	  participants	  with	  higher	  trait	  self-­‐regulation	  showed	  
greater	  inhibition-­‐related	  activation	  than	  participants	  with	  low	  trait	  self-­‐regulation	  (see	  
Figure	  3).	  The	  left	  anterior	  insula	  showed	  the	  same	  pattern	  of	  results,	  with	  a	  main	  effect	  
of	  Response,	  F(1,34)	  =	  29.788,	  p	  <	  .001,	  and	  an	  interaction	  between	  Response	  and	  SRQ	  
Quartile,	  F(3,34)	  =	  6.876,	  p	  =	  .001.	  The	  dFMC	  showed	  a	  significant	  interaction	  between	  
Response	  and	  SRQ	  Quartile,	  F(3,34)	  =	  4.865,	  p	  =	  .006,	  yet	  no	  main	  effect	  of	  Response,	  p	  
=	  .862.	  	  As	  Figure	  4	  indicates,	  this	  pattern	  reflects	  that	  this	  region	  was	  strongly	  recruited	  
for	  inhibition	  by	  participants	  with	  high	  self-­‐regulatory	  ability,	  but	  the	  opposite	  seems	  to	  
be	  true	  of	  participants	  with	  low	  self-­‐regulatory	  ability.	  The	  main	  effect	  of	  Response	  was	  
significant	  for	  the	  remaining	  four	  ROIs,	  all	  p-­‐values	  <	  .001,	  reflecting	  increased	  activity	  
on	  inhibition	  trials.	  The	  interaction	  terms	  for	  the	  right	  IFG	  and	  right	  anterior	  insula	  ROIs	  
were	   marginally	   significant	   but	   did	   not	   survive	   correction	   for	   multiple	   comparison	  
(uncorrected	  p-­‐values	  =	   .017	  and	  .024,	  respectively),	  and	  showed	  the	  same	  pattern	  of	  
results	   as	   their	   left	   counterparts.	   The	   preSMA	   and	   IPL	   did	   not	   produce	   significant	  







Figure	  3.	  	  Left-­‐lateralized	  results	  of	  the	  trait	  self-­‐regulation	  ROI	  analysis.	  Based	  on	  the	  study	  of	  
Lynn	   et	   al.	   (under	   revision),	   spherical	   ROIs	   were	   centered	   at	   the	   peak	   IFG	   and	   insula	  
coordinates	   (-­‐54	   2	   10,	   radius	   6	   mm	   and	   -­‐33	   17	   10,	   radius	   10	   mm	   respectively).	   Values	  
represent	   standard	   errors	   and	   a	   difference	   score	   of	   the	  mean	   percent	   signal	   change	   (beta	  




Figure	  4.	  Frontomedian	  results	  of	  the	  trait	  self-­‐regulation	  ROI	  analysis.	  A	  spherical	  ROI	  (radius	  
=	   6	  mm)	  was	   centered	   at	   the	   peak	   dFMC	   coordinate	   (-­‐7	   42	   21)	   resulting	   from	   the	   study	   of	  
Kühn	   et	   al.	   (2009).	   Values	   represent	   standard	   errors	   and	   a	   difference	   score	   of	   the	   mean	  
percent	  signal	  change	  (beta	  values)	  derived	  from	  inhibit	  versus	  press	  trials.	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In	  a	  second	  step,	  we	  examined	  state	  differences	  in	  self-­‐control	  at	  the	  ROI	  level.	  
Although	  the	  behavioral	   results	   indicated	  that	   the	  state	  self-­‐control	  manipulation	  was	  
not	   effective	   at	   altering	   participants’	   access	   to	   self-­‐regulatory	   resources,	   we	  
nevertheless	   inspected	   whether	   there	   were	   any	   group	   differences	   in	   the	   ROIs,	   by	  
conducting	  two	  additional	  repeated-­‐measures	  ANOVAs	  for	  each	  ROI	  with	  percent	  signal	  
change	  on	   action	   and	   inhibition	   trials	   as	   a	  within-­‐subjects	   factor.	   In	   the	   first	   ANOVA,	  
DEPLETION	  (control	  vs.	  depleted)	  was	  entered	  as	  a	  between-­‐subjects	  factor,	  and	  in	  the	  
second	   ANOVA	   the	   difference	   score	   between	   unsolvable	   anagram	   RT	   and	   solvable	  
anagram	   RT	   was	   used	   as	   a	   covariate	   (as	   a	   behavioral	   index	   of	   depletion).	   Neither	  
analysis	  yielded	  a	  significant	  interaction	  for	  any	  of	  the	  seven	  ROIs	  (all	  p-­‐values	  <	  .271).	  
	  
DISCUSSION	  
In	  the	  present	  study,	  we	  investigated	  the	  neural	  basis	  of	  intentional	  inhibition	  in	  
the	  context	  of	  pain	  avoidance	  behavior,	  and	  its	  relation	  to	  state	  and	  trait	  differences	  in	  
self-­‐regulatory	  ability.	   Largely	   replicating	  our	  previous	   results,	  we	   found	  a	  network	   to	  
be	  activated	  during	  inhibition	  that	  comprised	  areas	  implicated	  in	  both	  externally	  guided	  
and	   intentional	   inhibition.	   Importantly,	   we	   also	   observed	   that	   the	   degree	   to	   which	  
these	  regions	  were	  recruited	  for	  inhibition	  was	  modulated	  by	  participants’	  trait	  level	  of	  
self-­‐regulation,	   highlighting	   a	   link	   between	   the	   neuroimaging	   literature	   on	   response	  
inhibition	  and	  self-­‐control	   in	  realistic	  scenarios.	  By	  contrast,	  no	  effects	  were	  found	  for	  
our	  state	  manipulation,	  neither	  behaviorally	  nor	  at	  the	  brain	  level.	  Below	  we	  discuss	  the	  
implications	  of	  our	  findings	  for	  the	  neuroscience	  of	  self-­‐regulation	  and	  impulse	  control.	  
	  
A	  network	  for	  inhibitory	  self-­‐regulation	  
The	  present	  study	   replicated	  our	  previous	   finding	   that	   intentional	   inhibition	  of	  
the	  PAR	  relies	  on	  a	  combination	  of	  brain	  areas	  that	  have	  been	  implicated	  in	  externally	  
guided	   inhibition	   (e.g.,	   the	   IFG,	   the	   preSMA,	   and	   the	   globus	   pallidus)	   and	   those	  
implicated	   in	   intentional	   inhibition	   (e.g.,	   dFMC,	   IPL,	   and	   anterior	   insula),	   although	   it	  
needs	  to	  be	  mentioned	  that	  the	  dFMC	  could	  only	  be	  identified	  in	  a	  ROI	  analysis,	  and	  not	  
in	  the	  whole-­‐brain	  analysis.	  Nonetheless,	  this	  replication	  underscores	  that	  the	  original	  
idea	  of	   two	   independent	   inhibition	   systems	  might	  only	  hold	   for	   specific	   experimental	  




with	  little	  motivational	  incentives.	  By	  contrast,	  in	  motivationally	  salient	  conditions	  that	  
recruit	  “hot”	  response	  systems,	  successful	  stopping	  appears	  to	  require	  the	   interaction	  
of	  both	  networks	   (see	  Lynn	  et	  al.,	  under	  revision).	  This	  does,	  however,	  not	   imply	  that	  
these	   areas	   serve	   equivalent	   functions	   in	   inhibitory	   control.	   We	   have	   previously	  
proposed	  that	  the	  rIFG	  -­‐	  in	  conjunction	  with	  the	  preSMA	  and	  subcortical	  areas	  such	  as	  
the	   subthalamic	   nucleas	   and	   the	   globus	   pallidus	   -­‐	   is	   critical	   primarily	   for	   the	  
implementation	  of	  behavioral	  inhibition,	  i.e.,	  the	  actual	  suppression	  of	  prepotent	  motor	  
output	   (Lynn	   et	   al.,	   2014).	   The	   dFMC,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   appears	   to	   be	   involved	   in	  
more	  abstract	  decisional	  aspects	  of	  inhibition,	  though	  it	  is	  still	  an	  ongoing	  debate	  as	  to	  
whether	  this	  decision	  reflects	  a	  “veto”	  signal	  for	  the	  cancellation	  of	  motor	  output	  (see	  
Filevich,	  Kühn,	  &	  Haggard,	  2012),	  or	  instead	  higher-­‐level	  disengagement	  from	  urges	  and	  
intentions	   (see	   Lynn	   et	   al.,	   2014).	   	   Either	  way,	   we	   believe	   that	  when	   faced	  with	   the	  
demand	  to	  suppress	  a	  very	  strong	  behavioral	  urge,	  such	  as	  the	  urge	  to	  avoid	  pain,	  both	  
decisional	  and	  implementation	  aspects	  presumably	  need	  to	  be	  reinforced	  continuously	  
to	  enable	  compliance	  with	  the	  instructions.	  	  
	  
Linking	  brain	  activity	  with	  real-­‐life	  self-­‐regulation	  	  
Importantly,	   beyond	   strengthening	   the	   notion	   that	   voluntary	   inhibition	   of	   the	  
PAR	   relies	   on	   joint	   activation	   of	   brain	   areas	   implicated	   in	   externally	   guided	   and	  
intentional	   inhibition,	   the	   present	   study	   provides	   novel	   evidence	   that	   activation	   in	  
these	  areas	  is	  related	  to	  self-­‐regulatory	  abilities	  in	  real	  life.	  Participants	  with	  higher	  self-­‐
reported	  self-­‐regulatory	  abilities	  exhibited	  stronger	   inhibition-­‐related	  activation	   in	   the	  
core	   components	   of	   the	   inhibition	   network	   (i.e.,	   IFG,	   insula,	   and	   dFMC).	   This	   finding	  
constitutes	  an	  important	  step	  in	  the	  endeavor	  to	  transfer	  findings	  from	  inhibition	  tasks	  
in	   the	   lab	   to	   self-­‐regulation	   in	   real	   life	   (see	   also	  O’Connor,	   Upton,	  Moore,	   &	   Hester,	  
2014;	   Wessel	   &	   Aron,	   2014	   for	   motivationally-­‐salient	   investigations	   of	   self-­‐control).	  
Importantly,	  a	  host	  of	  social	  psychological	  research	  emphasizes	  that	  trait	  levels	  of	  self-­‐
control	   predict	   many	   important	   behavioral	   outcomes	   such	   as	   the	   extent	   to	   which	  
impulses	  are	   indulged	  (Friese	  &	  Hofmann,	  2009)	  and	  how	  well	   individuals	  perform	  on	  
behavioral	  self-­‐control	  tasks	  (Schmeichel	  &	  Zell,	  2007).	  In	  general,	  our	  data	  suggest	  that	  
a	   stronger	   recruitment	   of	   the	   inhibition	   network	   might	   underlie	   increased	   trait	   self-­‐
regulatory	   ability,	   but	  more	   research	  will	   be	   necessary	   to	   substantiate	   this	   view.	   For	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instance,	  this	  could	  be	  achieved	  by	  examining	  patient	  groups	  with	  impulsive	  disorders,	  
or	   in	   longitudinal	  studies	  that	  trace	  the	  development	  of	  self-­‐regulatory	  abilities	  across	  
childhood	  and	  adolescence.	  	  
Another	  interesting	  aspect	  of	  our	  data	  pertains	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  trait	  differences	  
in	  self-­‐regulation	  were	  more	  clearly	  reflected	  in	  activity	  of	  the	  left	  IFG	  than	  in	  activity	  of	  
the	   right	   IFG.	   Although	   the	   left	   IFG	   has	   occasionally	   been	   implicated	   in	   response	  
inhibition	   as	   well	   (e.g.,	   Swick,	   Ashley,	   &	   Turken,	   2008),	   the	   right	   IFG	   is	   generally	  
considered	  more	  critical	  for	  this	  capacity	  (see	  Aron	  et	  al.,	  2014).	  The	  left	  IFG	  is	  typically	  
assumed	   to	   be	   involved	   in	   more	   general	   cognitive	   control	   functions	   such	   as	   the	  
representation	  of	   task	   rules	   (e.g.,	  Hartstra,	  Kühn,	  Verguts,	  &	  Brass,	  2011;	  Mecklinger,	  
von	   Cramon,	   Springer,	   &	   Matthes-­‐von	   Cramon,	   1999).	   	   From	   this	   perspective,	   our	  
finding	  could	   imply	   that	  behavioral	   stopping	   is	  not	   the	  sole	  distinctive	   feature	  of	   self-­‐
control,	  and	   that	  more	  general	   control	  mechanisms	  also	  contribute	   to	  successful	   self-­‐
regulation.	  	  
	  
No	  evidence	  for	  state-­‐effects	  of	  self-­‐control	  
In	   contrast	   with	   the	   link	   between	   inhibition-­‐related	   brain	   activity	   and	   trait	  
measures	   of	   self-­‐regulation,	   our	   state	   manipulation	   did	   not	   appear	   to	   impact	   the	  
results.	  This	  null	  effect	  likely	  reflects	  that,	  despite	  extensive	  piloting,	  the	  depletion	  task	  
was	   ineffective	   at	   reducing	   self-­‐regulatory	   resources	   in	   the	   present	   experimental	  
context	   and	   illustrates	   the	   challenge	   of	   applying	   social	   psychological	   concepts	   to	  
neuroscience	  research.	  A	  number	  of	  reasons	  come	  to	  mind	  as	  to	  why	  the	  manipulation	  
did	   not	   impact	   participants’	   self-­‐control,	   neither	   behaviorally	   nor	   at	   the	   brain	   level:	  
First,	   the	   stressful	   scanner	   environment	   may	   have	   led	   to	   a	   general	   increase	   in	  
participants’	   arousal	   levels,	   making	   them	   less	   susceptible	   to	   subtle	   depletion	   effects	  
than	   in	   behavioral	   sessions	   in	   a	   non-­‐scanning	   environment.	   Previous	   studies	   have	  
shown	   that	   the	   presentation	   of	   MR	   noise	   during	   task	   performance	   can	   lead	   to	   an	  
increase	   of	   cognitive	   control	   and	   thereby	   diminish	   or	   even	   eliminate	   established	  
experimental	  effects	   (Hommel,	  Fischer,	  Colzato,	  van	  den	  Wildenberg,	  &	  Cellini,	  2012).	  
Second,	  it	  is	  also	  possible	  that	  depletion	  effects	  were	  too	  short-­‐lived	  to	  be	  measured	  in	  
our	  setup	  given	  both	  the	  time	  lag	  between	  the	  completion	  of	  the	  math	  problems	  and	  




the	  overall	  duration	  of	  the	  scanning	  session	  (see	  Hagger	  et	  al.,	  2010,	  and	  Tyler	  &	  Burns,	  
2008	  for	  evidence	  regarding	  the	  duration	  of	  ego	  depletion	  effects).	  Third,	  participants	  
might	  furthermore	  have	  been	  thinking	  ahead	  and	  regulated	  their	  resources	  in	  advance	  
of	   the	  manipulation,	  having	   full	  anticipatory	  knowledge	  of	  what	  would	  be	  required	  of	  
them	   in	   the	   second	  part	   of	   the	   experiment.	   Finally,	   the	   choice	  of	   our	   depletion	   task,	  
intended	  to	  avoid	  inhibitory	  demands,	  might	  have	  rendered	  this	  manipulation	  to	  be	  less	  
powerful	  than	  traditional	  ego	  depletion	  tasks	  such	  as	  thought	  or	  emotion	  suppression.	  
If	  correct,	  this	  would	  indicate	  that	  the	  transfer	  of	  ego	  depletion	  to	  other	  tasks	  is	  much	  
narrower	   than	   previously	   assumed,	   and	   that	   depletion	   might	   depend	   on	   common	  
cognitive	  functions	  being	  required	  in	  both	  the	  depletion	  task	  and	  the	  test	  task.	  Future	  
research	  could	  test	  this	  idea	  by	  systematically	  varying	  the	  degree	  of	  functional	  similarity	  
between	  both	   tasks.	  Overall,	   it	   is	  worth	  noting	   that	   the	  concept	  of	  ego	  depletion	  has	  
recently	   been	   called	   into	   question.	   Carter	  &	  Mccullough	   (2014)	   suggest	   that	   the	   ego	  
depletion	  effect	  is	  rather	  weak	  if	  not	  absent,	  while	  Xu	  et	  al.	  (2014)	  could	  not	  replicate	  
the	  effect	  in	  four	  separate	  studies	  using	  the	  strongest	  of	  depletion	  protocols.	  Beedie	  &	  
Lane	   (2011)	   negate	   prior	   assumptions	   about	   the	   role	   of	   glucose	   as	   willpower’s	  
physiological	   substrate.	   Finally,	   abundant	   evidence	   indicates	   that	   the	   ego	   depletion	  
effect	   seems	   to	   rely	   on	   mediating	   factors	   such	   as	   an	   individual’s	   beliefs	   about	   the	  
veracity	  of	  the	  limited	  resource	  model	  and	  about	  their	  own	  level	  of	  depletion	  (Clarkson,	  
Hirt,	  Jia,	  &	  Alexander,	  2010;	  Job,	  Dweck,	  &	  Walton,	  2010).	  	  
	  
Future	  perspectives	  
Future	  studies	  that	  attempt	  to	  apply	  ego	  depletion	  to	  neuroimaging	  should	  take	  
the	  above-­‐mentioned	  factors	  into	  account.	  Those	  studies	  addressing	  impulse	  control	  in	  
particular	  should	  attempt	  to	  ensure	  that	  experimental	  paradigms	  induce	  a	  strong	  action	  
tendency	   in	   each	   subject,	   allow	   for	   the	   endogenous	   generation	   of	   the	   decision	   to	  
inhibit,	   and	   establish	   a	   link	   between	   performance	   in	   the	   lab	   and	   self-­‐regulatory	  
behaviors	   outside	   the	   lab.	   Preferably,	   future	   studies	   would	   employ	   experimental	  
contexts	  other	  than	  pain	  avoidance	  that	  fulfill	  these	  criteria.	  This	  could	  help	  to	  reveal	  to	  
what	   extent	   our	   findings	   are	   driven	   by	   the	   presence	   of	   pain	   and	   to	   delineate	   the	  
domain-­‐specificity	  of	  the	  neural	  basis	  of	  self-­‐control.	  
	  




	   In	  the	  present	  study,	  we	  examined	  the	  neural	  underpinnings	  of	  the	  endogenous	  
inhibition	  of	  pain	  avoidance	  behavior	  and	  its	  relation	  to	  self-­‐regulatory	  abilities	  at	  both	  
state	   and	   trait	   levels.	   Our	   results	   show	   inhibition-­‐related	   activity	   in	   a	   previously	  
established	   network,	   which	   was	   associated	   with	   participants’	   trait	   level	   of	   self-­‐
regulation.	   By	   contrast,	   no	   effects	   were	   found	   for	   the	   state	   manipulation	   of	   self-­‐
regulatory	  abilities.	  Together,	  these	  findings	  provide	  evidence	  that	  brain	  activity	  during	  
response	   inhibition	   reflects	   individual	   differences	   in	   realistic	   self-­‐regulatory	   behaviors	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The	  influence	  of	  high-­‐level	  beliefs	  on	  self-­‐regulatory	  








Determinist	   beliefs	   have	   been	   shown	   to	   impact	   basic	   motor	   preparation,	   prosocial	  
behavior,	  performance	  monitoring,	  and	  voluntary	  inhibition,	  presumably	  by	  diminishing	  
the	   recruitment	   of	   cognitive	   resources	   for	   self-­‐regulation.	  We	   sought	   to	   support	   and	  
extend	   previous	   findings	   by	   applying	   a	   belief	   manipulation	   to	   a	   novel	   inhibition	  
paradigm	   that	   requires	   participants	   to	   occasionally	   suppress	   a	   prepotent	   withdrawal	  
reaction	  from	  a	  strong	  aversive	  stimulus.	  Our	  results	  suggest	  that	  reduction	  of	  free	  will	  
beliefs	  lead	  to	  a	  form	  of	  intentional	  disengagement	  that	  influences	  action	  selection	  and	  
inhibition.	   It	   is	   likely	   that	   disbelief	   in	   free	   will	   encourages	   participants	   to	   be	   more	  
passive,	  to	  exhibit	  a	  reduction	  in	  intentional	  engagement,	  and	  to	  be	  disinclined	  to	  adapt	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The	   question	   of	   whether	   free	   will	   truly	   exists	   is	   an	   age-­‐old	   philosophical	  
question,	   tackled	   by	   thinkers	   ranging	   from	   Democritus	   to	   Russell.	   Yet	   most	  
contemporary	  scientists	  have	  avoided	  the	  metaphysical	  and	  existential	  hurdles	  of	  free	  
will,	  and	  instead	  investigate	  its	  impact	  on	  human	  action:	  how	  this	  phenomenon	  arises	  in	  
the	  mind,	  and	  to	  what	  extent	  deterministic	  beliefs	  have	  an	  effect	  on	  our	  behavior	  (e.g.,	  
Wegner,	  2003;	  Vohs	  &	  Schooler,	  2008;	  Baumeister,	  Masicampo,	  &	  DeWall,	  2009;	  Rigoni	  
et	  al.,	  2011,	  2012,	  2013).	  The	  sensation	  of	  control	  over	  one’s	  actions	   is	  an	  undeniably	  
ubiquitous	   feature	  of	  human	  experience.	  People	   tend	   to	  believe	   they	  are	   responsible	  
for	   a	   given	   action	   if	   the	   causal	   principles	   of	   consistency,	   priority,	   and	   exclusivity	   are	  
satisfied;	   that	   is,	   if	   their	   intentions	   are	   consistent	  with	   and	   experienced	   at	   a	   suitable	  
interval	  prior	   to	   the	  relevant	  action,	  and	  there	   is	  no	  other	   reasonable	  explanation	   for	  
the	  action	  arising	  (Wegner,	  2003).	  Perception	  of	  personal	  control	  is	  further	  considered	  
to	   be	   intrinsic,	   biologically	   necessary,	   and	   protective	   against	   environmental	   stressors	  
(Leotti,	  Iyengar,	  &	  Ochsner,	  2010).	  	  
Social	   psychological	   research	   has	   recently	   investigated	   the	   degradation	   of	  
behavioral	   and	   social	   effects	   thought	   to	   follow	   from	   a	   belief	   in	   determinism.	   For	  
instance,	  Vohs	  and	  Schooler	  (2008)	  found	  that	  inducing	  disbelief	  in	  free	  will,	  via	  reading	  
of	  a	  determinist	  essay	  or	   series	  of	   statements,	  elicited	  an	   increase	   in	  cheating	  on	   the	  
part	   of	   participants.	   In	   comparison	  with	   control	   subjects,	   anti-­‐free	  will	   participants	   in	  
this	  case	  paid	  themselves	  a	  statistically	  improbable	  amount	  of	  money	  for	  performance	  
on	  a	  problem-­‐solving	  task,	  and	  more	  frequently	  permitted	  themselves	  to	  view	  answers	  
when	  given	  the	  opportunity	  to	  cheat.	  Under	  similar	  conditions,	  Baumeister	  et	  al.	  (2009)	  
found	   that	   participants	   with	  weakened	   free-­‐will	   beliefs	   showed	   increased	   aggression	  
and	   decreased	   helping	   behavior.	   Likewise,	   an	   increase	   in	   mindless	   conformity	   and	   a	  
decrease	   in	   counterfactual	   thinking,	   assumed	   to	   be	   adaptive	   for	   learning	   and	   social	  
adaptation,	   have	   been	   reported	   to	   accompany	   deterministic	   beliefs	   (Baumeister,	  
Crescioni,	  &	  Alquist,	  2011;	  Alquist,	  Ainsworth,	  &	  Baumeister,	  2013).	  Interestingly,	  when	  
these	  studies	  included	  a	  condition	  promoting	  free	  will,	  results	  were	  consistent	  with	  the	  
control	  group,	  suggesting	  that	  a	  belief	  in	  free	  will	  is	  a	  common	  default	  state.	  
More	   recent	   research	   in	   the	   domain	   of	   Cognitive	   Psychology	   has	   revealed	   an	  
impact	  of	  deterministic	  beliefs	  even	  on	  basic	  levels	  of	  motor	  control.	  Rigoni	  et	  al.	  (2011)	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used	  a	  manipulation	  identical	  to	  that	  of	  Vohs	  and	  Schooler	  (2008,	  Experiment	  1)	  to	  alter	  
participants’	   belief	   in	   free	  will.	   They	  observed	   that	   participants	  who	  were	   induced	   to	  
disbelieve	   in	   free	   will	   showed	   reduced	   amplitudes	   of	   the	   readiness	   potential,	   an	  
electrophysiological	  marker	  of	  unconscious	  motor	  preparation	  (Rigoni	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  In	  a	  
subsequent	   study	   (Rigoni	   et	   al.,	   2013)	   it	   was	   found	   that	   performance	  monitoring,	   as	  
indicated	   by	   post-­‐error	   slowing,	   was	   also	   diminished	   in	   participants	   induced	   to	  
disbelieve	   in	   free	   will.	   This	   may	   indicate	   a	   reduction	   in	   the	   recruitment	   of	   self-­‐
regulatory	   processes,	   and	   less	   inclination	   to	   adjust	   one’s	   behavior	   according	   to	  
circumstantial	  needs,	  on	  the	  part	  of	  anti-­‐free	  will	  participants.	  	  
Finally,	  this	  belief	  manipulation	  has	  been	  applied	  to	  an	   important	  facet	  of	  self-­‐
control,	  namely	  intentional	  inhibition,	  or	  the	  ability	  to	  voluntarily	  suppress	  a	  prepotent	  
action	   plan	   (Brass	   &	   Haggard,	   2007).	   The	   study	   in	   question	   (Rigoni	   et	   al.,	   2012)	  
employed	   a	   task	   developed	   by	   Kühn,	   Haggard,	   and	   Brass	   (2009)	   that	   overcame	   a	  
limitation	  of	  the	  well-­‐supported	  literature	  on	  externally-­‐generated	  stopping	  (see	  Aron,	  
2007,	   for	   a	   review)	   by	   enabling	   voluntary	   choice	   behavior	   to	   be	   experimentally	  
investigated	  within	  an	   inhibition	  paradigm.	   In	   this	   task,	  participants	  were	  occasionally	  
asked	  to	  freely	  decide	  whether	  to	  stop	  a	  prepared	  action	  (button	  pressing	  to	  halt	   the	  
progress	   of	   a	  marble	   rolling	   down	   a	   ramp).	   Both	   intentional	   inhibition	   and	  perceived	  
self-­‐control	   were	   shown	   to	   be	   adversely	   affected	   by	   an	   anti-­‐free	   will	   manipulation	  
(Rigoni	   et	   al.,	   2012).	   These	   findings	   were	   interpreted	   such	   that	   weakened	   free	   will	  
beliefs	  lead	  to	  a	  reduction	  in	  intentional	  effort,	  which	  then	  causes	  participants	  to	  select	  
the	  less	  demanding	  response	  option	  (in	  this	  case	  to	  execute	  the	  pre-­‐planned	  response).	  	  
The	  goal	  of	  the	  present	  study	  was	  to	  support	  and	  extend	  prior	  research	  on	  the	  
influence	   of	   free	   will	   beliefs	   upon	   intentional	   inhibition,	   by	   investigating	   whether	  
inducing	   determinist	   beliefs	  might	   in	   turn	   influence	   one’s	   intentional	   engagement	   in	  
self-­‐regulatory	  behavior.	  However,	  while	  previous	  studies	  have	  investigated	  intentional	  
inhibition	   in	   rather	   artificial	   experimental	   situations	   in	  which	  participants	  have	  hardly	  
any	   prior	  motivation	   to	   act	   or	   inhibit,	  we	   sought	   to	   address	   voluntary	   inhibition	   in	   a	  
more	  ecologically	  valid	  setting	   in	  which	  behavioral	  urges	  are	  present.	  To	  this	  end,	  our	  
secondary	   goal	   was	   to	   develop	   and	   pilot	   a	   novel	   experimental	   paradigm	   for	  




Pain	   was	   selected	   as	   the	   behaviorally	   relevant	   stimulus	   for	   our	   purposes.	  
Management	  of	  the	  pain	  avoidance	  response	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  compelling	  component	  
of	  the	  affective	  response	  system;	  the	  organism	  is	  strongly	  motivated	  to	  avoid	  the	  pain	  
sensation	   (Campbell	   &	   Misanin,	   1969;	   Elliot,	   2006).	   We	   can	   therefore	   consider	  
management	  of	  this	  urge	  as	  a	  window	  into	  how	  we	  suppress	  our	  most	  basic	  drives,	  and	  
a	  classical	  instance	  of	  self-­‐control.	  The	  pain	  avoidance	  response	  can	  of	  course	  be	  highly	  
automatized,	  for	  instance	  when	  one	  reflexively	  jerks	  their	  hand	  away	  from	  a	  hot	  stove.	  
However,	  at	  times	  other	  goals	  call	  for	  self-­‐control	  to	  be	  exerted	  for	  the	  suppression	  of	  
this	  avoidant	  urge,	  such	  as	  when	  the	  heat	  comes	  not	  from	  the	  stove,	  but	  from	  a	  plate	  of	  
food.	   In	   this	   case,	   one	   might	   choose	   to	   suppress	   the	   highly	   prepotent	   reaction	  
momentarily	   in	   favor	   of	   satisfying	   the	   opposing	   basic	   urge	   of	   hunger	   (cf.	   Morsella,	  
2005).	  
Our	   paradigm	   required	   participants	   to	   occasionally	   inhibit	   a	   prepotent	  
withdrawal	  reaction	  from	  a	  heat	  source	  applied	  to	  their	   inner	  wrists.	   In	  half	  the	  trials,	  
participants	   were	   able	   to	   choose	   whether	   to	   inhibit	   the	   withdrawal	   response	   or	   to	  
immediately	  terminate	  the	  trial.	  The	  advantage	  of	  this	  manipulation	   is	  that	   it	  requires	  
strong	   (and	  consistent;	   the	  urge	   to	  withdraw	  does	  not	   fade)	   self-­‐control	   to	  withstand	  
the	   thermal	   pain.	   In	   that	   sense,	   it	   is	   in	   stark	   contrast	   to	   standard	   laboratory	   tasks	  
involving	  self-­‐regulation	  and	  agency.	  The	  design	  also	  ensures	  that	  acting	  and	  inhibiting	  
were	  equally	  distributed	  in	  the	  non-­‐choice,	  or	  directed,	  trials,	  thereby	  discouraging	  any	  
response	   bias	   and	   ensuring	   a	   comparable	   number	   of	   trial	   in	   each	   design	   cell.	   To	  
manipulate	  free	  will	  beliefs,	  we	  used	  a	  Velten	  procedure	  (Velten,	  1968)	  similar	  to	  that	  
used	  in	  previous	  experiments	  (Vohs	  &	  Schooler,	  2008,	  Experiment	  2;	  Baumeister	  et	  al.,	  
2009),	  in	  which	  participants	  are	  required	  to	  read	  and	  reflect	  upon	  a	  series	  of	  statements	  
(see	  Appendix	  1	  for	  a	  complete	  list).	  Immediately	  prior	  to	  each	  trial,	  participants	  were	  
presented	  with	  a	  statement	  and	  asked	  to	  retain	  the	  statement	  in	  memory	  until	  the	  end	  
of	  the	  block.	   	  Statements	  were	  either	  neutral	  or	  meant	  to	   induce	  anti-­‐free	  will	  beliefs	  
(between-­‐subjects).	   	   These	   statements	   were	   shown	   during	   the	   inter-­‐trial	   interval	   in	  
order	   to	   reduce	   potential	   pain	   preparation	   and	   decision-­‐making	   strategies.	   We	  
hypothesized	   that	   inducing	   disbelief	   in	   free	   will	   would	   lead	   participants	   to	   exhibit	   a	  
reduction	  in	   intentional	  engagement,	  to	  lack	  adaptive	  strategies,	  and	  to	  be	  disinclined	  
to	  adapt	  their	  behavior	  to	  contextual	  needs.	  	  




METHODS	  AND	  MATERIALS	  
Participants	  
Fifty-­‐four	  Dutch-­‐speaking	  undergraduate	  students	  enrolled	  in	  the	  study;	  all	  gave	  
written	  consent	  prior	  to	  participation.	  They	  received	  either	  course	  credit	  or	  a	  payment	  
of	  ten	  euros	  for	  their	  participation.	  All	  participants	  had	  normal	  or	  corrected-­‐to-­‐normal	  
vision	   and	   reported	   no	   neurological	   deficits.	   The	   study	  was	   conducted	   in	   accordance	  
with	   the	   Declaration	   of	   Helsinki,	   and	   the	   approval	   of	   Ghent	   University’s	   Ethical	  
Committee	   was	   obtained	   in	   advance.	   After	   determining	   participants’	   individual	   pain	  
thresholds,	  those	  who	  did	  not	  report	  sufficient	  pain	  (i.e.,	  their	  threshold	  surpassed	  fifty	  
degrees	  –	  beyond	   the	  safety	   limitations	  of	   the	  stimulating	  equipment)	  were	   removed	  
from	  the	  study.	  A	  total	  of	  48	  participants	  (12	  male,	  tested	  individually)	  completed	  the	  
entire	  experiment.	  	  
Procedure	  
Threshold	   determination.	   Pain	   was	   induced	   via	   a	   thermode	   connected	   to	   a	  
Medoc	   PATHWAY	   device	   (MEDOC,	   Haifa,	   Israel),	   an	   apparatus	   designed	   to	   induce	  
thermal	   pain	   using	   cold	   or	   hot	   stimulation.	   The	   threshold	   at	   which	   participants	   felt	  
sufficient	  pain	  was	  determined	  by	  exposing	  each	  participant	   to	   26	   trials	   in	  which	   the	  
thermal	   sensation	   gradually	   increased	   over	   five	   seconds	   from	   32°C	   to	   a	   randomized	  
destination	  temperature	  between	  45	  and	  50°C	  (in	   increments	  of	   .25	  degrees),	  a	  slope	  
comparable	  to	  the	  experimental	  trials.	  After	  each	  trial,	  the	  thermode	  returned	  instantly	  
to	  baseline	  temperature,	  and	  participants	  were	  asked	  to	  rate	  their	  perceived	  pain	  on	  a	  
scale	   from	   zero	   to	   eight,	  with	   zero	   being	   no	   pain	   and	   eight	   being	   the	  worst	   possible	  
pain.	  The	  destination	  temperature	  employed	  in	  the	  main	  experiment	  was	  computed	  for	  
each	  participant	  as	  the	  highest	  temperature	  at	  which	  they	  rated	  their	  pain	  as	  a	  six.	  This	  
method	   was	   revealed	   during	   piloting	   to	   yield	   more	   accurate	   tolerance	   threshold	  
measurements	   than	  merely	   requiring	  participants	   to	   indicate	   the	  maximum	  heat	   they	  
could	   withstand	   when	   exposed	   to	   a	   steadily	   increasing	   temperature.	   Importantly,	  
participants	   were	   free	   to	   press	   a	   button	   at	   any	   point	   during	   the	   threshold	  
determination	  in	  order	  to	  terminate	  the	  trial.	  
Task	  and	  Stimuli.	  Participants	  received	  painful	  heat	  stimulation	  during	  each	  trial,	  




shapes	  (triangle,	  square,	  circle)	  were	  used	  as	  cues	  to	  indicate	  the	  trial	  type.	  Depending	  
on	  the	  cue,	  participants	  were	  requested	  to	  either	  press	  the	  button	  as	  quickly	  as	  possible	  
(‘directed	   action,’	   25%	   of	   trials),	   inhibit	   this	   response	   and	   endure	   the	   pain	   (‘directed	  
inhibition,’	   25%	   of	   trials),	   or	   make	   a	   voluntary	   decision	   to	   either	   button	   press	  
immediately	   or	   persist	   until	   the	   end	   of	   the	   trial	   (‘choice,’	   50%	  of	   trials).	   In	   the	   latter	  
case,	  participants	  were	  requested	  to	  make	  their	  choices	  approximately	  equal	  over	  the	  
course	   of	   the	   experiment,	   but	   not	   to	   use	   any	   particular	   strategies	   or	   to	   decide	   in	  
advance	   of	   the	   presentation	   of	   the	   cue.	   In	   a	   practice	   block,	   absent	   pain	   stimulation,	  
participants	  were	  trained	  on	  the	  cues.	  A	  pilot	  study	  had	  revealed	  that	  participants	  are	  
typically	   around	   200	   ms	   slower	   to	   respond	   on	   choice	   action	   trials	   than	   on	   directed	  
action	  trials,	  reflecting	  the	  additional	  time	  needed	  for	  the	  choice	  decision.	  Accordingly,	  
to	  make	  stimulation	  as	  identical	  as	  possible	  across	  action	  conditions,	  200	  ms	  of	  thermal	  
stimulation	  was	  added	  to	  directed	  action	  trials,	  following	  the	  button	  press.	  	  
Each	  trial	  was	  preceded	  by	  a	  statement	  (‘neutral’	  or	   ‘anti-­‐free	  will,’	  see	  below)	  
with	   a	   duration	   of	   twelve	   seconds.	   After	   a	   delay	   of	   one	   second,	   a	   fixation	   cross	  was	  
presented	   and	   the	   temperature	   of	   the	   thermode	   began	   to	   gradually	   increase	   from	   a	  
baseline	   of	   32°C	   to	   the	   participant’s	   individually	   determined	   threshold.	   After	   five	  
seconds,	   one	   of	   the	   three	   task	   cues	   appeared	   in	   place	   of	   the	   fixation	   cross.	   The	  
temperature	   remained	   at	   threshold	   for	   the	   next	   2	   seconds,	   or	   until	   the	   participant	  
pressed	   the	   button	   to	   terminate	   both	   the	   pain	   stimulation	   and	   the	   trial.	   Afterwards,	  
prompts	   for	   ratings	  of	   the	  perceived	  pain	  and	   ‘urge	  to	   terminate	   the	  trial	  by	  pressing	  
the	  button’	  (both	  on	  a	  scale	  of	  0	  –	  8)	  remained	  on	  screen	  until	  participants	  responded.	  
Participants	  were	  then	  cued	  to	  alternate	  the	  arm	  placed	  atop	  the	  thermode.	  The	  arm	  
not	  being	  stimulated	  was	  used	  to	  button	  press	  (thereby	  providing	  a	  response	  time	  for	  
action	  trials)	  and	  was	  placed	  atop	  the	  opposing	  wrist,	  in	  order	  to	  lend	  weight	  and	  make	  
it	  more	  difficult	  for	  participants	  to	  inadvertently	  withdraw	  from	  pain	  rather	  than	  button	  
pressing.	   A	   schematic	   overview	   of	   a	   possible	   trial	   in	   the	   anti-­‐free	   will	   condition	   is	  
presented	  in	  Figure	  1.	  
The	   assignment	   of	   geometric	   shapes	   to	   trial	   types,	   and	   the	   order	   of	   the	   first-­‐
stimulated	  wrist	  were	  counterbalanced	  across	  subjects.	  Each	  participant	  had	  to	  perform	  
120	  trials	  in	  total,	  being	  divided	  into	  six	  blocks	  of	  twenty	  trials	  presented	  in	  randomized	  
sequence.	  In	  each	  block,	  participants	  were	  given	  ten	  trials	   in	  which	  they	  were	  cued	  to	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make	  a	  decision,	  five	  trials	  in	  which	  they	  were	  cued	  to	  push	  and	  five	  trials	  in	  which	  they	  
were	  cued	  to	  inhibit	  their	  withdrawal	  response.	   Importantly,	  participants	  were	  free	  to	  





Figure	  1.	  Schematic	  overview	  of	  a	  sample	  block	  (Anti-­‐free	  will	  condition).	  Note	  that	  there	  was	  
no	  time	  limit	  for	  pain	  and	  urge	  rating	  responses.	  
	  
Manipulation	  of	  free	  will	  beliefs.	  Participants	  were	  randomly	  assigned	  to	  either	  
the	   control	   condition	   or	   the	   anti-­‐free	   will	   condition	   (24	   in	   each	   condition).	   All	  
participants	  were	  required	  to	  read	  discrete	  statements	  presented	  on-­‐screen	  during	  the	  
inter-­‐trial	   interval.	  They	  were	  instructed	  to	  retain	  this	  information	  until	  the	  end	  of	  the	  
block,	  at	  which	  point	  a	  probe	  question	  concerning	  statement	  recognition	  was	  presented	  
on	   the	   screen	   (see	   Appendix	   2).	   	   The	   probe	   questions	   were	   inserted	   to	   verify	   that	  
participants	  had	  attended	  to	  the	  statements	  as	  directed,	  and	  to	  support	  a	  cover	  story	  




the	  accuracy	  of	  their	  answer	  was	  given,	  a	  novel	  set	  of	  statements	  was	  presented,	  and	  
subjects	   were	   instructed	   to	   remember	   these	   subsequent	   statements	   instead.	   The	  
statements	  were	  either	  neutral	  or	  designed	  to	  tap	  into	  free	  will	  beliefs,	  with	  60	  unique	  
statements	  in	  each	  group.	  Over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  experiment,	  control	  participants	  were	  
exposed	  to	  each	  of	  the	  60	  neutral	  statements	  twice,	  while	  participants	  in	  the	  anti-­‐free	  
will	  condition	  were	  shown	  each	  of	  the	  60	  statements	  related	  to	  free	  will	  beliefs	  twice.	  
Furthermore,	   in	   the	   anti-­‐free	   will	   condition,	   the	   three	   trial	   types	   (directed	   action,	  
directed	   inhibition,	   choice)	   were	   divided	   equally	   over	   each	   of	   the	   three	   statement	  
categories.	  	  
A	   total	   of	   90	   statements	  were	   collected	   from	   a	   variety	   of	   questionnaires	   and	  
articles	  involving	  free	  will	  beliefs	  (e.g.,	  Vohs	  &	  Schooler,	  2008;	  Paulhus	  &	  Carey,	  2011;	  
Carey,	  2005),	  or	  were	  produced	  based	  on	  these	  inventories.	  These	  90	  statements	  were	  
selected	   with	   the	   aim	   of	   being	   related	   to	   certain	   aspects	   of	   free	   will	   beliefs;	   thirty	  
statements	  were	  related	  to	  the	  idea	  that	  people	  do	  not	  have	  a	  free	  will	  (e.g.,	  “scientists	  
tell	  us	  that	  people	  have	  no	  free	  will”),	  thirty	  statements	  concerned	  beliefs	   in	  scientific	  
determinism	  (e.g.,	  “the	  environment	  someone	  is	  raised	   in	  determines	  their	  success	  as	  
an	  adult”)	  and	  thirty	  statements	  were	  related	  to	  beliefs	   in	  fatalistic	  determinism	  (e.g.,	  
“you	   can’t	   change	   your	   destiny,	   no	   matter	   how	   hard	   you	   try”).	   Another	   90	   neutral	  
statements	  were	  selected,	  stating	  facts	  and	  ideas	  that	  were	  unrelated	  to	  beliefs	  in	  free	  
will	  (e.g.,	  “an	  ostrich’s	  eye	  is	  bigger	  than	  its	  brain”).	  	  
The	   combined	   180	   statements	   were	   then	   rated	   online	  
(http://www.thesistools.com)	   by	   38	   participants,	   none	   of	   whom	   participated	   in	   the	  
main	   experiment.	   Participants	   rated	   how	   difficult	   they	   would	   find	   the	   statement	   to	  
recall,	  and	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  the	  statement	  was	  in	  line	  with	  either	  a	  disbelief	  in	  free	  
will,	   a	   belief	   in	   scientific	   determinism,	   or	   a	   belief	   in	   fatalistic	   determinism.	   These	  
questions	  were	   based	   on	   the	   factors	   laid	   out	   by	   Paulhus	   and	   Carey	   (2011)	   and	  were	  
expressed	  in	  layman’s	  terms	  for	  ease	  of	  understanding.	  	  
A	   total	  of	  120	  statements	  were	  selected	  based	  on	   the	   ratings	  drawn	   from	  this	  
pre-­‐test.	   The	   twenty	   statements	   that	   had	   received	   the	   highest	   ratings	   in	   each	   belief	  
category	   were	   chosen,	   for	   a	   total	   of	   sixty	   experimental	   statements.	   Sixty	   neutral	  
statements	   were	   matched	   for	   difficulty	   with	   these	   statements.	   Crucially,	   the	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experimental	  statements	  and	  the	  control	  statements	  did	  not	  differ	  with	  regard	  to	  their	  
difficulty	  to	  recall	  (experimental:	  M	  =	  1.59;	  neutral:	  M	  =	  1.60),	  t(7)	  =	  0.86,	  p	  =	  .82.	  	  
Questionnaires.	  Two	  days	  prior	   to	  their	  participation	   in	  this	  study,	  participants	  
completed	  an	  array	  of	  questionnaires	  concerning	  memory,	  anxiety	  and	  free	  will	  beliefs.	  
Questions	   about	   memory	   and	   anxiety	   were	   inserted	   to	   support	   the	   aforementioned	  
cover	  story.	  	  Questions	  regarding	  free	  will	  beliefs	  consisted	  of	  the	  entire	  battery	  of	  the	  
Free	  Will	  and	  Determinism	  questionnaire	  (FAD-­‐Plus,	  Paulhus	  &	  Carey,	  2011).	  Following	  
the	   experimental	   session,	   participants	   were	   requested	   to	   complete	   the	   FAD-­‐Plus	  
questionnaire	  a	  second	  time	  to	  determine	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  experimental	  statements	  




To	  test	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  belief	  manipulation,	  a	  mixed	  design	  ANOVA	  was	  
conducted	  on	  participants’	  total	  FAD-­‐scores	  before	  and	  after	  the	  experiment	  using	  Time	  
(Pre-­‐test	  vs.	  Post-­‐test)	  as	  a	  within-­‐subject	  factor	  and	  Belief	  condition	  (Anti-­‐free	  will	  vs.	  
Control)	   as	   a	   between-­‐subjects	   factor.	   Total	   FAD-­‐scores	   were	   calculated	   for	   each	  
participant	  such	  that	  higher	  values	  indicate	  less	  belief	  in	  free	  will,	  by	  reverse	  scoring	  the	  
Free	   Will	   subscale	   and	   combining	   it	   with	   the	   other	   three	   subscales	   (Scientific	  
Determinism,	   Fatalistic	   Determinism,	   and	   Unpredictability).	   The	   analysis	   revealed	   a	  
significant	  interaction	  between	  Time	  and	  Belief	  Condition,	  F(1,46)	  =	  4.19;	  p	  <	  .05	  (Figure	  
2),	  such	  that	  participants	  in	  the	  experimental	  condition	  scored	  significantly	  higher	  after	  
the	  experiment	  than	  before	  (Post-­‐test:	  M	  =	  80.0,	  SD	  =	  8.9;	  Pre-­‐test:	  M	  =	  76.3,	  SD	  =	  8.5),	  
t(23)	  =	  3.23,	  p	  <	   .01,	   indicating	  a	  weakening	  of	  beliefs	   in	  free	  will.	  No	  such	  effect	  was	  
observed	   for	  participants	   in	   the	   control	   condition	   (Post-­‐test:	  M	  =	  76.9,	  SD	  =	  8.9;	  Pre-­‐






Figure	   2.	  Mean	   total	   scores	   on	   the	   FAD-­‐Plus	   questionnaire	   as	   a	   function	   of	   Belief	   condition	  
(Control	  vs.	  Anti-­‐free	  will)	  and	  Time	  (Pre-­‐test	  vs.	  Post-­‐test).	  Higher	  scores	   indicate	   increased	  
disbelief	  in	  free	  will.	  
	  
Data	  preparation	  
Despite	   efforts	   towards	   optimizing	   the	   pain	   threshold	   procedure,	   the	   grand	  
mean	  pain	  rating	  across	  participants	  was	  rather	   low	  (M	  =	  4.6;	  SD	  =	  1.11).	  Crucially,	   in	  
the	  debriefing	  questionnaire,	  more	  than	  half	  (N	  =	  26)	  of	  all	  participants	  stated	  that	  they	  
had	  not	   needed	   to	   exert	   any	   effort	   to	  withhold	   the	  pain-­‐withdrawal	   response	  during	  
the	  experiment.	  As	  pain	   is	  a	  key	   factor	   in	   this	  experiment,	  we	  decided	   to	   restrict	  our	  
analyses	  to	  participants	  that	  reported	  a	  sufficient	  level	  of	  pain	  throughout	  the	  whole	  of	  
the	  experiment.	  We	   therefore	  excluded	  all	   participants	  with	  mean	  pain	   ratings	   lower	  
than	   the	   median	   of	   the	   subjective	   pain	   scale,	   namely	   4.5.	   All	   further	   analyses	   were	  
performed	  on	  this	  subset	  of	  25	  	  ‘high	  pain’	  participants	  (8	  male):	  12	  participants	  in	  the	  
anti-­‐free	   will	   condition	   and	   13	   participants	   in	   the	   control	   condition.	   	   Results	   for	   the	  
excluded	  ‘low	  pain’	  participants	  may	  be	  found	  in	  Appendix	  3.	  	  
	  
Behavioral	  analyses	  
Between-­‐group	  means	  and	  standard	  deviations	  are	  reported	  in	  Table	  1.	  




Table	  1.	  Between-­‐group	  means	  and	  standard	  deviations	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   Control	  	   	   	   Anti-­‐Free	  Will	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   Mean	  (SD)	   	   	   Mean	  (SD)	  
Reaction	  Times	  (ms)	  	  
All	  Action	  Trials	  	   	   	   658	  (124)	   	   	   736	  (101)	  
Choice	  Action	  Trials	   	   	   748	  (162)	   	   	   871	  (133)	  
Directed	  Action	  Trials	   	   	   552	  (121)	   	   	   582	  (94)	  
Proportion	  Inhibition	  (%)	   	   	   40.59	  (9.64)	   	   	   42.43	  (10.22)	  
	  
Pain	  Ratings	  (across	  trials)	   	   	   5.5	  (0.9)	   	   	   5.4	  (0.6)	  
	  
Urge	  Ratings	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   Across	  Trials	   	   	   	   4.4	  (1.3)	   	   	   4.7	  (1.5)	  
	   Choice	  Trials	   	   	   	   4.5	  (0.4)	   	   	   4.5	  (0.4)	  
	   Directed	  Trials	   	   	   	   4.3	  (0.4)	   	   	   4.8	  (0.3)	  
	  
Reaction	   times.	   On	   trials	   in	   which	   participants	   were	   cued	   to	   button	   press,	  
participants	  performed	  the	  correct	  response	  in	  nearly	  all	  trials	  (M	  =	  99%,	  SD	  =	  2%).	  We	  
expected	  anti-­‐free	  will	  participants	  to	  be	  significantly	  slower	  than	  controls,	  particularly	  
on	  choice	  trials.	  A	  mixed	  design	  ANOVA	  on	  RTs,	  with	  Instruction	  (Choice	  vs.	  Directed)	  as	  
a	  within-­‐subjects	   factor	  and	  Belief	   condition	   (Anti-­‐free	  will	   vs.	  Control)	  as	  a	  between-­‐
subjects	  factor,	  revealed	  a	  main	  effect	  of	  Instruction,	  F(1,23)	  =	  79.310,	  p	  <	  .01,	  such	  that	  
participants	  were	  slower	  to	  respond	  on	  choice	  trials	  (Choice:	  M	  =	  807	  ms,	  SD	  =	  158	  ms;	  
Directed:	  M	   =	   567	  ms,	  SD	   =	   108	  ms),	   consistent	  with	  piloting	   and	   reflecting	   the	   time	  
needed	   for	   a	   response	   decision.	   A	   main	   effect	   of	   Belief	   condition	   revealed	   a	   non-­‐
significant	   trend,	   F(1,23)	   =	   2.958,	   p	   =	   .099,	   indicating	   that	   anti-­‐free	   will	   participants	  
tended	   to	   be	   slower	   to	   respond	   than	   controls	   (though	   this	   interpretation	   should	   be	  
approached	   with	   caution	   due	   to	   the	   marginal	   significance	   level).	   Further,	   the	  
interaction	  between	  Instruction	  and	  Belief	  condition	  trended	  towards	  significance,	  F(1,	  
23)	  =	  2.928,	  p	  =	  .10.	  Planned	  comparisons	  revealed	  an	  RT	  difference	  between	  anti-­‐free	  




.84	  (Figure	  3),	  such	  that	  anti-­‐free	  will	  participants	  were	  significantly	  slower	  to	  respond	  
when	  given	  a	  choice	  than	  were	  controls.	  No	  such	  effect	  was	  found	  on	  directed	  action	  
trials,	  t(23)	  =	  -­‐.69,	  p	  =	  .497,	  d	  =	  .27.	  
	  
Figure	   3.	  Reaction	   times	   on	   press	   trials,	   between-­‐subjects.	   Values	   depicted	   are	  means	   and	  
standard	  errors.	  
	  
Correlation	  of	  FAD	  difference	  scores	  with	  choice	  reaction	  times.	  To	  examine	  the	  
relationship	   between	   participants’	   RTs	   and	   free	   will	   beliefs	   more	   thoroughly,	   we	  
performed	   an	   additional	   correlation	   analysis.	   The	   aim	   of	   this	   analysis	   was	   to	   test	   to	  
what	   extent	   the	   slowed	   responding	   on	   choice	   action	   trials	   was	   related	   to	   the	  
effectiveness	   of	   the	   belief	   manipulation.	   To	   this	   end,	   we	   first	   computed	   each	  
participant’s	   change	   in	   anti-­‐free	   will	   beliefs,	   across	   experimental	   condition	   (control	  
participants	  were	   included	  to	  ensure	  sufficient	  variability),	  by	  subtracting	  participants’	  
post-­‐experimental	   scores	   on	   the	   anti-­‐free	   will	   subscale	   of	   the	   FAD	   from	   their	   pre-­‐
experimental	  scores.	  Second,	  we	  computed	  a	  difference	  score	  of	  participants’	  mean	  RTs	  
on	   choice	   and	   directed	   action	   trials	   to	   create	   an	   index	   of	   each	   participant’s	   decision	  
time	   at	   pushing	   the	   button.	   There	  was	   a	   significant	   positive	   correlation	   between	   the	  
two	  difference	  scores,	  r(23)=0.40,	  p	  <	  .05	  (Figure	  4),	  reflecting	  that	  those	  subjects	  who	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showed	  a	  stronger	  reduction	  in	  free	  will	  beliefs	  were	  also	  slower	  to	  make	  the	  decision	  




Figure	   4.	   Correlation	   of	   difference	   scores	   (post-­‐test	   minus	   pre-­‐test)	   on	   the	   anti-­‐free	   will	  
subscale	   of	   the	   FAD-­‐Plus	   with	   the	   decision	   response	   time	   index	   (mean	   response	   times	   on	  
choice	  minus	  directed	  trials).	  
	  
Proportion	   of	   inhibition	   on	   choice	   trials.	  On	   trials	   in	   which	   participants	   were	  
cued	  to	  choose	  between	  acting	  and	  inhibiting,	  participants	  opted	  to	  inhibit	  in	  41.47%	  of	  
all	  trials	  (SD	  =	  9.76%).	  The	  proportion	  of	   inhibition	  on	  choice	  trials	  was	  analyzed	  in	  an	  
independent-­‐samples	   t-­‐test,	   revealing	   no	   significant	   difference	   between	   anti-­‐free	  will	  
participants	   and	   controls,	   t(23)	   =	   -­‐.462,	   p	   =	   .648.	   This	   lack	   of	   a	   difference	   between	  
experimental	  groups,	  which	  is	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  findings	  of	  Rigoni	  et	  al.	  (2012),	  may	  be	  
due	   to	   the	  experimental	   design,	  which,	  unlike	  previous	   studies,	   discourages	   response	  
biases	  by	  using	  an	  equal	  proportion	  of	  directed	  action	  and	  inhibition	  trials.	  	  
Ratings	  
Pain	  ratings.	  We	  began	  by	  computing	  pain	  ratings	  across	  all	  participants	  for	  the	  
first	  and	  second	  halves	  of	  the	  experiment	  to	  ensure	  that	  participants	  did	  not	  adapt	  to	  




were	   observed	   between	   the	   trials	   of	   the	   first	   and	   the	   second	  half	   of	   the	   experiment	  
(First	  half:	  M	  =	  5.4,	  SD	  =	  0.8;	  Second	  half:	  M	  =	  5.5,	  SD	  =	  0.8),	  t(24)	  =	  -­‐0.58,	  p	  =	  .57.	  
Participants	   reported	  a	  grand	  mean	  pain	   rating	  of	  5.5	   (SD	  =	  0.74).	  Pain	   ratings	  
were	  analyzed	   in	  a	  mixed	  design	  ANOVA	  using	  Belief	  condition	  as	  a	  between-­‐subjects	  
factor,	   and	   Response	   (Action	   vs.	   Inhibition)	   and	   Instruction	   (Directed	   vs.	   Choice)	   as	  
within-­‐subject	  factors.	  The	  main	  effect	  of	  Belief	  condition	  was	  not	  significant,	  F(1,23)	  =	  
0.13,	   p	   =	   .73,	   reflecting	   that	   subjective	   pain	   across	   trials	   was	   equivalent	   for	   the	   two	  
groups.	  However,	  there	  was	  a	  significant	  main	  effect	  of	  Response	  (Action:	  M	  =	  5.3,	  SD	  =	  
0.2;	  Inhibition:	  M	  =	  5.7,	  SD	  =	  0.1),	  F(1,23)	  =	  12.60,	  p	  <	  .01,	   indicating	  higher	  perceived	  
pain	   on	   inhibition	   compared	  with	   action	   trials,	   presumably	   due	   to	   the	   lengthier	   pain	  
stimulation.	   Moreover,	   there	   was	   an	   interaction	   effect	   of	   Response	   x	   Instruction,	  
F(1,23)	  =	  7.94,	  p	  =	   .01,	  reflecting	  that	   inhibition	  trials	  were	  rated	  as	   less	  painful	  when	  
they	  were	  voluntarily	  chosen	  rather	  than	  instructed	  (Choice:	  M	  =	  5.5,	  SD	  =	  0.8;	  Directed:	  
M	  =	  5.8,	  SD	  =	  0.6),	   t(24)	  =	  3.38,	  p	  <	   .01,	  while	   there	  was	  no	  such	  difference	  between	  
chosen	  and	  directed	  action	  trials	  (Choice:	  M	  =	  5.4,	  SD	  =	  1.0;	  Directed:	  M	  =	  5.2,	  SD	  =	  0.9),	  
t(24)	   =	   -­‐1.54,	   	   p=	   .14.	   Importantly,	   the	   lack	   of	   a	   difference	   between	   the	   mean	   pain	  
ratings	  of	  anti-­‐free	  will	  and	  control	  participants	  suggests	  that	  our	  findings	  are	  not	  solely	  
due	  to	  differences	  in	  the	  overall	  subjective	  experience	  of	  pain.	  
Urge	  ratings.	  Participants	  reported	  a	  grand	  mean	  urge	  rating	  of	  4.5	  (SD	  =	  1.4).	  
Urge	  ratings	  were	  analyzed	  with	  a	  mixed	  design	  ANOVA	  akin	  to	  that	  of	  the	  pain	  ratings.	  
The	  analysis	  revealed	  a	  significant	  main	  effect	  of	  response,	  reflecting	  greater	  urges	  on	  
action	  trials	  (Action:	  M	  =	  4.8,	  SD	  =	  0.3;	  Inhibition:	  M	  =	  4.2,	  SD	  =	  0.3),	  F(1,23)	  =	  4.98,	  p	  <	  
.05.	  There	  was	  also	  a	  significant	   interaction	  effect	  of	  Response	  x	   Instruction,	  F(1,23)	  =	  
6.49,	  p	  <	  .05.	  Consistent	  with	  the	  pain	  ratings,	  participants	  reported	  a	  reduced	  urge	  on	  
choice	  compared	  with	  directed	  inhibition	  trials	  (Choice:	  M	  =	  4.0,	  SD	  =	  1.6;	  Directed:	  M	  =	  
4.5,	  SD	  =	  1.7),	  t(24)	  =	  2.67,	  p	  <	  .05,	  while	  there	  was	  no	  such	  difference	  between	  choice	  
and	  directed	  action	  trials	  (Choice:	  M	  =	  5.0,	  SD	  =	  1.4;	  Directed:	  M	  =	  4.6,	  SD	  =	  1.6),	  t(24)	  =	  
-­‐1.70,	  p	  =	  .10.	  The	  main	  effect	  of	  Belief	  condition	  was	  not	  significant,	  F(1,23)	  =	  0.10	  ,	  p	  =	  
.76.	   Crucially	   however,	   there	  was	   a	   significant	   interaction	   effect	   of	   Belief	   condition	   x	  
Instruction,	   F(1,23)	   =	   6.22,	   p	   <	   .05.	   Post-­‐hoc	   t-­‐tests	   revealed	   that	   participants	   in	   the	  
anti-­‐free	  will	  condition	  tended	  to	  report	  a	  stronger	  urge	  to	  press	  on	  directed	  trials	  than	  
on	   choice	   trials,	   t(11)	   =	   2.044,	   p	   =	   .066,	   whereas	   this	   was	   not	   the	   case	   for	   control	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subjects,	  t(12)=	  -­‐1.465,	  p=.17	  (Figure	  5).	  This	  may	  be	  indicative	  of	  a	  greater	  urge	  to	  act	  
when	  externally	  instructed	  on	  the	  part	  of	  anti-­‐free	  will	  participants.	  Similar	  results	  were	  
obtained	  by	  Alquist	  et	  al.	  (2013),	  who	  found	  that	  anti-­‐free	  will	  participants	  conformed	  




Figure	  5.	  Urge	   ratings	  as	  a	   function	  of	   Instruction	   (Choice	   vs.	  Directed)	  and	  Belief	   condition	  
(Control	  vs.	  Anti-­‐free	  will).	  Values	  depicted	  are	  means	  and	  standard	  errors.	  
	  
Adaptive	  strategies	  on	  choice	  trials	  
Based	   on	   the	   hypothesis	   that	   anti-­‐free	   will	   participants	   might	   lack	   adaptive	  
strategies,	   we	   conducted	   an	   exploratory	   analysis	   in	   which	   we	   investigated	   whether	  
preceding	  trial	  pain	  or	  trial	   type	  had	  an	   influence	  on	  response	  selection	  during	  choice	  
trials.	  We	  assumed	  that	  high	  pain	  trials	  might	  create	  a	  strong	   incentive	  to	   ‘quit’	  when	  
subsequently	   given	   a	   choice,	   thereby	   activating	   a	   strategy	   that	   is	   protective	   of	   the	  
organism.	   Similarly,	   participants	  might	   attempt	   to	   create	   subjectively	   easier	   response	  




present	  for	  control	  participants,	  as	  anti-­‐free	  will	  participants	  tend	  to	  be	  less	  inclined	  to	  
adjust	  their	  behavior	  to	  the	  present	  situation	  (Rigoni	  et	  al.,	  2013).	  
Pain	   on	   preceding	   trial.	   To	   investigate	   the	   influence	   of	   pain	   on	   subsequent	  
choice	   behavior,	   we	   computed	   each	   participant’s	   mean	   pain	   rating	   for	   the	   trials	  
preceding	  choice	  inhibition	  and	  choice	  action	  trials.	  A	  mixed	  design	  ANOVA	  with	  factors	  
of	  Belief	   condition	   (Anti-­‐free	  will	   vs.	   Control)	   and	  Response	   (Choice	  Action	   vs.	  Choice	  
Inhibition)	  was	  then	  conducted	  on	  mean	  pain	  rating	  for	  n-­‐1	  trials.	  The	  analysis	  revealed	  
no	  main	  effects	  or	   interactions,	  Fs	  <	   .838,	  ps	  >	   .36,	   indicating	  that	  pain	  ratings	  on	  the	  
preceding	   trial	   did	   not	   differ	   between	   choice	   inhibition	   and	   choice	   action	   trials,	   for	  
either	  experimental	  group.	  This	  would	  suggest	  that	  participants	  do	  not	  use	  recent	  pain	  




Figure	  6.	  N-­‐1	  trial	  contribution	  to	  response	  tendencies	  in	  each	  experimental	  group.	  Compared	  
with	   anti-­‐free	  will	   participants	   (AFW),	   control	   participants	   (CTRL)	   tend	   to	   inhibit	   less	   often	  
following	   a	   directed	   press	   trial.	   The	   dashed	   line	   indicates	   the	   grand	   mean	   proportion	   of	  
inhibition.	  *	  p	  <	  0.05.	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Response	  styles.	  To	  investigate	  response	  styles,	  we	  computed	  mean	  proportions	  
of	   inhibition	  during	  choice	  trials	   following	  each	  of	  the	  four	  trial	   types.	  A	  mixed	  design	  
ANOVA	   with	   factors	   of	   Belief	   condition	   (Anti-­‐free	   will	   vs.	   Control),	   n-­‐1	   Instruction	  
(Choice	  vs.	  Directed),	  and	  n-­‐1	  Response	  (Action	  vs.	   Inhibition)	  was	  then	  conducted	  on	  
mean	   proportion	   of	   inhibition	   in	   choice	   trials.	   This	   gave	   an	   index	   of	   how	   often	  
participants	  chose	  to	   inhibit	  rather	  than	  act	  following	  a	  particular	  trial	  type	  (Figure	  6).	  
The	  analysis	  revealed	  a	  main	  effect	  of	  n-­‐1	  Instruction	  (Choice:	  M	  =	  45.0%	  inhibition	  on	  
subsequent	   choice	   trial;	   Directed:	  M	   =	   38.7%	   inhibition	   on	   subsequent	   choice	   trial),	  
F(1,23)	  =	  6.366,	  p	  <	  .05,	  such	  that	  participants	  tended	  to	  choose	  to	  inhibit	  more	  often	  
following	  a	  choice	  trial.	  There	  was	  also	  a	  significant	  interaction	  between	  n-­‐1	  Instruction	  
and	   n-­‐1	   Response,	   F(1,23)	   =	   11.460,	   p	   <	   .01,	   	   such	   that	   participants	   chose	   to	   inhibit	  
more	  often	  following	  a	  choice	  action	  trial	  (M	  =	  52.2%)	  than	  any	  other	  trial	  type	  (Choice	  
Inhibit	  n-­‐1	  =	  37.9%;	  Directed	  Action	  n-­‐1	  =	  35.5%;	  Directed	  Inhibition	  n-­‐1	  =	  41.7%),	  ts	  >	  
2.64,	  ps	  <	   .05.	   Furthermore,	   there	  was	  a	  non-­‐significant	   trend	   towards	  an	   interaction	  
between	   n-­‐1	   Response	   and	   Belief	   condition,	   F(1,23)	   =	   3.523,	   p	   =	   .07.	   Anti-­‐free	   will	  
participants	  tended	  to	  inhibit	  more	  often	  following	  an	  action	  trial	  (M	  =	  48.0%)	  than	  an	  
inhibition	   trial	   (M	  =	  38.6%),	   t(11)	  =	   -­‐2.164,	  p	  =	   .05,	  d	  =	   .63,	  whereas	   this	  was	  not	   the	  
case	   for	  controls	   (Action	  n-­‐1:	  M	  =	  40.0%;	   Inhibition	  n-­‐1:	  M	  =	  40.8%),	  t(12)	  =	   .251,	  p	  =	  
.806,	  d	  =	  .03.	  This	  may	  indicate	  a	  more	  explicit	  tendency	  to	  alternate	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  
satisfy	  the	  50%	  choice	   instruction.	  Finally,	  post-­‐hoc	  t-­‐tests	  confirmed	  that	  the	  primary	  
difference	   in	   proportion	   of	   inhibition	   between	   experimental	   groups	   lay	   in	   directed	  
action	  n-­‐1	  trials.	  Control	  subjects	  chose	  to	  inhibit	  significantly	  less	  often	  than	  anti-­‐free	  
will	  participants	  following	  a	  directed	  action	  trial	  (Control:	  M	  =	  29.7%;	  Anti-­‐free	  will:	  M	  =	  
41.7%),	  t(23)	  =	  -­‐2.490,	  p	  <	  .05,	  d	  =	  .99.	  This	  may	  be	  indicative	  of	  an	  additional	  adaptive	  
strategy	  on	  the	  part	  of	  control	  participants,	  as	  response	  repetitions	  are	  subjectively	  less	  
effortful	  than	  response	  switches.	  
DISCUSSION	  
In	  the	  present	  study,	  we	  employed	  a	  novel	  experimental	  approach	  using	  thermal	  
pain	  stimulation	  in	  order	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  moderating	  nature	  of	  high-­‐level	  beliefs	  on	  
self-­‐regulation.	   In	  particular,	  we	  sought	  to	  probe	  whether	  reducing	  participants’	  belief	  
in	  free	  will	  could	  lead	  to	  a	  form	  of	  intentional	  disengagement	  that	  influences	  selection	  




In	  line	  with	  our	  predictions,	  participants	  who	  were	  induced	  to	  disbelieve	  in	  free	  
will	  were	  significantly	  slower	  to	  initiate	  a	  response	  on	  trials	  in	  which	  they	  chose	  to	  act.	  
This	  directly	  corresponds	  to	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  anti-­‐free	  will	  participants	  would	  exhibit	  
less	   intentional	  engagement.	   Interestingly,	  this	  effect	   is	  only	  evident	  when	  a	  response	  
has	  to	  be	  executed	   internally	   rather	   than	  externally,	   suggesting	  not	  a	  global	  passivity,	  
but	  rather	  a	  specific	  impairment	  in	  voluntary	  self-­‐regulation.	  The	  amount	  of	  slowing	  on	  
choice	  action	  trials	  was	  furthermore	  correlated	  with	  the	  degree	  of	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  
the	   belief	   manipulation,	   suggesting	   a	   direct	   link	   between	   the	   weakening	   of	   free	   will	  
beliefs	  and	  intentional	  behavioral	  engagement.	  This	  mirrors	  the	  finding	  by	  Rigoni	  et	  al.	  
(2011)	   in	  which	  decreases	   in	  the	  readiness	  potential	  were	  correlated	  with	  a	  change	  in	  
anti-­‐free	   will	   scores.	   Moreover,	   anti-­‐free	   will	   participants	   reported	   greater	   urges	   to	  
terminate	  the	  trial	  when	  their	  behavior	  was	  guided	  by	  the	  cue	  compared	  to	  when	  they	  
were	  able	  to	  freely	  choose,	  suggesting	  a	  disengagement	  from	  the	  task	  when	  externally	  
instructed.	   Importantly,	   and	   in	   contrast	   with	   previous	   studies,	   the	   aforementioned	  
differences	   are	   not	   confounded	   by	   differential	   response	   biases,	   as	   the	   proportion	   of	  
inhibition	  in	  choice	  trials	  was	  equivalent	  between	  control	  and	  anti-­‐free	  will	  participants.	  	  
Our	   analysis	   of	   potentially	   adaptive	   strategies	   revealed	   surprising	   results.	  
Participants	  do	  not	  appear	  to	  use	  recent	  pain	  as	  a	  criterion	  in	  deciding	  whether	  to	  act	  or	  
inhibit	   when	   given	   the	   choice.	   However,	   we	   do	   find	   differences	   between	   the	  
experimental	   groups	   in	   terms	   of	   their	   response	   styles.	   Interpretations	   are	   merely	  
speculative	   at	   this	   point,	   but	   one	   could	   suppose	   that	   control	   participants	   select	   a	  
subjectively	  easier	  strategy	  when	  exhibiting	  a	  bias	  to	  repeat	  an	  action	  response.	  On	  the	  
other	   hand,	   one	   could	   interpret	   the	   anti-­‐free	   will	   participants	   as	   selecting	   the	   less	  
effortful	  strategy,	  by	  avoiding	  two	  (subjectively	  more	  painful)	  inhibition	  trials	  in	  a	  row.	  
In	  the	  future,	  this	  could	  be	  disentangled	  by	  presenting	  blocks	  composed	  solely	  of	  choice	  
trials	   in	   order	   to	   determine,	   via	   longer	   choice	   trial	   sequences,	   which	   is	   the	   favored	  
strategy:	  response	  repetitions	  or	  avoidance	  of	  effortful	  combinations.	  
Taken	   together,	   the	  present	   study	   supports	   and	  extends	  previous	   research	  on	  
intentional	   inhibition.	   In	   particular,	   it	   is	   the	   first	   to	   investigate	   voluntary	   inhibition	  of	  
behavior	   in	   an	   ecologically	   valid	   experimental	   setting	   that	   involves	   hot	   motivational	  
systems.	  Participants	   reported	   less	  pain	  and	  a	   reduced	  urge	   to	   terminate	   the	   trial	  on	  
choice	   inhibition	   trials	   compared	   with	   directed	   inhibition	   trials,	   while	   choice	   and	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directed	   press	   trials	   were	   more	   comparable.	   Thus	   the	   pain	   paradigm	   we	   introduce	  
offers	  an	  effective	  way	  to	  dissociate	  between	  voluntary	  and	   instructed	   inhibition	  on	  a	  
behavioral	  level,	  which	  opens	  the	  door	  to	  new	  ways	  of	  investigating	  inhibition	  in	  which	  
behaviorally-­‐relevant	  options	  are	  available	  to	  the	  participant.	  	  
That	   being	   said,	   as	   this	   study	   served	   as	   a	   first	   pilot	   of	   a	   novel	   paradigm,	   our	  
investigation	  must	   be	   seen	   as	   exploratory	   in	   nature,	   and	   our	   conclusions	   considered	  
accordingly.	  The	  exclusion	  of	  participants	  who	  did	  not	  experience	  sufficient	  pain	  levels	  
is	   an	   unfortunate	   limitation	   of	   the	   present	   line	   of	   research.	   	   Future	   studies	   should	  
endeavor	   to	   ensure	   that	   a	   sufficient	   pain	   tolerance	   threshold	   is	   obtained	   for	   each	  
participant,	  or	  that	  unsuitable	  participants	  are	  excluded	  in	  advance	  of	  testing.	  	  This	  may	  
require	  rigorous	  pre-­‐testing	  of	  criteria	  such	  as	  whether	  participants	  are	  able	  to	  reliably	  
report	   their	   tolerance	   thresholds,	   and	  whether	   or	   not	   they	   adapt	   too	  quickly	   to	   pain	  
over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  experiment.	  	  	  
On	   a	   larger	   scale,	   the	   observed	   effects	   also	   exemplify	   a	   growing	   body	   of	  
research	   that	   reveals	   the	   influence	   of	   higher-­‐order	   beliefs	   and	   metacognitions	   on	  
behavioral	   control.	  As	  discussed	  earlier,	  determinist	  beliefs	  have	  been	  shown	   to	  have	  
an	  effect	  on	  prosocial	  behavior	  (Vohs	  &	  Schooler,	  2008;	  Baumeister	  et	  al.,	  2009,	  2011),	  
basic	  motor	   and	   cognitive	   processes	   (Rigoni	   et	   al.,	   2011,	   2013),	   intentional	   inhibition	  
(Rigoni	   et	   al.,	   2012),	   and	  now	  on	   self-­‐regulation	  of	   a	   ‘hot’	   incentive	   response	   system	  
(Morsella,	  2005).	  Yet	  free	  will	  beliefs	  are	  not	  the	  only	  higher-­‐order	  cognitions	  capable	  of	  
influencing	  a	  variety	  of	  processes	  underlying	  behavioral	  control.	  	  	  
For	   instance,	  one	  factor	  that	  has	  been	  proposed	  to	  have	  a	  strong	   influence	  on	  
self-­‐control	   is	   ‘ego	   depletion,’	   or	   the	   phenomenon	   in	   which	   exertion	   of	   self-­‐control	  
exhausts	   a	   common	   regulatory	   resource,	   leading	   to	   hindered	   performance	   on	  
subsequent	   tasks	   (Muraven,	  Tice,	  &	  Baumeister,	   1998;	  Vohs	  et	   al.,	   2008;	  Baumeister,	  
2009;	   Hagger	   et	   al.,	   2010).	   However,	   recent	   research	   has	   revealed	   that	   participants’	  
relevant	   belief	   systems	   are	   likely	   to	   be	   more	   crucial	   than	   actual	   depletion	   when	   it	  
comes	   to	   self-­‐regulatory	   capacity.	   For	   instance,	   Job,	   Dweck,	   &	   Walton	   (2010)	  
demonstrated	   that	   only	   participants	  who	   thought	   of	   willpower	   as	   a	   limited	   resource	  
demonstrated	   the	   typical	   pattern	   of	   ego	   depletion,	   while	   the	   effect	   was	   completely	  
absent	   in	   participants	   who	   lacked	   this	   conviction.	   Similarly,	   Clarkson	   and	   colleagues	  




perceived	  themselves	  as	  less	  depleted,	  they	  failed	  to	  demonstrate	  ego	  depletion	  effects	  
during	  subsequent	  task	  performance	  (see	  also	  Vohs,	  Baumeister,	  &	  Schmeichel,	  2012).	  
These	   observations	   indicate	   that	   beliefs	   regarding	   regulatory	   resources	   are	   distinct	  
from	  the	  resources	  themselves,	  and	  can	  impact	  task	  performance	  independently,	  thus	  
mirroring	   our	   finding	   of	   reduced	   engagement	   in	   self-­‐control	   on	   the	   part	   of	   subjects	  
whose	  belief	  in	  free	  will	  has	  been	  diminished.	  	  
A	   similar	   influence	   of	   high-­‐level	   beliefs	   has	   been	   observed	   for	   intentional	  
binding,	   i.e.,	   an	   implicit	  measure	   of	   self-­‐agency	   in	  which	   the	   perception	   of	   voluntary	  
movement	   is	   shifted	   forward	   in	   time	   towards	   a	   subsequent	   sensory	   effect,	   and	   vice	  
versa.	  Desantis	  et	  al.	  (2011)	  demonstrated	  that	  intentional	  binding	  was	  stronger	  when	  
participants	  were	  led	  to	  believe	  they	  were	  responsible	  for	  the	  action	  effect	  than	  when	  
they	  believed	  that	  another	  participant	  was	  the	  causal	  agent.	  This	  finding	  indicates	  that	  
high-­‐level	  beliefs	  about	  authorship	  can	  influence	  low-­‐level	  sensorimotor	  processes,	  and	  
thus	  bias	  the	  experience	  of	  self-­‐agency.	  A	  similar	  mechanism	  may	  also	  contribute	  to	  our	  
findings,	  as	  belief	  in	  the	  concept	  of	  free	  will	  has	  been	  shown	  to	  be	  associated	  with	  the	  
experience	  of	  self-­‐agency	  (Aarts	  &	  van	  den	  Bos,	  2011).	  Thus,	  the	  weakening	  of	  free	  will	  
beliefs	   may	   have	   discouraged	   participants	   from	   engaging	   in	   self-­‐regulatory	   behavior	  
due	   to	   the	   subjective	   feeling	   of	   reduced	   control	   over	   the	   outcomes	   of	   their	   actions.	  
Future	  research	  should	  directly	  address	  this	  question.	  	  
	   The	  present	  study	  demonstrates	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  a	  disbelief	  in	  free	  will	  may	  
lead	  participants	   to	  be	   less	   inclined	   to	  put	  effort	   into	  self-­‐regulatory	  behavior,	  and	   to	  
rely	  on	  the	  external	  environment	  rather	  than	  internally-­‐determined	  strategies,	  even	  in	  
the	  face	  of	  a	  strong	  incentive	  stimulus.	  It	  seems,	  therefore,	  that	  metacognitions	  have	  a	  
nontrivial	   impact	  on	  behavioral	   control.	   Furthermore,	   a	   fundamental	   belief	   in	   control	  
over	   one’s	   actions	   may	   prove	   to	   be	   an	   integral	   prerequisite	   for	   self-­‐regulatory	  
investments.	  Future	  studies	  should	  more	  directly	  investigate	  the	  mechanisms	  by	  which	  
higher-­‐order	  beliefs	  impact	  the	  recruitment	  of	  self-­‐control.	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Results	  Including	  Low	  Pain	  Participants	  
	  
Overview	  
The	  ‘low	  pain’	  group	  consisted	  of	  23	  participants	  (4	  males),	  with	  12	  participants	  
in	  the	  anti-­‐free	  will	  condition	  and	  11	  in	  the	  control	  condition.	  Total	  FAD-­‐scores	  did	  not	  
differ	  significantly	  between	  the	  low	  and	  high	  pain	  group,	  t(46)	  =	  0.77,	  p=.44.	  	  The	  grand	  
mean	  pain	  rating	  for	  the	  low	  pain	  group	  was	  3.7	  (SD	  =	  0.57).	  	  The	  below	  results	  include	  
all	  participants,	  and	  treat	  Pain	  Group	  as	  a	  between-­‐subjects	  factor.	  
Behavioral	  analyses	  
Reaction	  times.	  	  On	  trials	  in	  which	  participants	  were	  cued	  to	  button	  press,	  
participants	  performed	  the	  correct	  response	  in	  nearly	  all	  trials	  (M	  =	  98%,	  SD	  =	  3%).	  We	  
expected	  anti-­‐free	  will	  participants	  to	  be	  significantly	  slower	  than	  controls,	  particularly	  
on	  choice	  trials.	  A	  mixed	  design	  ANOVA	  on	  RTs	  with	  Instruction	  (Choice	  vs.	  Directed)	  as	  
a	  within-­‐subjects	  factor,	  and	  Belief	  condition	  (Anti-­‐free	  will	  vs.	  Control)	  and	  Pain	  Group	  
(High	  vs.	  Low)	  as	  between-­‐subjects	  factors,	  revealed	  a	  main	  effect	  of	  Instruction,	  
F(1,44)	  =	  139.31,	  p	  <	  .001,	  such	  that	  participants	  were	  slower	  to	  respond	  on	  choice	  
trials	  (Choice:	  M	  =	  795	  ms,	  SD	  =	  21	  ms;	  Directed:	  M	  =	  563	  ms,	  SD	  =	  15	  ms),	  consistent	  
with	  piloting	  and	  reflecting	  the	  time	  needed	  for	  a	  response	  decision.	  Neither	  the	  main	  
effect	  of	  Belief	  condition	  nor	  the	  main	  effect	  of	  Pain	  Group	  were	  significant,	  ps	  >	  .31.	  
Crucially	  however,	  there	  was	  a	  significant	  three-­‐way	  interaction	  effect	  of	  Instruction	  x	  
Belief	  Condition	  x	  Pain	  Group,	  F(1,44)	  =	  4.43,	  p	  <	  .05.	  Planned	  comparisons	  revealed	  a	  
significant	  RT	  difference	  between	  anti-­‐free	  will	  participants	  and	  controls	  on	  choice	  
action	  trials	  in	  the	  high	  pain	  group,	  t(23)	  =	  -­‐	  2.07,	  p	  <	  .05,	  such	  that	  anti-­‐free	  will	  
participants	  were	  significantly	  slower	  to	  respond	  when	  given	  a	  choice	  (M	  =	  871	  ms,	  SD	  =	  
133	  ms)	  than	  controls	  (M	  =	  748	  ms,	  SD	  =	  162	  ms).	  No	  such	  effect	  was	  found	  on	  
exogenous	  action	  trials,	  t(23)	  =	  -­‐.69,	  p	  =	  .497	  (Anti-­‐free	  will:	  M	  =	  582	  ms,	  SD	  =	  94	  ms;	  
Control:	  M	  =	  552	  ms,	  SD	  =	  121	  ms).	  In	  the	  low	  pain	  group	  there	  were	  no	  significant	  RT	  
differences	  between	  the	  Belief	  Conditions,	  ps>.40.	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Correlation	  of	  FAD	  difference	  scores	  with	  choice	  reaction	  times.	  To	  examine	  the	  
relationship	  between	  participants’	  RTs	  and	  free	  will	  beliefs	  more	  thoroughly,	  we	  
performed	  an	  additional	  correlation	  analysis.	  The	  aim	  of	  this	  analysis	  was	  to	  test	  to	  
what	  extent	  the	  slowed	  responding	  on	  endogenous	  action	  trials	  was	  related	  to	  the	  
effectiveness	  of	  the	  belief	  manipulation.	  To	  this	  end,	  we	  first	  computed	  each	  
participant’s	  change	  in	  anti-­‐free	  will	  beliefs,	  across	  experimental	  condition,	  by	  
subtracting	  participants’	  post-­‐experimental	  scores	  on	  the	  anti-­‐free	  will	  subscale	  of	  the	  
FAD	  from	  their	  pre-­‐experimental	  scores.	  Second,	  we	  computed	  a	  difference	  score	  of	  
participants’	  mean	  RTs	  on	  endogenous	  and	  exogenous	  action	  trials	  to	  create	  an	  index	  of	  
each	  participant’s	  decision	  time	  at	  pushing	  the	  button.	  There	  was	  a	  significant	  positive	  
correlation	  between	  the	  two	  difference	  scores	  for	  participants	  in	  the	  high	  pain	  group,	  
r(25)=0.40,	  p	  <	  .05,	  reflecting	  that	  those	  subjects	  who	  showed	  a	  stronger	  reduction	  in	  
free	  will	  beliefs	  were	  also	  slower	  to	  make	  the	  decision	  to	  press	  the	  button.	  In	  line	  with	  
the	  previous	  analysis,	  no	  such	  effect	  was	  observed	  for	  participants	  in	  the	  low	  pain	  
group,	  r(23)=0.04,	  p	  =	  .87.	  
Proportion	  of	  inhibition	  on	  choice	  trials.	  On	  trials	  in	  which	  participants	  were	  
cued	  to	  choose	  between	  pressing	  and	  inhibiting,	  participants	  opted	  to	  inhibit	  in	  44.92%	  
of	  all	  trials	  (SD	  =	  12.60%).	  The	  proportion	  of	  inhibition	  on	  choice	  trials	  was	  analyzed	  in	  
an	  ANOVA	  with	  Belief	  condition	  and	  Pain	  Group	  as	  between-­‐subjects	  factors.	  This	  
analysis	  revealed	  a	  main	  effect	  of	  Pain	  Group,	  F(1,44)	  =	  3.87,	  p	  =	  .05,	  such	  that	  
participants	  in	  the	  high	  pain	  group	  chose	  to	  inhibit	  less	  often	  than	  participants	  in	  the	  
low	  pain	  group	  (high	  pain:	  M	  =	  41.6%,	  SD	  =	  2.5%;	  low	  pain:	  M	  =	  48.6%,	  SD	  =	  2.6%).	  	  
However,	  there	  was	  no	  interaction	  effect,	  nor	  a	  significant	  main	  effect	  of	  Belief	  
Condition,	  ps>.	  70.	  A	  planned	  comparison	  revealed	  no	  significant	  difference	  between	  
anti-­‐free	  will	  participants	  (M	  =	  42.43%,	  SD	  =	  10.22%)	  and	  controls	  (M	  =	  40.59%,	  SD	  =	  
9.64%)	  in	  the	  high	  pain	  group,	  t(23)	  =	  -­‐.462,	  p	  =	  .65.	  This	  lack	  of	  a	  difference	  between	  
experimental	  groups,	  which	  is	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  findings	  of	  Rigoni	  et	  al.	  (2012),	  may	  be	  
due	  to	  the	  experimental	  design,	  which,	  unlike	  previous	  studies,	  discourages	  response	  
biases	  by	  using	  an	  equal	  proportion	  of	  directed	  press	  and	  inhibit	  trials.	  
Ratings	  
Pain	  ratings.	  Pain	  ratings	  were	  computed	  for	  the	  first	  and	  second	  halves	  of	  the	  




course	  of	  the	  experiment.	  No	  differences	  in	  pain	  ratings	  were	  observed	  between	  the	  
trials	  of	  the	  first	  and	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  experiment	  (First	  half:	  M	  =	  4.6,	  SD	  =	  1.1;	  
Second	  half:	  M	  =	  4.6,	  SD	  =	  1.2),	  t(47)	  =	  0.21,	  p	  =	  .84.	  Pain	  ratings	  were	  analyzed	  in	  a	  
mixed	  design	  ANOVA	  using	  Belief	  condition	  as	  a	  between-­‐subjects	  factor,	  and	  Response	  
(Action	  vs.	  Inhibition)	  and	  Instruction	  as	  within-­‐subject	  factors.	  The	  main	  effect	  of	  Belief	  
condition	  was	  not	  significant	  (Anti-­‐free	  will:	  M	  =	  4.5,	  SD	  =	  1.1;	  Control:	  M	  =	  4.7,	  SD	  =	  
1.2),	  F(1,46)	  =	  0.23,	  p	  =	  .63,	  reflecting	  that	  subjective	  pain	  across	  trials	  was	  equivalent	  
for	  the	  two	  groups.	  However,	  there	  was	  a	  significant	  main	  effect	  of	  Response	  (Action:	  
M	  =	  4.2,	  SD	  =	  0.2;	  Inhibition:	  M	  =	  5.0,	  SD	  =	  0.1),	  F(1,46)	  =	  51.81,	  p	  <	  .001,	  indicating	  
higher	  perceived	  pain	  on	  inhibition	  compared	  with	  action	  trials,	  presumably	  due	  to	  the	  
lengthier	  pain	  stimulation.	  Moreover,	  there	  was	  a	  main	  effect	  of	  instruction,	  F(1,46)	  =	  
4.77,	  p	  <	  .05.	  Participants	  had	  higher	  pain	  ratings	  on	  directed	  than	  on	  choice	  trials	  
(Directed:	  M	  =	  4.7,	  SD	  =	  0.2;	  Choice:	  M	  =	  4.6,	  SD	  =	  0.2).	  We	  also	  observed	  an	  interaction	  
effect	  of	  Response	  x	  Instruction,	  F(1,46)	  =	  20.12,	  p	  <	  .001,	  reflecting	  that	  inhibition	  trials	  
were	  rated	  as	  less	  painful	  when	  they	  were	  chosen	  rather	  than	  directed	  (Choice:	  M	  =	  4.8,	  
SD	  =	  1.1;	  Directed:	  M	  =	  5.2,	  SD	  =	  0.9),	  t(47)	  =	  5.78,	  p	  <	  .001,	  while	  action	  trials	  were	  
rated	  as	  less	  painful	  when	  they	  were	  directed	  rather	  than	  chosen	  (Directed:	  M	  =	  4.1,	  SD	  
=	  1.4;	  Choice:	  M	  =	  4.3,	  SD	  =	  1.4),	  t(47)	  =	  -­‐2.30,	  p	  <	  .05.	  Importantly,	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  
difference	  between	  the	  mean	  pain	  ratings	  of	  anti-­‐free	  will	  and	  control	  participants	  
suggests	  that	  our	  findings	  are	  not	  solely	  due	  to	  differences	  in	  the	  overall	  subjective	  
experience	  of	  pain.	  
Urge	  ratings.	  Participants	  reported	  a	  grand	  mean	  urge	  rating	  of	  3.6	  (SD	  =	  1.7).	  
Participants’	  mean	  urge	  ratings	  were	  higher	  in	  the	  high	  pain	  group	  (M	  =	  4.5,	  SD	  =	  1.38)	  
than	  in	  the	  low	  pain	  group	  (M	  =	  2.6,	  SD	  =	  1.37),	  t(46)	  =	  4.94,	  p	  <	  .001.	  Urge	  ratings	  were	  
analyzed	  with	  a	  mixed	  design	  ANOVA	  akin	  to	  that	  of	  pain	  ratings.	  The	  analysis	  revealed	  
a	  significant	  main	  effect	  of	  response,	  reflecting	  greater	  urges	  on	  action	  trials	  than	  
inhibition	  trials	  (Action:	  M	  =	  4.0,	  SD	  =	  0.3;	  Inhibition:	  M	  =	  3.2,	  SD	  =	  0.3),	  F(1,46)	  =	  8.46,	  p	  
<	  .05.	  There	  was	  also	  a	  significant	  interaction	  effect	  of	  Response	  x	  Instruction,	  F(1,46)	  =	  
9.74,	  p	  <	  .05.	  Consistent	  with	  the	  pain	  ratings,	  participants	  reported	  reduced	  urges	  on	  
choice	  compared	  with	  directed	  inhibition	  trials	  (Choice:	  M	  =	  3.0,	  SD	  =	  1.7;	  Directed:	  M	  =	  
3.4,	  SD	  =	  1.9),	  t(47)	  =	  2.89,	  p	  <	  .05,	  while	  this	  effect	  was	  reversed	  for	  choice	  and	  
directed	  action	  trials	  (Choice:	  M	  =	  4.2,	  SD	  =	  2.1;	  Directed:	  M	  =	  3.7,	  SD	  =	  2.2),	  t(47)	  =	  -­‐
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2.27,	  p	  <	  .05.	  The	  main	  effect	  of	  Belief	  condition	  was	  not	  significant	  (Anti-­‐free	  will:	  M	  =	  
3.7,	  SD	  =	  1.6;	  Control:	  M	  =	  3.5,	  SD	  =	  1.8),	  F(1,46)	  =	  0.14	  ,	  p	  =	  .72.	  Notably	  however,	  we	  
observed	  a	  trend	  towards	  a	  three-­‐way	  interaction	  effect	  of	  Belief	  condition	  x	  Response	  
x	  Instruction,	  F(1,23)	  =	  3.36,	  p	  =	  .07.	  Post-­‐hoc	  t-­‐tests	  revealed	  that	  participants	  in	  the	  
control	  condition	  tended	  to	  report	  a	  stronger	  urge	  to	  press	  on	  choice	  action	  trials	  than	  
on	  directed	  action	  trials	  (Choice	  Action:	  M	  =	  4.3,	  SD	  =	  2.1;	  Directed	  Action:	  M	  =	  3.4,	  SD	  =	  
2.0),	  t(23)	  =	  4.32,	  p	  <	  .001,	  whereas	  this	  was	  not	  the	  case	  for	  anti-­‐free	  will	  subjects	  
(Choice	  Action:	  M	  =	  4.2,	  SD	  =	  2.1;	  Directed	  Action:	  M	  =	  4.1,	  SD	  =	  2.4),	  t(23)=	  0.21,	  p=.84.	  
Though	  strong	  conclusions	  cannot	  be	  drawn	  from	  this	  non-­‐significant	  result,	  it	  may	  be	  
indicative	  of	  a	  greater	  urge	  to	  act	  when	  externally	  instructed	  on	  the	  part	  of	  anti-­‐free	  
will	  participants.	  Similar	  results	  were	  obtained	  by	  Alquist	  et	  al.	  (2013),	  who	  found	  that	  




























Priming	  determinist	  beliefs	  diminishes	  implicit	  (but	  not	  







Weakening	   belief	   in	   the	   concept	   of	   free	   will	   yields	   pronounced	   effects	   upon	   social	  
behavior,	   typically	   promoting	   selfish	   and	   aggressive	   over	   pro-­‐social	   and	   helping	  
tendencies.	  Belief	  manipulations	  have	   furthermore	  been	  shown	  to	  modulate	  basic	  and	  
unconscious	   processes	   involved	   in	   motor	   control	   and	   self-­‐regulation.	   Yet,	   to	   date,	   it	  
remains	  unclear	  how	  high-­‐level	  beliefs	  can	  impact	  such	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  behaviors.	  Here,	  
we	   tested	   the	   hypothesis	   that	   priming	   disbelief	   in	   free	   will	   diminishes	   the	   sense	   of	  
agency,	  i.e.,	  the	  intrinsic	  sensation	  of	  being	  in	  control	  of	  one’s	  own	  actions.	  To	  this	  end,	  
we	  measured	  participants’	  implicit	  and	  explicit	  self-­‐agency	  under	  both	  anti-­‐free	  will	  and	  
control	   conditions.	   Priming	   disbelief	   in	   free	   will	   reduced	   implicit	   but	   not	   explicit	  
components	  of	  agency.	  These	  findings	  suggest	  that	  free	  will	  beliefs	  have	  a	  causal	  impact	  
on	   the	   pre-­‐reflective	   feeling	   of	   being	   in	   control	   of	   one’s	   actions,	   and	   solidify	   previous	  








	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






The	   question	   of	   whether	   free	   will	   truly	   exists	   has	   fascinated	   philosophers,	  
psychologists,	  and	  neuroscientists	  for	  centuries	  (e.g.,	  Haggard,	  2008;	  Libet	  et	  al.,	  1983;	  
Wegner,	   2004).	   Yet	   contemporary	   empirical	   research	   typically	   avoids	   the	   existential	  
question	  itself,	  and	  instead	  focuses	  on	  more	  tangible	  research	  questions	  concerning	  the	  
consequences	   of	   (dis)belief	   in	   free	   will,	   and	   its	   relation	   to	   agentic	   causation	   and	  
volition.	  
Seminal	  studies	  in	  the	  domain	  of	  social	  psychology	  have	  shown	  that	  weakening	  
belief	   in	   the	   concept	  of	   free	  will,	   via	   reading	  of	  essays	  or	   statements	   that	  promote	  a	  
determinist	   perspective,	   can	   greatly	   impact	   participants’	   subsequent	   social	   behavior.	  
For	  instance,	  Vohs	  and	  Schooler	  (2008)	  found	  that	  participants	  who	  were	  primed	  with	  
disbelief	   in	   free	  will	   paid	   themselves	  a	   statistically	   improbable	  amount	  of	  money	  and	  
took	   advantage	   of	   opportunities	   to	   cheat	   more	   often	   than	   a	   group	   of	   control	  
participants	  who	   read	   texts	   unrelated	   to	   free	  will.	   Likewise,	   Baumeister	   et	   al.	   (2009)	  
found	   that	   a	   similar	   manipulation	   was	   able	   to	   increase	   participants’	   aggression	   and	  
decrease	   their	   helping	   behavior.	   These	   findings	   indicate	   that	   free	   will	   beliefs	   (FWBs)	  
might	  be	  crucial	  for	  maintaining	  the	  motivation	  necessary	  to	  control	  selfish	  impulses	  in	  
favor	  of	  pro-­‐social	  behavior,	  in	  accordance	  with	  societal	  norms.	  
	  More	  recent	  work	  in	  the	  field	  of	  experimental	  psychology	  has	  revealed	  that	  the	  
effects	  of	  weakening	  participants’	  FWBs	  are	  not	  restricted	  to	  complex	  social	  behavior,	  
but	  even	  propagate	  to	  very	  basic	  levels	  of	  motor	  control	  (Lynn	  et	  al.,	  2013;	  Rigoni	  et	  al.,	  
2011;	  2013).	  Using	  a	  similar	  procedure	  to	  that	  of	  Vohs	  and	  Schooler	  (2008),	  Rigoni	  et	  al.	  
(2011)	   found	   that	   inducing	   disbelief	   in	   free	   will	   was	   associated	   with	   a	   reduced	  
amplitude	  of	   the	   readiness	  potential,	   an	  electrophysiological	  marker	  of	   pre-­‐conscious	  
movement	   preparation	   (Libet	   et	   al.,	   1983).	   In	   follow-­‐up	   studies,	   it	   was	   found	   that	  
weakening	   FWBs	   also	   influenced	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   other	   basic	   adaptive	   control	  
processes,	  such	  as	  post-­‐error	  slowing	  (Rigoni	  et	  al.,	  2013)	  or	  the	  intentional	  inhibition	  of	  
pain	   avoidance	   behavior	   (Lynn	   et	   al.,	   2013).	   This	   suggests	   that	   weakening	   FWBs	  
counteracts	  the	  recruitment	  of	  self-­‐regulatory	  resources	  to	  adapt	  behavior	  in	  response	  
to	  environmental	  demands.	  
However,	  despite	  these	  recent	  advances	  in	  research	  on	  the	  impact	  of	  FWBs	  on	  
behavioral	  control,	  the	  mechanisms	  underlying	  the	  crosstalk	  between	  high-­‐level	  beliefs	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and	   low-­‐level	   sensorimotor	   processes	   remain	   poorly	   understood.	   To	   explain	   their	  
original	   finding	   regarding	   the	   readiness	  potential,	   Rigoni	   et	   al.	   (2011)	   speculated	   that	  
weakening	   FWBs	   may	   reduce	   participants’	   sense	   of	   agency	   (SoA),	   i.e.,	   the	   intrinsic	  
experience	  of	  being	   in	   control	  of	  one’s	  own	  actions	   (for	   reviews	   see	  Gallagher,	  2000;	  
Haggard	   &	   Chambon,	   2012).	   This	   altered	   experience	   may	   then,	   in	   turn,	   hamper	   the	  
recruitment	   of	   intentional	   effort	   for	   action	   production.	   Yet,	   despite	   the	   principle	  
plausibility	  of	   this	   view,	   to	  date	   there	  exists	  only	  preliminary	   correlational	   supporting	  
evidence.	  	  
Building	  on	  the	  notion	  that	  belief	  in	  free	  will	  often	  co-­‐occurs	  with	  the	  pursuit	  of	  
goal-­‐directed	  behavior,	  Aarts	  and	  van	  den	  Bos	   (2011)	  tested	  the	  possibility	   that	  FWBs	  
are	   associated	   with	   implicit	   processing	   of	   action-­‐outcome	   relations	   underlying	   goal-­‐
directed	   behavior.	   The	   authors	   compared	   participants	   with	   either	   strong	   or	   weak	  
dispositional	   FWBs	   in	   two	   different	   tasks	   that	   tapped	   into	   implicit	   aspects	   of	   agentic	  
experience:	  (1)	  an	  intentional	  binding	  task,	  which	  measures	  the	  perceptual	  attraction	  of	  
an	   intentional	   action	   and	   its	   sensory	   outcomes	   in	   terms	   of	   time,	   and	   (2)	   an	   action-­‐
outcome	   priming	   task,	   which	   assesses	   agency	   inferences	   resulting	   from	   a	   match	  
between	  primed	  and	  actual	  outcomes	  (see	  Moore	  &	  Obhi,	  2012;	  van	  der	  Weiden,	  Aarts,	  
&	   Ruijs,	   2013;	   for	   a	   review).	   Aarts	   and	   van	   den	   Bos	   (2011)	   found	   that	   strong	  
dispositional	   FWBs	   were	   associated	   with	   greater	   intentional	   binding	   and	   a	   stronger	  
influence	  of	  primes	  on	  agency	  inferences.	  These	  findings	  clearly	  indicate	  that	  FWBs	  and	  
agency	   are	   related.	   In	   particular,	   they	   suggest	   that	   FWBs	   modulate	   the	   strength	   of	  
predictive	  signals	  about	  action	  outcomes.	  Nevertheless,	  given	  the	  correlational	  nature	  
of	   this	   study,	   a	   causal	   link	   between	   the	   two	   concepts	   remains	   to	   be	   established.	  
Accordingly,	  the	  primary	  goal	  of	  the	  present	  study	  was	  to	  scrutinize	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  
FWBs	   have	   a	   direct	   and	   causal	   impact	   on	   the	   SoA.	   Such	   evidence	  would	   provide	   the	  
missing	   link	   to	   explain	   previous	   findings	   employing	   anti-­‐free	   will	   manipulations,	   and	  
highlight	   a	   general	   mechanism	   through	   which	   beliefs	   can	   affect	   even	   basic	   and	  
unconscious	   adaptive	   processes.	   To	   this	   end,	   we	   employed	   the	   same	   procedure	   to	  
manipulate	  the	  strength	  of	  FWBs	  as	  used	  in	  previous	  studies	  (e.g.,	  Vohs	  and	  Schooler,	  
2008)	  in	  a	  within-­‐subjects	  design.	  Participants	  were	  invited	  for	  two	  visits,	  in	  which	  they	  
read	  essays	   that	  promoted	  either	  disbelief	   in	   free	  will	  or	  outlined	  general	   statements	  




Our	  secondary	  goal	  was	  to	  specify	  which	  aspects	  of	  agency	  are	  related	  to	  FWBs.	  
It	  has	  been	  argued	   that	   the	  SoA	  constitutes	  a	  multi-­‐dimensional	  construct	  comprising	  
both	  an	   implicit,	  pre-­‐reflective,	  or	  non-­‐conceptual	  component	  that	  is	  related	  to	  lower-­‐
level	   perceptual	   and	   motor	   experiences,	   and	   an	   explicit,	   reflective	   or	   conceptual	  
component	   that	   is	   related	   to	   higher-­‐level	   thoughts	   and	   attributions	   (Synofzik	   et	   al.,	  
2008).	  The	  findings	  by	  Aarts	  and	  van	  den	  Bos	  (2011)	  indicate	  that	  FWBs	  are	  related	  to	  
implicit	  processes,	  yet,	  so	  far,	  it	  is	  unclear	  to	  what	  extent	  their	  influence	  may	  propagate	  
to	   the	   conscious,	   deliberative	   level	   of	   explicit	   agency.	   Thus,	   in	   order	   to	  measure	   the	  
effects	   of	   the	   induction	   procedure	   on	   participants’	   agency,	   we	   used	   two	   different	  
experimental	   paradigms.	   To	   assess	   implicit	   components	   of	   agency,	   we	   employed	   an	  
intentional	   binding	   task	   (see	   above	   and	   methods	   section).	   To	   assess	   explicit	  
components	   of	   agency	   we	   used	   a	   modified	   version	   of	   the	   action-­‐outcome	   learning	  
method	   introduced	   by	   Sato	   and	   Yasuda	   (2005).	   This	   task	   requires	   participants	   to	  
explicitly	   learn	   action-­‐outcome	   relations	   and	   to	   subsequently	   rate	   their	   perceived	  
agency	  over	  the	  outcomes.	  The	  benefit	  of	  this	  latter	  task	  is	  that	  it	  is	  explicit	  at	  all	  levels	  
of	  processing;	  participants	  have	  full	  awareness	  of	   their	  actions	  and	  the	  corresponding	  
agency	   cues	   (see	   methods	   section	   for	   a	   comprehensive	   description).	   Comparing	   the	  
effects	  of	  inducing	  disbelief	  in	  free	  will	  in	  these	  two	  tasks	  should	  therefore	  reveal	  (i)	  if	  
FWBs	  indeed	  have	  a	  causal	  impact	  on	  the	  sense	  of	  agency,	  and	  (ii)	  whether	  this	  causal	  
link	  is	  directed	  towards	  implicit	  and/or	  explicit	  components	  of	  agency.	  
	  
METHODS	  AND	  MATERIALS	  
	  
Participants	  
Fifty-­‐two	  students	  of	  Ghent	  University	  received	  a	  compensation	  of	  sixteen	  euros	  
for	  their	  participation.	  	  The	  study	  was	  conducted	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  Declaration	  of	  
Helsinki,	   and	   the	   approval	   of	   Ghent	   University’s	   Ethical	   Committee	   was	   obtained	   in	  
advance.	   All	   participants	   reported	   being	   naïve	   as	   to	   the	   purpose	   of	   the	   experiment.	  	  








Participants	   were	   individually	   tested	   during	   two	   sessions,	   taking	   place	   on	   the	  
same	  weekday	  and	  time	  over	  two	  consecutive	  weeks.	  	  Each	  participant	  completed	  one	  
‘control’	   and	   one	   ‘anti-­‐free	   will’	   (AFW)	   session,	   with	   session	   order	   counterbalanced	  
across	  participants.	   	  Each	  session	  began	  with	  participants	  reading	  one	  of	  two	  possible	  
excerpts	   from	   Francis	   Crick’s	   ‘The	   Astonishing	   Hypothesis.’	   	   To	   ensure	   a	   thorough	  
reading	   of	   the	  material	   and	   obfuscate	   the	   goal	   of	   the	   experiment,	   participants	  were	  
informed	   that	   they	  would	   be	   tested	   regarding	   the	  material	   at	   two	   points	   during	   the	  
session,	  and	   that	  memory	   retention	  was	  a	  major	  outcome	  of	   interest.	   	   In	   the	  control	  
session,	  the	  excerpt	  was	  a	  brief	  historical	  overview	  of	  consciousness	  research,	  while	  the	  
excerpt	   read	   during	   the	   anti-­‐free	   will	   session	   questioned	   the	   reality	   of	   free	   will	   and	  
posited	  that	  such	  a	  notion	  was	  pre-­‐scientific	  (see	  Vohs	  and	  Schooler,	  2008	  for	  a	  similar	  
procedure).	  	  Participants	  were	  invited	  to	  take	  as	  much	  time	  as	  they	  pleased	  to	  read	  and	  
review	  the	  texts.	  Following	  the	  readings,	  participants	  were	  asked	  to	  complete	  the	  first	  
of	   two	  tasks	   (either	  the	   IB	  task	  or	   the	   ‘Sato’	   task,	  see	  below),	   the	  order	  of	  which	  was	  
counterbalanced	   across	   participants.	   	   Subsequent	   to	   the	   first	   task,	   participants	   were	  
asked	  to	  write	  a	  brief	  essay	  summarizing	  the	  previously	  read	  excerpt.	  	  Participants	  were	  
then	  given	   the	  chance	   to	   reread	   the	   text	  prior	   to	  commencing	   the	   second	   task.	  After	  
the	  completion	  of	  both	  tasks,	  participants	  were	  asked	  to	  fill	  out	  four	  questionnaires	  in	  
their	   first	   session	   (the	  FAD+,	   the	  BIS/BAS,	   the	   LOC,	   and	   the	  PANAS-­‐X)	   and	   two	   in	   the	  
second	  session	  (the	  FAD+	  and	  PANAS-­‐X).	  	  The	  FAD+	  (Paulhus	  &	  Carey,	  2011)	  measures	  
free	  will	  and	  deterministic	  beliefs,	  and	  served	  as	  the	  basis	  for	  our	  manipulation	  check.	  	  
The	  PANAS-­‐X	   (Watson,	  Clark	  &	  Tellegen,	  1988)	  measures	  current	  mood.	   	  The	  BIS/BAS	  
(Carver	   &	   White,	   1994)	   is	   a	   measure	   of	   both	   behavioral	   inhibition	   and	   behavioral	  
activation	  (cf.	  Gray,	  1982),	  while	  the	  LOC	  (Rotter,	  1966)	  measures	  a	  participant’s	  locus	  
of	  control.	   	  The	   latter	  questionnaires	  served	  exclusively	  as	  fillers	  to	  shield	  participants	  
from	   discovering	   the	   purpose	   of	   our	   experiment	   following	   the	   first	   session.	   Once	  
participants	   had	   completed	   the	   questionnaires	   they	   received	   a	   written	   quiz	   on	   the	  
essay,	  and	  in	  their	  second	  session,	  a	  short	  debriefing.	  The	  quiz	  was	  not	  scored	  but	  only	  
served	  to	  reinforce	  our	  cover	  story.	  The	  debriefing	  questionnaire	  consisted	  of	  general	  




experiment,	   whether	   they	   felt	   their	   concentration	   slip,	   whether	   they	   had	   used	   any	  
specific	  strategies,	  and	  finally,	  what	  they	  thought	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  experiment	  was.	  	  
	  
Manipulation	  check	  
To	  probe	  the	  general	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  manipulation	  in	  reducing	  participants’	  
FWBs,	  we	   compared	   their	   scores	   on	   the	   free-­‐will	   subscale	   of	   the	   FAD+	   following	   the	  
control	  and	  AFW	  sessions	  via	  paired	  samples	  t-­‐tests	  (p	  =	  0.05,	  one-­‐tailed2).	  Moreover,	  
we	  computed	  a	  session-­‐based	  difference	  score	  on	  the	  free-­‐will	  subscale	  as	  an	  individual	  
screening	  of	  a	  given	  participant’s	  response	  to	  the	  manipulation.	  In	  previous	  studies,	  we	  
observed	   that	   a	   small	   but	   meaningful	   number	   of	   participants	   respond	   to	   the	   AFW	  
manipulation	  in	  a	  reactant	  way,	  i.e.,	  they	  reported	  a	  stronger	  belief	  in	  FW	  after	  reading	  
an	  anti-­‐free	  will	  text.	  Accordingly,	  we	  also	  wanted	  to	  explore	  how	  a	  reactant	  response	  
affects	  the	  resulting	   level	  of	  agency.	  To	  this	  end,	  we	  conducted	  (explorative)	  post-­‐hoc	  
analyses	  in	  which	  the	  data	  of	  responders	  (i.e.	  participants	  whose	  FWBs	  were	  weakened	  
in	   the	   AFW	   session)	   and	   reactant	   participants	   (i.e.	   participants	   whose	   FWBs	   were	  
augmented	  in	  the	  AFW	  session)	  were	  analyzed	  separately.	  	  
	  
Intentional	  Binding	  Task	  
As	  a	  measure	  of	  implicit	  agency	  components,	  we	  used	  a	  modified	  version	  of	  the	  
‘intentional	   binding’	   method	   introduced	   by	   Haggard,	   Aschersleben	   et	   al.	   (2002)	   and	  
Haggard,	  Clark	  et	  al.	   (2002).	   	   IB	   refers	   to	   the	   temporal	  attraction	  of	  an	  action	  and	   its	  
sensory	  effects	  within	  the	  actor’s	  perception	  (see	  Moore	  &	  Obhi,	  2012,	  for	  a	  review).	  In	  
this	   task,	   participants	   made	   time	   judgments	   about	   either	   actions	   or	   sensory	   events	  
(tones)	   while	   these	   events	   occurred	   together	   or	   in	   isolation.	   They	   attended	   to	   the	  
image	   of	   a	   centrally	   presented	   circular	   clock	   face	   (diameter	   =	   8	   cm)	   consisting	   of	   60	  
dots	  (diameter	  =	  2	  mm).	  On	  every	  trial,	  a	  circular	  clock	  hand	  (diameter	  =	  4	  mm)	  rotated	  
clockwise	  along	   the	  dots	   at	   a	   rate	  of	  3	   s	  per	   rotation,	   starting	   from	  an	  unpredictable	  
clock	  hand	  position.	  Four	  different	  block	  types	  were	  employed,	  differing	  with	  respect	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	   We	   employed	   one-­‐tailed	   significance	   tests	   in	   all	   comparisons	   for	   which	   we	   had	   clear	   directional	  
expectations.	  This	  is	  the	  case	  for	  the	  comparison	  of	  IB	  scores	  or	  agency	  ratings	  between	  the	  AFW	  session	  
and	  CTR	  session	  (where	  we	  expected	  the	  AFW	  manipulation	  to	  decrease	  participants’	  agency).	  However,	  
this	   is	  not	  the	  case	  for	  undirected	  comparisons	  (e.g.,	   the	  test	  between	  the	  frequency	  of	   left-­‐	  and	  right-­‐
hand	  responses	  in	  the	  acquisition	  phase	  of	  the	  Sato	  task).	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the	  event	  to	  be	  judged	  (action	  vs.	  tone)	  and	  whether	  or	  not	  there	  was	  an	  instrumental	  
relation	   between	   actions	   and	   tones	   (agency	   vs.	   baseline).	   In	   the	   agency	   conditions,	  
participants	  were	   instructed	   to	   press	   a	   response	   key	   (keyboard	   space	   bar)	  with	   their	  
right	  hand	  at	  a	  moment	  of	  their	  choosing.	  Their	  responses	  were	  followed	  by	  a	  brief	  sine	  
wave	  tone	  (frequency	  =	  600	  Hz,	  duration	  =	  75	  ms)	  presented	  via	  headphones	  at	  a	  delay	  
of	  250	  ms,	  while	  the	  clock	  hand	  continued	  rotating	  for	  an	  unpredictable	  interval	  (varied	  
between	  1000	  and	  2000	  ms	  in	  steps	  of	  250	  ms)	  and	  then	  disappeared.	  After	  the	  clock	  
hand	  disappeared,	  participants	  were	  prompted	  to	  indicate	  the	  perceived	  time	  of	  either	  
their	  button	  press	  (agency	  action)	  or	  the	  tone	  onset	  (agency	  tone)	  by	  manually	  selecting	  
(mouse	   clicks)	   the	   corresponding	   clock	  hand	  position.	   In	   the	   two	  baseline	   conditions,	  
temporal	   judgments	   were	   made	   about	   actions	   (baseline	   action)	   or	   about	   tones	  
(baseline	   tone)	   when	   these	   events	   occurred	   in	   isolation.	   Participants	   performed	   20	  
trials	   for	   each	   block	   type,	   resulting	   in	   80	   trials	   overall.	   The	   block	   order	   was	  
counterbalanced	   across	   subjects.	   To	   estimate	   individual	   IB	   scores,	  we	   first	   calculated	  
the	  mean	  judgment	  errors	  (i.e.,	  the	  deviance	  between	  perceived	  vs.	  actual	  time	  points	  
of	   either	   actions	   or	   tones)	   for	   each	   block	   type	   and	   experimental	   session.	   Thereafter,	  
binding	  scores	  were	  calculated	  for	  actions	  and	  for	  tones	  by	  subtracting	  judgment	  errors	  
in	   the	   agency	   blocks	   from	   those	   in	   the	   corresponding	   baseline	   blocks.	   Finally,	   the	  
overall	   amount	   of	   IB	   was	   computed	   by	   adding	   the	   absolute	   values	   of	   both	   binding	  
scores	   (see	  Fig.	  1	   for	  a	  graphical	   illustration	  of	   the	   task).	  Mean	   judgment	  errors	  were	  
analyzed	   in	  a	  general	   linear	  model	   (GLM)	  with	   the	  within-­‐subjects	   factors	   JUDGMENT	  
(action	   vs.	   tone),	   AGENCY	   (baseline	   vs.	   agency)	   and	   BELIEF	   CONDITION	   (control	   vs.	  
AFW).	  To	  test	  whether	  IB	  was	  modulated	  by	  the	  FW	  manipulation,	  we	  conducted	  post-­‐
hoc	  paired-­‐samples	  t-­‐tests	  between	  the	  overall	  IB	  scores	  in	  the	  control	  session	  and	  the	  





Figure	   1.	   Illustration	   of	   the	   single-­‐trial	   structure	   of	   the	   IB	   task	   (adapted	   from	   Demanet	   &	  
Muhle-­‐Karbe	  et	  al.,	  2013).	  
Sato	  Task	  
To	   assess	   explicit	   components	   of	   agency,	  we	   employed	   an	   adapted	   version	   of	  
the	  task	  introduced	  by	  Sato	  and	  Yasuda	  (2005).	  	  This	  rationale	  of	  this	  task	  is	  grounded	  in	  
ideomotor	   theory	   (e.g.,	   Prinz,	   1997;	   Elsner	  &	  Hommel,	   2001)	   and	  entails	   two	  distinct	  
experimental	  phases.	  In	  an	  initial	  acquisition	  phase,	  novel	  action-­‐effect	  associations	  are	  
explicitly	  formed	  by	  means	  of	  frequent	  and	  contingent	  pairing	  of	  simple	  responses	  and	  
resulting	  sensory	  outcomes.	  In	  a	  subsequent	  test	  phase,	  participants	  perform	  the	  same	  
task	   and	   judge	   their	   perceived	   agency	   over	   the	   action	   outcome,	   while	   both	   the	  
congruency	  of	   the	  action	  effect	   (compared	  to	  the	  acquisition	  phase)	  and	   its	  delay	  are	  
manipulated.	  	  
In	  the	  acquisition	  phase,	  trials	  started	  with	  the	  presentation	  of	  the	  outline	  of	  a	  
white	   square	   in	   the	  center	  of	   the	   screen.	  Participants	  were	   instructed	   to	  press	  either	  
the	   NUM-­‐del	   (with	   their	   right	   index	   finger)	   or	   NUM-­‐enter	   button	   (with	   their	   right	  
middle	  finger).	  Immediately	  after	  a	  response	  was	  given,	  the	  white	  square	  was	  replaced	  
by	  a	  colored	  square	  with	  a	  specific	  color	  being	  assigned	  to	  each	  response	  (red	  and	  blue	  
in	   one	   session,	   and	   yellow	   and	   green	   in	   the	   other;	   sequence	   of	   color	   sets	  
counterbalanced	  across	   subjects).	   	   Participants	  were	   instructed	   to	   freely	   choose	   their	  
responses	   in	   each	   trial,	   but	   to	   try	   to	   achieve	   an	   equal	   overall	   frequency	   of	   both	  
responses	  without	  using	  a	  particular	  strategy	  such	  as	  simple	  alternations	  between	  left	  
and	  right	  responses.	  Altogether,	  the	  acquisition	  phase	  comprised	  200	  trials,	  a	  number	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of	   repetitions	   that	   has	   been	   shown	   to	   be	   sufficient	   to	   establish	   strong	   action-­‐effect	  
representations	  (see	  Elsner	  &	  Hommel,	  2001).	  
In	  the	  test	  phase,	  participants	  were	  told	  that	  on	  some	  trials	  their	  action	  would	  
cause	  the	  colored	  square	  to	  appear	  on	  the	  screen,	  while	  on	  other	  trials	  the	  computer	  
would	  cause	  the	  colored	  square,	  and	  their	  task	  would	  be	  to	  infer	  the	  originator.	  Trials	  
were	  similar	  to	  the	  acquisition	  phase	  with	  the	  following	  modifications:	  The	  color	  of	  the	  
produced	  square	  was	  either	  congruent	  (i.e.,	   the	  same	  color	  that	  a	  particular	  response	  
produced	   in	   the	   acquisition	  phase)	   or	   incongruent	   (i.e.,	   the	   color	   that	  was	  previously	  
produced	   by	   the	   other	   response).	  Moreover,	   the	   delay	   between	   action	   and	   outcome	  
was	  manipulated	  so	  that	  the	  colored	  square	  appeared	  on	  the	  screen	  either	  immediately	  
after	  the	  response	  was	  given	  or	  at	  a	  delay	  of	  either	  300	  ms,	  or	  of	  600	  ms.	  Finally,	  after	  
the	  colored	  square	  disappeared	  from	  the	  screen,	  participants	  were	  asked	  to	  rate	  their	  
perceived	  agency	  over	  the	  action	  outcome	  (i.e.,	  their	  certainty	  that	  they	  had	  caused	  the	  
square	   to	   appear	   on	   the	   screen).	   To	   this	   end,	   a	   Likert	   scale	   was	   presented	   and	  
participants	  indicated	  their	  answers	  on	  a	  scale	  from	  one	  to	  four,	  with	  one	  representing	  
absolute	  certainty	   that	   the	  computer	  had	  produced	   the	  square	  and	   four	   representing	  
absolute	   certainty	   that	   the	   square	  was	  produced	  by	  oneself.	   Ratings	  were	  given	  with	  
the	   left	   hand	   fingers	   using	   the	   buttons	   ‘Z’,	   ‘X’,	   ‘C’,	   and	   ‘V’	   of	   a	   QWERTY	   keyboard.	  
Importantly,	  to	  avoid	  a	  contamination	  of	  the	  ratings	  by	  response	  biases,	  two	  different	  
rating	  scales	  were	  presented	  across	  trials	  (randomly	  intermixed).	  These	  two	  scales	  were	  
of	  opposite	  polarity	  (i.e.,	  starting	  from	  1	  on	  the	  left	  to	  4	  on	  the	  right	  or	  vice	  versa).	  Prior	  
to	  starting	  the	  test	  phase,	  participants	  were	  familiarized	  with	  the	  general	  task	  and	  the	  
rating	  procedure.	  	  They	  first	  performed	  ten	  practice	  trials	  in	  which	  only	  the	  rating	  scales	  
were	   presented	   followed	   by	   another	   ten	   practice	   trials	   with	   the	   complete	   task,	  
supervised	  by	  the	  experimenter.	  
For	  both	  experimental	  phases,	  we	  first	  computed	  the	  proportion	  of	  left	  and	  right	  
hand	   responses	   and	   the	   mean	   response	   times	   (RTs).	   Both	   scores	   were	   compared	  
between	   the	   control	   session	   and	   the	   anti-­‐free	   will	   session	   via	   paired-­‐samples	   t-­‐tests	  
(two-­‐tailed).	  Agency	  ratings	  of	  the	  test	  phase	  were	  analyzed	  in	  a	  GLM	  using	  the	  within-­‐
subjects	  factors	  CONGRUENCY	  (congruent	  vs.	  incongruent),	  DELAY	  (0	  ms	  vs.	  300	  ms	  vs.	  







The	   comparison	  of	   participants’	   FAD+	   scores	   between	   the	   control	   session	   and	  
the	   AFW	   session	   confirmed	   that	   participants	   reported	   stronger	   determinist	   beliefs	   in	  
the	  AFW	  session	  than	  in	  the	  control	  session,	  t50	  =	  2.885,	  p	  =	  0.003	  (AFW:	  M	  =	  3.01,	  SD	  =	  
0.59;	  Control:	  M	  =	  2.88,	  SD	  =	  0.64).	  Moreover,	  the	  aforementioned	  screening	  procedure	  
of	   individual	   difference	   scores	   (see	   methods	   section)	   identified	   eleven	   reactant	  
participants	   who	   reported	   stronger	   FWBs	   in	   the	   AFW	   session	   than	   in	   the	   control	  
session.	  	  
	  
Intentional	  binding	  task	  
The	  GLM	  revealed	  a	   significant	  main	  effect	  of	  AGENCY,	  F1,50	  =	  6.28,	  p	   =	  0.015,	  
and	  a	  marginally	  significant	  trend	  of	  JUDGMENT,	  F1,50	  =	  3.032;	  p	  =	  0.088.	  In	  addition,	  the	  
interaction	  between	  JUDGMENT	  and	  AGENCY	  was	  significant,	  F1,50	  =	  36.874,	  p	  <	  0.001,	  
indicating	   that	   actions	  were	  perceived	  as	  occurring	   later	   in	   the	  agency	  blocks	   than	   in	  
the	  baseline	  blocks	  (Judgment	  errors:	  Baseline	  M	  =	  -­‐0.184	  ms,	  SE	  =	  6.899;	  Agency	  M	  =	  
25.701	   ms,	   SE	   =	   8.578),	   whereas	   the	   opposite	   was	   observed	   with	   tone	   judgments	  
(Baseline	  M	  =	  58.217	  ms,	  SE	  =	  7.892;	  Agency	  M	  =	  -­‐4.448	  ms,	  SE	  =	  11.922).	  This	  pattern	  
reflects	   a	   replication	   of	   the	   general	   intentional	   binding	   effect	   (Haggard	   et	   al.,	   2002).	  
Most	   importantly,	   the	   three-­‐way	   interaction	   between	   JUDGEMENT,	   AGENCY,	   and	  
BELIEF	  was	   at	   trend-­‐level,	   F1,50	   =	   2.863,	  p	   =	   0.097,	   and	   reached	   significance	   in	   a	   one-­‐
tailed	  t-­‐test	  between	  the	  IB	  scores	  of	  the	  control	  session	  (M	  =	  100.116	  ms	  SE	  =	  18.104)	  
and	   the	  AFW	  session	   (M	  =	  76.973	  ms,	   SE	  =	  13.822),	   t50	   =	   1.692;	  p	   =	   0.048.	   This	  one-­‐
tailed	  test	  can	  be	   justified	  by	  the	  directional	  expectation	  that	  weakening	  FWBs	  would	  
diminish	  the	  sense	  of	  agency	  (see	  Fig.	  2).	  All	  other	  main	  effects	  and	   interaction	  terms	  
were	  non-­‐significant	  (all	  p-­‐values	  >	  0.39).	  	  
	  





Figure	   2.	   Results	   of	   the	   IB	   task.	   Bars	   display	   mean	   binding	   scores	   and	   standard	   errors	   for	  
actions,	  tones	  and	  composite	  scores	  of	  both,	  separately	  for	  control	  and	  AFW	  conditions.	  
	  
Thereafter,	   we	   conducted	   explorative	   post-­‐hoc	   analyses	   in	   which	   IB	   scores	  
were	   analyzed	   separately	   for	   responders	   and	   reactant	   participants	   (see	   methods	  
section).	   In	   the	  group	  of	   responders,	   the	   IB	  scores	  were	  significantly	  decreased	   in	   the	  
AFW	  session	   (Control	   session	  M	  =	  106.866	  ms,	  SE	  =	  21.202;	  AFW	  session	  M	  =	  71.360	  
ms,	  SE	  =	  15.065),	  t39	  =	  2.260;	  p	  =	  .015.	  By	  contrast,	  in	  the	  reactant	  group,	  IB	  scores	  did	  
not	  differ	  and	  were	  in	  fact	  numerically	  reversed,	  with	  the	  AFW	  session	  showing	  greater	  
binding	  scores	   (Control	  session	  M	  =	  75.569	  ms,	  SE	  =	  33.856;	  AFW	  session	  M	  =	  97.381	  
ms,	   SE	   =	   34.015),	   t10	   =	   .909;	  p	   =.193	   (See	   Fig.	   3).	   Thus,	   although	   only	   of	   exploratory	  
value,	  this	  analysis	  indicates	  that	  the	  overall	  effect	  of	  the	  belief	  manipulation	  on	  IB	  was	  





Figure	  3.	   IB	  composite	  scores	   for	  reactant	  and	  responder	  participants,	  separately	   for	  control	  
and	  AFW	  sessions.	  Error	  bars	  represent	  standard	  errors.	  
	  
Sato	  task:	  acquisition	  phase	  
The	   analysis	   of	   participants’	   RTs	   and	   response	   choices	   revealed	   that	  
performance	  in	  the	  acquisition	  phase	  did	  not	  differ	  between	  the	  control	  session	  and	  the	  
AFW	   session	   (RT:	   Control	   =	   293.2	  ms;	   AFW	   =	   299.9	  ms;	   percentage	   of	   left	   and	   right	  
responses:	  Control	  =	  49.6%	  vs.	  50.4%;	  AFW	  =	  51.8%	  vs.	  48.2%;	  all	  p-­‐values	  >	  0.05).	  	  
	  
Sato	  task:	  test	  phase	  	  
As	  for	  the	  acquisition	  phase,	  the	  proportion	  of	  response	  choices	  and	  the	  RTs	  did	  
not	   differ	   between	   the	   two	   sessions	   (RT:	   Control	   =	   320.1	   ms;	   AFW	   =	   326.6	   ms;	  
percentage	   of	   left	   and	   right	   responses:	   Control	   =	   52.8%	   vs.	   47.2%;	   AFW	   =	   50.4%	   vs.	  
49.6%;	   all	   p-­‐values	   >	   0.05).	   Moreover,	   the	   analysis	   of	   participants’	   agency	   ratings	  
revealed	  a	  significant	  main	  effect	  of	  CONGRUENCY,	  F1,50	  =	  96.692;	  p	  <	  0.001,	  indicating	  
higher	   agency	   ratings	   on	   congruent	   trials	   than	   on	   incongruent	   trials	   (Congruent	  M	   =	  
3.070	   SE	   =	   .081;	   Incongruent	  M	   =	   1.698,	   SE	   =	   .080).	   The	   main	   effect	   of	   DELAY	   was	  
significant	  as	  well,	  F1,50	  =	  48.022;	  p	  <	  0.001,	  reflecting	  a	  progressive	  decrease	  of	  agency	  
rating	  with	  the	  length	  of	  the	  delay	  (0	  ms	  delay	  M	  =	  2.900,	  SE	  =	  .069;	  300	  ms	  delay	  M	  =	  
PRIMING	  DETERMINIST	  BELIEFS	  DIMINISHES	  IMPLICIT	  (BUT	  NOT	  EXPLICIT)	  COMPONENTS	  OF	  SELF-­‐AGENCY	  
151	  
	  
2.204,	  SE	  =	   .067;	  600	  ms	  delay	  M	  =	  2.049,	  SE	  =	   .065).	  Both	  effects	  are	   replications	  of	  
previous	  studies	  on	  explicit	  agency	  components	  (e.g.,	  Sato	  &	  Yasuda,	  2005;	  Spengler	  et	  
al.,	   2009).	   In	   addition,	   there	  was	  a	   significant	   interaction	  between	  CONGRUENCY	  and	  
DELAY,	  F1,50	  =	  16.605;	  p	  <	  0.001,	  reflecting	  a	  stronger	  delay	  effect	  for	  congruent	  effects	  
than	  for	  incongruent	  effects	  (see	  Fig.	  4).	  Importantly,	  neither	  the	  main	  effect	  of	  BELIEF	  
was	  significant,	  F1,50	  =	  1.118;	  p	  =	  0.295,	  nor	  any	  interaction	  term	  involving	  this	  factor	  (all	  
p-­‐values	   >	   0.203).	   Thus,	   our	   results	   replicated	  previous	   observations	   that	   congruency	  
with	  prior	  action-­‐effect	  contingencies,	  along	  with	  as	   the	  delay	  of	   the	  action	  outcome,	  
affects	  the	  explicit	  components	  of	  agency	  (Sato	  &	  Yasuda,	  2005;	  Spengler	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  
By	  contrast,	  agency	  ratings	  were	  not	  affected	  by	  the	  manipulation	  of	  FWBs.	  
As	  in	  the	  IB	  section,	  we	  next	  conducted	  the	  post-­‐hoc	  analyses	  in	  which	  the	  data	  
of	   responders	   and	   reactants	  were	   analyzed	   separately.	   In	   both	   groups,	   however,	   the	  
same	   pattern	   was	   evident	   as	   in	   the	   main	   analysis	   (i.e.,	   significant	   main	   effects	   of	  
CONGRUENCY,	  DELAY,	  and	  a	  significant	   interaction	  between	  the	  two	  factors,	  but	  non-­‐
significant	   main	   effects	   of	   BELIEF	   and	   interaction	   terms	   involving	   this	   factor).	   Thus,	  
contrary	  to	  the	  IB	  data,	  explicit	  agency	  ratings	  were	  not	  influenced	  by	  the	  effectiveness	  
of	  the	  belief	  manipulation.	  
	  
Figure	   4.	   Results	   of	   the	   Sato	   task.	   Values	   indicate	   mean	   agency	   ratings	   as	   a	   function	   of	  






The	   aim	   of	   the	   present	   study	   was	   to	   probe	   whether	   weakening	   belief	   in	   the	  
concept	  of	  free	  will	  would	  have	  a	  causal	  impact	  on	  participants’	  sense	  of	  agency.	  In	  line	  
with	  our	  hypothesis,	  we	  found	  that	  IB	  was	  significantly	  reduced	  in	  the	  AFW	  condition,	  
indicating	  that	  determinist	  beliefs	  hamper	  the	   implicit	  sensation	  of	  being	   in	  control	  of	  
one’s	  actions.	  By	  contrast,	  participants’	  explicit	  agency	  ratings	  were	  not	  affected	  by	  the	  
belief	  manipulation.	  	  
	  
Free	  will	  beliefs	  and	  self-­‐control	  
The	  present	  study	  complements	  and	  extends	  a	  growing	  body	  of	  research	  on	  the	  
interaction	  between	  high-­‐level	  determinist	  beliefs	  and	   low-­‐level	  processes	   involved	   in	  
self-­‐control.	  Previous	  studies	  have	  shown	  that	  participants	  induced	  to	  disbelieve	  in	  FW	  
exhibit	   less	   involvement	   in	  motor	  preparation	  (Rigoni	  et	  al.,	  2011),	  do	  not	  adapt	  their	  
behavior	   in	   response	   to	  unwanted	  action	  outcomes	   (Rigoni	  et	  al.,	   2013),	   and	  are	   less	  
inclined	   to	   engage	   in	   effortful	   cancellation	   of	   prepotent	   behavior	   (Lynn	   et	   al.,	   2013;	  
Rigoni	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  Our	  findings	  add	  several	  new	  and	  valuable	  insights	  to	  this	  existing	  
literature.	  First	  and	  foremost,	  establishing	  a	  causal	  link	  between	  determinist	  beliefs	  and	  
the	  sense	  of	  agency	  provides	  an	  integrative	  mechanism	  that	  explains	  how	  FWBs	  impact	  
behavioral	  control	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  contexts.	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  FWBs	  are	  able	  to	  influence	  
the	  entire	  action	  cycle	  by	  intervening	  at	  an	  early	  or	  pre-­‐reflective	  level.	  This	  impact	  on	  
sensorimotor	   binding	   then	   cascades	   to	   more	   overt	   behavior,	   eliciting	   in	   turn	   less	  
intentional	   effort,	   a	   reduced	   sense	   of	   agency,	   and	   less	   feeling	   of	   responsibility.	  
Interestingly,	   a	   recent	   study	   has	   linked	   the	   IB	   effect	   to	   the	   feeling	   of	   responsibility	  
(Moretto	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  These	  authors	  employed	  a	  modified	  IB	  paradigm	  in	  which	  actions	  
had	   unpredictable	   consequences,	   either	   in	   a	   moral	   context	   or	   a	   simple	   economic	  
context.	  IB	  was	  enhanced	  when	  actions	  were	  embedded	  in	  a	  moral	  context,	  suggesting	  
binding	   is	   sensitive	   to	   a	   feeling	   of	   responsibility	   over	   self-­‐produced	   action	  
consequences.	  It	  is	  tempting	  to	  speculate	  that	  an	  intrinsic	  bias	  to	  bind	  actions	  with	  their	  
outcomes	  in	  time	  could	  constitute	  a	  building	  block	  of	  higher-­‐order	  social	  cognition,	  and	  
in	  light	  of	  these	  findings	  it	  becomes	  more	  apparent	  why	  the	  manipulation	  of	  FWBs	  can	  
impact	  such	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  behaviors.	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Finally,	   from	   a	  methodological	   perspective,	   our	   study	   is	   the	   first	   to	   employ	   a	  
successful	   within-­‐subjects	   manipulation	   of	   FWBs.	   As	   such,	   it	   provides	   more	   direct	  
evidence	   for	   the	   causal	   impact	   of	   high-­‐level	   beliefs,	   since	   pre-­‐existing	   differences	  
between	  different	  groups	  of	  participants	  can	  be	  ruled	  out	  as	  an	  alternative	  explanation.	  
Moreover,	   having	   established	   the	   feasibility	   of	   this	   manipulation	   in	   within-­‐subjects	  
designs	  may	  permit	   its	   application	   in	   new	  experimental	   settings,	   e.g.,	   in	   combination	  
with	  brain	  imaging	  techniques	  such	  as	  fMRI.	  
	  
Implicit	  and	  explicit	  components	  of	  agency	  
Beyond	  establishing	  a	  causal	  link	  between	  FWBs	  and	  agency,	  our	  data	  revealed	  
striking	  differences	  between	  implicit	  and	  explicit	  components	  of	  agency.	  While	  IB	  scores	  
were	  reduced	  in	  the	  AFW	  session,	  the	  explicit	  agency	  ratings	  in	  the	  Sato	  task	  were	  not	  
affected.	  This	  dissociation	   is	   interesting	   for	   several	   reasons.	  First,	   it	   indicates	   that	   the	  
influence	   of	   FWBs	   on	   agency	   does	   not	   extend	   to	   the	   level	   of	   reflective	   deliberation.	  
Instead,	   beliefs	   seem	   to	   bias	   very	   basic	   and	   implicit	   processes	   that	   underlie	   our	   pre-­‐
reflective	  self-­‐perception	  as	  intentional	  agents.	  In	  cases	  where	  the	  integration	  of	  agency	  
cues	   into	   judgment	   is	   transparent,	   explicit	   processes	  may	  override	   the	  modulation	  of	  
pre-­‐reflective	   prediction	  processes.	   In	   addition,	   the	   dissociation	  between	   implicit	   and	  
explicit	   agency	   components	   also	   speaks	   against	   the	   possibility	   that	   our	   data	   may	  
originate	  from	  “demand	  effects”	  (i.e.,	  participants	  form	  expectations	  about	  the	  purpose	  
of	  the	  experiment	  and	  try	  to	  please	  the	  experimenter	  by	  fulfilling	  his/her	  hypotheses).	  
Finally,	   on	   a	   theoretical	   level,	   this	   result	   corroborates	   the	   notion	   that	   the	   sense	   of	  
agency	   is	   not	   a	   unitary	   psychological	   concept,	   but	   rather	   entails	   distinct	   components	  
that	  tap	   into	  different	  facets	  of	  action	  awareness	  (see	  David	  et	  al.,	  2008;	  Obhi	  &	  Hall,	  
2011;	  Synofzik	  et	  al.,	  2008).	  In	  line	  with	  this	  view,	  a	  recent	  study	  indicated	  that	  explicit	  
and	   implicit	   components	   might	   operate	   at	   different	   time	   scales.	   Ebert	   and	   Wegner	  
(2010)	  employed	  a	  paradigm	  that	  simultaneously	  assessed	  implicit	  and	  explicit	  agency	  
components	  in	  a	  relatively	  naturalistic	  task	  setting.	  Participants	  were	  instructed	  to	  push	  
or	  pull	  a	  lever,	  causing	  objects	  on	  a	  screen	  to	  either	  come	  closer	  or	  move	  further	  away	  
from	  them.	  As	  in	  the	  present	  study,	  the	  authors	  manipulated	  the	  congruency	  between	  
actions	  and	  outcomes,	  and	  the	  outcome	  delay.	  It	  was	  found	  that	  both	  measures	  were	  




higher	   for	   congruent	   outcomes).	   However,	   the	   influence	   of	   congruency	   was	   more	  
pronounced	  for	  explicit	  agency,	  particularly	  with	  long	  outcome	  delays,	  suggesting	  that	  
implicit	  components	  may	  operate	  on	  a	  shorter	  time	  scale.	  
	  
Limitations	  and	  outlook	  
Despite	  the	  clear	  overall	  patterns	  of	  results,	  several	  aspects	  of	  our	  data	  indicate	  
the	   need	   for	   further	   investigation.	   First,	   it	  must	   be	   considered	   that	   the	   effect	   of	   the	  
belief	  manipulation	  on	  IB	  reached	  significance	  only	  in	  a	  one-­‐tailed	  t-­‐test.	  The	  post-­‐hoc	  
analyses	  indicated	  that	  this	  was	  likely	  due	  to	  the	  variability	  in	  participants’	  responses	  to	  
the	  manipulation:	  There	  was	  a	  robust	  attenuation	  of	  IB	  in	  the	  group	  of	  responders,	  but	  
in	  the	  group	  of	  reactant	  participants	  this	  effect	  was	  not	  only	  absent	  but	  even	  reversed	  
numerically.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  this	  finding	  is	  reassuring,	  as	  it	  confirms	  that	  the	  effect	  is	  
related	  to	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  belief	  manipulation.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  it	  raises	  new	  
questions,	   in	   particular	   what	   determines	   an	   individual’s	   response,	   and	   whether	   a	  
reactant	  response	  only	  eliminates	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  FW	  manipulation	  or	   if	   it	  can	  even	  
increase	  agency	  as	  compared	  to	  a	  control	  session.	  The	  rather	  small	  number	  of	  reactant	  
subjects	   in	   our	   sample	   prohibits	   us	   from	   making	   conclusions	   about	   this	   issue.	  
Furthermore,	  the	  precise	  nature	  of	  the	  implicit	  processes	  responding	  to	  FWBs	  remains	  
to	  be	  uncovered	  through	  future	  research.	  While	  IB	  has	  primarily	  been	  related	  to	  motor	  
prediction,	   the	   findings	   of	   Aarts	   and	   van	   den	   Bos	   (2011)	   indicate	   that	   non-­‐motor	  
predictive	  and	  inferential	  processes	  might	  be	  affected	  as	  well.	  	  
	  
Conclusion	  
	   The	  present	   study	   revealed	   that	   inducing	  disbelief	   in	   the	   concept	  of	   FW	  has	  a	  
causal	   impact	   on	   implicit	   components	   of	   agency,	   but	   not	   on	   explicit	   agency	  
components.	   This	   finding	   points	   to	   a	   psychological	   mechanism	   through	   which	  
determinist	   beliefs	   exert	   their	   wide-­‐ranging	   influence	   on	   human	   behavior,	   and	  
highlights	  the	  multi-­‐dimensional	  nature	  of	  the	  sense	  of	  agency.	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The	   goal	   of	   this	   dissertation	   was	   twofold.	   First,	   I	   wanted	   to	   develop	   an	  
experimental	   paradigm	   that	   allows	   for	   the	   investigation	   of	   intentional	   inhibition	   in	   a	  
more	  ecologically	  valid	  context.	  Furthermore,	  I	  wanted	  to	  investigate	  the	  determinants	  
of	  volitional	  engagement.	  	  Below,	  I	  give	  a	  brief	  overview	  of	  the	  empirical	  results	  of	  each	  
section	  of	  the	  thesis,	  followed	  by	  a	  discussion	  of	  limitations	  and	  possible	  directions	  for	  
future	  research.	  	  
	  
Impulse	  control	  
Although	   research	   on	   response	   inhibition	   has	   a	   long	   tradition	   in	   cognitive	  
psychology	   and	   neuroscience,	   the	   functional	   and	   neural	   basis	   of	   impulse	   control	   (in	  
realistic	  scenarios)	  is	  still	  insufficiently	  understood;	  in	  classical	  experimental	  paradigms,	  
participants’	   behavior	   is	   completely	   determined	   by	   external	   stimuli	   (e.g.,	   Aron	   &	  
Poldrack,	   2006;	   Chambers	   et	   al.,	   2006;	   Chikazoe	   et	   al.,	   2007;	   2009).	   This	   rationale	  
allows	   for	   the	   necessary	   and	   precise	   delineation	   of	   componential	   processes,	   but	   the	  
transfer	  of	  findings	  to	  realistic	   instances	  of	  impulse	  control	   is	  rather	  questionable	  (see	  
Haggard,	   2008).	   To	   overcome	   this	   problem,	   the	   concept	   of	   intentional	   inhibition	   has	  
been	   introduced,	   and	   corresponding	   paradigms	   require	   participants	   to	   make	  
endogenous	   decisions	   about	   acting	   or	   inhibiting	   (Brass	   &	   Haggard,	   2007;	   2008).	  
Preliminary	   studies	   from	   this	   young	   line	   of	   research	   clearly	   require	   internal	   decision-­‐
making	  (Brass	  &	  Haggard,	  2007;	  Kühn	  et	  al.,	  2009;	  2013;	  Walsh	  et	  al.,	  2010);	  however,	  
decisions	  are	  often	  rather	  arbitrary	  and	  absent	  urges	  or	  a	  prepotency	  of	  action.	  Hence,	  
the	  primary	   goal	   of	   the	   first	   part	   of	  my	   thesis	  was	   to	   develop	   a	   novel	   paradigm	   that	  
permitted	   the	   measurement	   of	   behavioral	   inhibition	   in	   a	   more	   ecologically	   valid	  
manner.	  This	  endeavor	  was	  largely	  successful;	  applying	  thermal	  pain	  stimulation	  in	  the	  
MR	  scanner	  proved	   feasible,	   and	   the	  experimental	  parameters	   successfully	   induced	  a	  
level	   of	   pain	   sufficient	   to	   provoke	   a	   substantial	   urge	   to	   act	   in	   each	   participant	   and	  
throughout	   the	   whole	   experiment.	   Concurrently,	   the	   individually-­‐tailored	   pain	   levels	  
were	  moderate	  enough	  to	  allow	  for	  voluntary	  engagement	  in	  a	  choice	  scenario.	  Hence,	  
the	   paradigm	   provided	   a	   useful	   and	   novel	   setting	   for	   the	   investigation	   of	   impulse	  
control,	  which	  justifies	  the	  additional	  efforts	  that	  the	  use	  of	  thermal	  stimulation	  entails	  





Similarities	  between	  externally-­‐guided	  and	  intentional	  inhibition	  
One	  of	  the	  central	  observations	  resulting	  from	  this	  new	  paradigm	  was	  that	  the	  
difference	   between	   endogenous	   and	   exogenous	   inhibition	   decisions	   dissipated.	  
Specifically,	   both	   types	   of	   inhibition	   relied	   on	   the	   joint	   activation	   of	   brain	   areas	   that	  
were	  previously	  implicated	  in	  either	  externally-­‐guided	  inhibition	  (see	  Aron	  et	  al.,	  2014)	  
or	  in	  intentional	  inhibition	  (see	  Brass	  &	  Haggard,	  2007;	  Kühn	  et	  al.,	  2009;	  2013).	  Thus,	  
rather	  than	  performing	  independent	  functions,	  these	  areas	  appeared	  to	  work	  in	  concert	  
to	   enable	   suppression	   of	   the	   pain	   avoidance	   response.	   This	   finding	   is	   at	   odds	   with	  
earlier	  proposals	  of	  two	  distinct	  neural	  circuitries	  for	  inhibition	  (Brass	  &	  Haggard,	  2007;	  
2008)	  and	  indicates	  the	  need	  for	  their	  comprehensive	  integration.	  	  
In	   reconsidering	   previous	   work	   on	   the	   two	   types	   of	   behavioral	   inhibition,	   it	  
appears	   that	   the	   respective	   studies	   have	   captured	   complementary	   components	   of	  
inhibitory	   control,	   each	   of	   which	   may	   contribute	   to	   the	   control	   of	   impulses	   in	  
ecologically	   valid	   situations.	   External	   inhibition	   studies	   focus	   on	   the	   implementation	  
component	  of	  inhibition	  by	  requiring	  participants	  to	  cancel	  an	  already	  initiated	  action.	  
This	  reflects	  the	  final	  stage	  of	  impulse	  control,	  namely	  the	  suppression	  of	  an	  impulsive	  
act	  after	  the	  decision	  to	  inhibit	  has	  been	  determined	  (in	  this	  case	  by	  the	  external	  stop	  
or	  nogo	  signal).	  By	  contrast,	  intentional	  inhibition	  studies	  focus	  more	  on	  the	  decisional	  
components	  of	   inhibition	  by	   requiring	  participants	   to	   choose	  between	  engaging	   in	  an	  
action	   and	   withholding	   from	   doing	   so.	   This	   reflects	   a	   much	   earlier	   stage	   of	   impulse	  
control.	  Importantly,	  in	  realistic	  instances	  of	  inhibitory	  self-­‐regulation	  both	  components	  
play	  a	  critical	   role	  and	  must	  necessarily	   interact,	  particularly	  when	  a	  very	   strong	  urge	  
must	  be	  suppressed	  continuously	  rather	  than	  instantaneously.	  In	  the	  current	  paradigm,	  
thermal	   stimulation	   persisted	   for	   several	   seconds,	   likely	   necessitating	   a	   continuous	  
reinforcement	   of	   both	   decisional	   and	   implementational	   aspects	   to	   adhere	   with	   the	  
demand	  to	  endure	  the	  pain	  (see	  Ridderinkhof	  et	  al.,	  2014).	  	  
The	  distinction	  between	  early	   decisional	   and	   late	   implementational	   aspects	   of	  
impulse	  control	   is	  consistent	  with	  the	  differing	  connections	  of	  the	  dFMC	  and	  the	  rIFG.	  
Whereas	  the	  rIFG	  is	  well-­‐suited	  to	  implement	  motor	  control	  due	  to	  its	  rich	  connections	  
to	  the	  motor	  cortex	  (Aron	  et	  al.,	  2007;	  2011),	   the	  dFMC	  has	  connections	  with	  diverse	  
areas,	   including	   those	   implicated	   in	   processing	   internal,	   emotional,	   and	   semantic	  




dual-­‐component	   view	  on	   inhibitory	   control	   is	   that	   the	  dFMC	   should	  be	   the	   source	  of	  
signals	   that	   instantiate	  the	   implementation	  of	   inhibition	  and	  thus	  recruit	   the	  stopping	  
system.	  Previous	  findings	  have	  yielded	  positive	  evidence	  that	  the	  dFMC	  is	  functionally	  
coupled	  with	  the	  preSMA	  during	  intentional	   inhibition	  (PPI	  analysis;	  Kühn	  et	  al.,	  2009;	  
2013),	   but	   further	   research	   seems	   necessary	   to	   reveal	   the	   temporal	   and	   functional	  
dynamics	  within	  the	  extended	  inhibition	  network.	  
	   	  	  
The	  mechanisms	  underlying	  intentional	  inhibition	  
	   Although	  the	  dFMC	  has	  been	  reliably	  associated	  with	  intentional	  inhibition,	  the	  
matter	   of	   how	   it	   supports	   this	   capacity	   remains	   controversial.	   Seminal	   studies	   on	  
intentional	   inhibition	   suggested	   that	   activity	   of	   the	   dFMC	   directly	   reflects	   the	  
suppression	   of	   motor	   output	   (veto	   signals).	   For	   instance,	   Brass	   &	   Haggard	   (2007)	  
employed	  a	  variant	  of	  the	  Libet	  task	  in	  which	  participants	  chose	  between	  pressing	  and	  
not	   pressing	   a	   button	   while	   monitoring	   the	   timing	   of	   their	   motor	   intentions.	   The	  
authors	  observed	  not	  only	  increased	  dFMC	  activity	  on	  trials	  in	  which	  participants	  chose	  
not	   to	   respond,	   but	   also	   a	   negative	   correlation	   between	   activity	   in	   the	   dFMC	   and	  
activity	  in	  the	  primary	  motor	  cortex.	  To	  some	  extent,	  the	  data	  from	  the	  pain	  avoidance	  
suppression	  paradigm	  support	  and	  extend	  this	  view	  of	   intentional	   inhibition	  as	  motor	  
suppression;	  the	  ROI	  analysis	   in	  Chapter	  1	  that	  focused	  on	  the	  motor	  hand	  area	  could	  
reveal	   a	   trace	   of	   inhibition	   (i.e.,	   reduced	   activity	   on	   inhibition	   trials).	   Interestingly	  
inhibition	   was	   directed	   only	   towards	   the	   effector	   hand	   (i.e.,	   the	   hand	   that	   could	  
terminate	   the	   pain	   indirectly	   via	   button	   press),	   but	   not	   towards	   the	   stimulated	   hand	  
(which	   could	   theoretically	   also	   terminate	   the	   pain,	   via	   withdrawal).	   	   However,	   these	  
findings	   need	   to	   be	   taken	  with	   caution,	   as	   the	   stimulated	   hand	  was	   restrained	   via	   a	  
sandbag	   to	   prevent	   automatic	   withdrawal,	   and	   it	   remains	   to	   be	   tested	   if	   the	   same	  
results	  would	  be	  found	  in	  an	  unconstrained	  setting.	  Moreover,	  although	  these	  findings	  
clearly	   indicate	   that	  motor	   inhibition	   took	  place,	   the	  source	  of	   this	   inhibition	   remains	  
elusive	  and	  could	  possibly	  be	  located	  outside	  the	  dFMC.	  
	   As	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  2,	  it	  is	  quite	  noteworthy	  that	  activation	  of	  the	  dFMC	  has	  
been	  documented	   in	  a	  variety	  of	  other	   situations	   that	  entail	   the	  demand	   to	   suppress	  
impulses	   or	   urges,	   but	   no	   actual	   motor	   behavior.	   For	   example,	   dFMC	   activation	   has	  




cigarette	  cravings	  (Brody	  et	  al.,	  2007;	  Hanlon	  et	  al.,	  2013;	  Hartwell	  et	  al.,	  2012),	  or	  even	  
gambling	   desires	   (Campbell-­‐Meiklejohn	   et	   al.,	   2008).	   To	   reconcile	   the	   involvement	   of	  
the	  dFMC	   in	   the	   suppression	  of	  motor	  behavior	   as	  well	   as	  more	  abstract	  desires	  and	  
urges,	   two	   different	   solutions	   have	   been	   formulated.	   Filevich	   et	   al.	   (2012)	   proposed	  
that	   even	   more	   abstract	   states	   such	   as	   emotions	   or	   desires	   might	   also	   be	   coded	   in	  
terms	   of	   associated	  motor	   programs	   (e.g.	   facial	  muscles	   used	   to	   express	   a	   particular	  
emotion).	   In	   this	   sense,	   inhibition	   of	   the	   corresponding	   urge	  may	   still	   have	   a	  motor	  
target,	  albeit	  a	  more	  abstract	  target.	  Alternatively,	  Chapter	  2	  discusses	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  
dFMC	   may	   serve	   a	   more	   general	   role	   in	   human	   self-­‐control	   that	   reflects	   general	  
disengagement	   rather	   than	  motor	   control	   in	   a	   strict	   sense	   (Lynn	   et	   al.,	   2014).	  More	  
research	  will	  be	  necessary	  to	  evaluate	  both	  accounts.	  
Future	   studies	   should	   also	   consider	   the	   possibility	   of	   different	   subdivisions	  
within	   the	   large	   dFMC	   region.	   As	   noted	   above,	   the	   dFMC	   peak	   locations	   reported	   in	  
previous	   intentional	   inhibition	   studies	  varied	  considerably	   in	   their	  exact	   location.	  This	  
could	   reflect	   the	   spatial	   uncertainty	   of	   neuroimaging	   experiments,	   but	   it	   could	   also	  
indicate	  the	  existence	  of	  different	  context-­‐dependent	  control	  mechanisms.	  In	  line	  with	  
the	   latter	   view,	   a	   recent	   meta-­‐analytic	   parcellation	   study	   revealed	   four	   different	  
subdivisions	  of	  the	  dFMC	  that	  could	  be	  isolated	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  their	  distinct	  functional	  
connections	   (Eickhoff	   et	   al.,	   2014).	   Either	   way,	   future	   research	   should	   take	   these	  
neuroanatomical	  landmarks	  into	  account	  in	  order	  to	  maximize	  spatial	  accuracy.	  
	  
Limitations	  and	  future	  directions	  
In	   spite	   of	   the	   aforementioned	   strengths	   of	   this	   paradigm,	   several	   important	  
challenges	  remain	  to	  be	  addressed	  with	  further	  research.	  For	  instance,	  a	  certain	  degree	  
of	   ambiguity	   exists	   with	   regard	   to	   the	   timing	   of	   the	   choice	   between	   acting	   and	  
inhibiting.	  We	  could	  not	  fully	  exclude	  the	  possibility	  that	  participants	  decide	  in	  advance	  
of	  each	  trial	  how	  they	  will	  behave	   in	  the	  event	  of	  a	  choice	  cue,	  which	  would	  call	   into	  
question	   whether	   the	   analysis	   of	   cue-­‐locked	   brain	   activity	   captures	   the	   proper	   time	  
period.	  In	  fact,	  this	  is	  a	  classical	  problem	  when	  relying	  on	  internally-­‐generated	  decisions	  
in	   experimental	   studies	   (see	   Nachev	   &	   Hussain,	   2010;	   Nachev	   &	   Hacker,	   2014).	  
Although	  several	  aspects	  of	  our	  data	  indicate	  that	  participants	  in	  the	  study	  of	  Chapter	  1	  




action	   trials	   compared	   with	   externally	   guided	   action	   trials),	   it	   would	   nonetheless	   be	  
desirable	  to	  find	  a	  method	  that	  allows	  for	  more	  precise	  tracking	  of	  the	  decision	  process.	  
Furthermore,	   it	   remains	   an	   open	   issue	   to	   what	   extent	   the	   results	   from	   the	   current	  
paradigm	   are	   specific	   to	   the	   suppression	   of	   pain	   avoidance	   behavior	   or	   instead	  
generalize	  to	  other	  domains	  of	  self-­‐control.	  Although	  we	  put	  considerable	  efforts	   into	  
the	  dissociation	  of	  pain-­‐related	  from	  inhibition-­‐related	  brain	  activity,	  more	  research	  will	  
be	  necessary	  to	  evaluate	  the	  generality	  of	  the	  neural	  basis	  of	  self-­‐control.	  To	  this	  end,	  
studies	  will	  be	  needed	  that	  assess	   the	  suppression	  of	  other	  behavioral	  urges,	  and	  the	  
challenge	  will	  lie	  in	  finding	  a	  way	  of	  inducing	  urges	  with	  similar	  reliability.	  The	  positive	  
association	  between	   inhibition-­‐related	  activity	   in	   the	  present	  paradigm	  and	  scores	  on	  
the	   Self	   Regulation	  Questionnaire	   (observed	   in	   Chapter	   3)	   is	   certainly	   encouraging	   in	  
this	   respect,	   and	   indicates	   that	   our	   findings	  might	   generalize	   to	   other	   self-­‐regulatory	  
behaviors.	  	  
A	  final	   issue	  pertains	  to	  the	  type	  of	  action	  decisions	  in	  our	  paradigm.	  One	  may	  
argue	  that	  the	  choices	  employed	  here	  still	   suffer	   from	  some	  of	  the	  shortcomings	  that	  
we	  sought	  to	  address,	  albeit	  to	  a	  lesser	  extent.	  In	  particular,	  the	  choice	  between	  acting	  
impulsively	   (to	   terminate	  pain)	  and	  withholding	   from	  executing	   this	   impulse	  differs	   in	  
an	   important	   respect	   from	   many	   instances	   of	   realistic	   self-­‐control,	   as	   there	   are	   no	  
genuine	  (positive)	  incentives	  for	  inhibiting.	  Participants	  presumably	  occasionally	  opt	  to	  
endure	  the	  pain	  only	  because	  of	  the	  desire	  to	  adhere	  to	  the	  experimental	  instructions	  
to	  achieve	  a	  similar	  frequency	  of	  action	  and	  inhibition	  trials.	  However,	  in	  real	  life,	  self-­‐
control	   is	   often	   characterized	   by	   a	   conflict	   between	   different	   incentives	   for	   acting	  
impulsively	   (e.g.,	   the	  pleasure	  of	   a	   fun	  activity	   versus	  work)	   and	   for	   controlling	   these	  
impulses	   (e.g.,	   the	  prospect	  of	  advancing	  one’s	  career).	  The	   incentives	   for	  self-­‐control	  
are	  often	  more	  abstract	  or	  temporally	  distal	  in	  nature	  than	  those	  of	  their	  corresponding	  
impulses;	  however,	  these	  countering	  incentives	  do	  exist	  and	  can	  be	  considered	  crucial	  
motivators	   for	   the	  exertion	  of	  effortful	   self-­‐control.	   The	  circumstances	  of	   the	  present	  
paradigm	  rather	  mirror	   situations	   in	  which	   impulses	  have	   to	  be	  controlled	   in	   favor	  of	  
social	  norms	  (e.g.	  not	  stealing	  a	  desired	  but	   inaccessible	  object),	  where	  the	  benefit	  of	  
self-­‐control	  is	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  negative	  outcome	  rather	  than	  the	  accomplishment	  of	  a	  
positive	  outcome.	  Accordingly,	  a	  very	  interesting	  but	  challenging	  perspective	  for	  future	  




control	   into	   experimental	   paradigms	   in	   order	   to	  mirror	   the	   portrayed	   self-­‐regulatory	  
scenarios	  more	  closely.	  
	  
Trait	  and	  state	  levels	  of	  self-­‐control	  
Chapter	  3	  used	  the	  pain	  avoidance	  paradigm	  to	  test	  whether	  inhibition-­‐related	  
brain	  activity	   is	  associated	  with	  individual	  differences	   in	  self-­‐regulatory	  ability,	  both	  at	  
the	   state	   level	   and	   at	   the	   trait	   level.	   Importantly,	   trait	   differences	   in	   self-­‐regulation	  
were	   positively	   associated	   with	   activity	   in	   several	   inhibition	   areas,	   i.e.,	   they	   were	  
recruited	  for	  inhibition	  to	  a	  greater	  extent	  by	  people	  with	  high	  self-­‐regulatory	  abilities.	  
This	   result	   is	   encouraging	   for	   several	   reasons.	  Methodologically,	   it	   indicates	   that	   the	  
paradigm	   is	   indeed	  sensitive	   to	  aspects	  of	  self-­‐regulation	  that	  are	   required	   in	   realistic	  
scenarios.	   Theoretically,	   it	   indicates	   that	   individual	   differences	   in	   self-­‐regulatory	  
abilities	  might	   reflect	   the	  differential	   ability	   to	   recruit	   inhibitory	  brain	   regions.	   Future	  
research	   should	   further	   expand	   on	   this,	   for	   example	   by	   investigating	   individual	  
differences	   in	  more	   specific	   self-­‐control	   strategies	   such	   as	   distraction	   and	   reappraisal	  
(e.g.,	  Metcalfe	  &	  Mischel,	  1999).	  In	  contrast	  to	  this	  positive	  result,	  no	  effects	  of	  the	  ego	  
depletion	  manipulation	  were	  found	  in	  Chapter	  3,	  neither	  behaviorally	  nor	  at	  the	  brain	  
level.	  This	  null	  effect	   is	  somewhat	  difficult	   to	   interpret,	  particularly	   in	   light	  of	  positive	  
results	   in	  several	  behavioral	   studies	  employing	  similar	  depletion	  methods.	  One	  has	   to	  
consider	  the	  possibility	  that	  the	  scanner	  environment	  counteracted	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  
ego	   depletion,	   either	   via	   recruitment	   of	   additional	   resources	   (as	   a	   consequence	   of	  
stress),	   via	   recovery	   (due	   to	   the	   temporal	   delay	   between	   depletion	   task	   and	   scanner	  
task),	  or	  due	  to	  resource	  management	  on	  the	  part	  of	  participants	  in	  anticipation	  of	  the	  
upcoming	   pain.	   Thus	   far,	   only	   one	   study	   has	   successfully	   demonstrated	   a	   depletion	  
effect	   in	   a	   neuroimaging	   study	   (Wagner	  &	  Heatherton,	   2012),	   although	   the	   outcome	  
measure	  (amygdala	  activation	  during	  an	  emotional	  categorization	  task)	  is	  arguably	  only	  
indirectly	   related	   to	   self-­‐regulation;	  most	   ego	   depletion	   studies	   have	   instead	   directly	  
investigated	   the	   impact	   of	   depletion	   on	   a	   subsequent	   task	   requiring	   self-­‐control.	   It	  
should	  also	  be	  noted	  that	  recent	  research	  has	  called	  the	  concept	  of	  ego	  depletion	  into	  
question.	   Publication	   bias	   often	   prevents	   null	   results	   from	   being	   disseminated,	   but	   a	  
few	  recent	  studies	  nevertheless	  suggest	  that	  the	  ego	  depletion	  effect	  is	  rather	  weak	  if	  




phenomenon	  of	  ego	  depletion	  seems	  to	  lack	  the	  robustness	  to	  encourage	  further	  use	  in	  
neuroimaging	   studies,	   at	   least	   until	   behavioral	   research	   has	   further	   specified	   its	  
boundary	   conditions.	   Abundant	   evidence	   furthermore	   indicates	   that	   the	   depletion	  
effect	  seems	  to	  rely	  on	  mediating	  factors	  such	  as	  an	  individual’s	  beliefs,	  both	  about	  the	  
veracity	  of	  the	  limited	  resource	  model	  and	  about	  their	  own	  level	  of	  depletion	  (Clarkson,	  
Hirt,	   Jia,	  &	  Alexander,	  2010;	   Job,	  Dweck,	  &	  Walton,	  2010).	   	  Beliefs	   seem	  therefore	   to	  
have	   a	   nontrivial	   impact	   on	   self-­‐regulation	   and	   volition,	   and	   with	   that	   in	   mind,	   in	  
Chapters	  4	  and	  5	  we	  directly	  manipulate	  participants’	  belief	  structures.	  
	  
Determinist	  Beliefs	  
	   Repeated	   experiments	   have	   shown	   that	   determinist	   beliefs	   negatively	   impact	  
behavior	   (e.g.,	   eliciting	   increased	   cheating	   and	   aggression;	   Vohs	   &	   Schooler,	   2008;	  
Baumeister	   et	   al.,	   2009).	   	   These	   findings	   also	   extend	   to	   low-­‐level	   sensorimotor	  
processes	   (Rigoni	   et	   al.,	   2011)	   and	   engagement	   in	   voluntary	   inhibition	   (Rigoni	   et	   al.,	  
2012).	  	  Presumably,	  weakening	  free	  will	  beliefs	  diminishes	  the	  recruitment	  of	  cognitive	  
resources	   for	   self-­‐regulation	   at	   an	   early	   stage	   of	   processing.	   In	   Chapter	   4,	   we	  
investigated	   whether	   this	   explanation	   might	   apply	   to	   effortful	   impulse	   control	   in	   a	  
motivational	   scenario	   requiring	   a	   high	   level	   of	   engagement.	   	   Using	   a	   pain	   paradigm	  
similar	  to	  those	  of	  Chapters	  1	  and	  3,	  we	  manipulated	  free	  will	  beliefs	  on	  a	  trial-­‐by-­‐trial	  
basis	  in	  a	  between-­‐subjects	  design.	  	  
	   In	  line	  with	  our	  predictions,	  participants	  who	  were	  induced	  to	  disbelieve	  in	  free	  
will	  were	  significantly	  slower	  to	  terminate	  the	  pain	  stimulation	  on	  choice	  action	  trials,	  
while	   there	   was	   no	   difference	   between	   groups	   on	   externally-­‐instructed	   action	   trials.	  
This	   suggests	   a	   specific	   impairment	   in	   voluntary	   action	   selection	   for	   self-­‐regulation,	  
rather	   than	   a	   global	   passivity	   on	   the	  part	   of	   participants.	   	  On	   an	   individual	   level,	   the	  
amount	  of	  slowing	  on	  choice	  trials	  was	  furthermore	  correlated	  with	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  
the	  belief	  manipulation,	  mirroring	  the	  finding	  by	  Rigoni	  et	  al.	  (2011)	  in	  which	  decreases	  
in	  the	  readiness	  potential	  were	  correlated	  with	  a	  change	   in	  anti-­‐free	  will	  scores.	  Anti-­‐
free	  will	   participants	   furthermore	   reported	   greater	   urges	   to	   terminate	   the	   trial	  when	  
their	   behavior	   was	   guided	   by	   the	   cue	   compared	   to	   when	   they	   were	   able	   to	   freely	  
choose,	   suggesting	   a	   disengagement	   from	   the	   task	   when	   externally	   instructed.	  




the	  proportion	  of	  inhibition	  in	  choice	  trials	  was	  equivalent	  between	  groups.	  Contrary	  to	  
our	   expectations,	   participants	   did	   not	   appear	   to	   use	   recent	   pain	   as	   a	   criterion	   in	  
deciding	  whether	   to	  act	  or	   inhibit	  on	  choice	   trials.	  However,	   the	  experimental	  groups	  
did	  differ	   in	  terms	  of	  their	  response	  styles;	  anti-­‐free	  will	  participants	  tended	  to	   inhibit	  
more	  often	  following	  an	  action	  trial	  than	  an	  inhibition	  trial,	  while	  this	  was	  not	  the	  case	  
for	   control	   participants.	   Interpretations	   are	   merely	   speculative	   without	   further	  
research;	   the	  choice	  behavior	  of	  anti-­‐free	  will	  participants	  may	  reflect	  a	  more	  explicit	  
desire	   to	   conform	   to	   the	   50%	   instruction,	   or	   control	   participants	  may	   be	   selecting	   a	  
more	  adaptive	   strategy	  by	   choosing	   the	   subjectively	   less	  effortful	   response	   (response	  
repetitions	   vs	   alternations).	   This	  may	   be	   disentangled	   in	   future	   studies	   by	   presenting	  
blocks	   composed	   solely	   of	   choice	   trials	   in	   order	   to	   determine,	   via	   longer	   choice	   trial	  
sequences,	  which	  is	  the	  favored	  strategy.	  
	  	   Overall,	   the	   results	  of	  Chapter	  4	   suggest	   that	   the	   reduction	  of	   free	  will	   beliefs	  
corresponds	   with	   a	   reduction	   in	   effort	   investment	   that	   influences	   voluntary	   action	  
selection	   and	   inhibition,	   and	   a	   disinclination	   to	   adapt	   one’s	   behavior	   to	   contextual	  
needs.	  A	  fundamental	  belief	  in	  control	  over	  one’s	  actions	  may	  therefore	  prove	  to	  be	  an	  
integral	   prerequisite	   for	   self-­‐regulatory	   investments.	   	   Yet	   knowing	   the	   impact	   beliefs	  
have	  on	  self-­‐control	  was	  only	  a	  piece	  of	   the	  puzzle;	   the	  means	  by	  which	   this	  effect	   is	  
achieved	  remained	  poorly	  understood.	  
	   With	   that	   in	  mind,	   in	   Chapter	   5	  we	   sought	   to	   directly	   address	   the	   underlying	  
mechanism	   by	   which	   beliefs	   impact	   the	   recruitment	   of	   self-­‐control.	   To	   explain	   their	  
original	   finding	   regarding	   the	   readiness	  potential,	   Rigoni	   et	   al.	   (2011)	   speculated	   that	  
weakening	   free	   will	   beliefs	   may	   reduce	   participants’	   sense	   of	   agency	   (SoA),	   i.e.,	   the	  
intrinsic	   experience	   of	   being	   in	   control	   of	   one’s	   own	   actions.	   This	   altered	   experience	  
may	  then	  impede	  the	  recruitment	  of	  intentional	  effort	  for	  action	  production.	  In	  the	  first	  
study	  to	  investigate	  the	  relationship	  between	  free	  will	  beliefs	  and	  agency,	  Aarts	  and	  van	  
den	   Bos	   (2011)	   found	   that	   strong	   dispositional	   free	  will	   beliefs	  were	   associated	  with	  
greater	   intentional	   binding	   and	   a	   stronger	   influence	   of	   primes	   on	   agency	   inferences,	  
suggesting	  that	  free	  will	  beliefs	  modulate	  the	  strength	  of	  predictive	  signals	  about	  action	  
outcomes.	   Nevertheless,	   given	   the	   correlational	   nature	   of	   this	   study,	   a	   causal	   link	  
between	  the	  two	  concepts	  remained	  to	  be	  established.	  To	  that	  end,	   in	  Chapter	  5,	  we	  




of	  agency,	  using	  a	  fully	  within-­‐subjects	  design.	  Our	  secondary	  goal	  was	  to	  specify	  which	  
aspects	  of	  agency	  are	   related	   to	   free	  will	  beliefs;	  Synofzik	  et	  al.	   (2008)	  proposed	   that	  
the	   sense	   of	   agency	   consists	   of	   an	   implicit,	   pre-­‐reflective	   component	   and	   an	   explicit,	  
conceptual	   component.	   The	   findings	   of	   Aarts	   and	   van	   den	   Bos	   (2011)	   demonstrated	  
that	   FWBs	   are	   related	   to	   implicit	   processes,	   yet	   it	   was	   unclear	   to	   what	   extent	   their	  
influence	  might	  propagate	  to	  the	  conscious,	  deliberative	  level	  of	  explicit	  agency.	  Thus,	  
we	  used	  two	  tasks	  to	  measure	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  induction	  procedure,	  each	  intended	  to	  
tap	  into	  a	  different	  component	  of	  agency.	  	  
We	  found	  that	  intentional	  binding	  (the	  implicit	  task)	  was	  significantly	  reduced	  in	  
the	   anti-­‐free	   will	   condition,	   indicating	   that	   determinist	   beliefs	   hamper	   the	   implicit	  
sensation	  of	  being	  in	  control	  of	  one’s	  actions.	  By	  contrast,	  participants’	  explicit	  agency	  
ratings	   were	   unaffected	   by	   the	   belief	   manipulation.	   Establishing	   such	   a	   causal	   link	  
between	   determinist	   beliefs	   and	   the	   sense	   of	   agency	   points	   to	   an	   integrative	  
mechanism	  by	  which	  beliefs	  are	  able	  to	  influence	  the	  entire	  action	  cycle	  by	  intervening	  
at	   an	   early	   stage	   of	   processing	   before	   cascading	   to	   more	   overt	   behavior,	   including	  
error-­‐related	  behavioral	  adjustments	   (feedback	  processing;	  Rigoni	  et	  al.,	  2013;	  Rigoni,	  
Pourtois,	  &	  Brass,	  2014).	   It	   is	  possible,	   then,	   that	   the	   intrinsic	  bias	   to	   temporally	  bind	  




Chapters	  4	  and	  5	  both	  clearly	  illustrate	  that	  the	  effects	  of	  free	  will	  manipulations	  
are	  far	  from	  universal	  and	  depend	  strongly	  on	  individual	  subject	  variables.	  	  In	  Chapter	  4,	  
the	   effects	   were	   only	   present	   in	   those	   participants	   who	   reported	   a	   level	   of	   pain	  
sufficient	   to	   require	   self-­‐control	   to	   execute	   inhibition.	   In	   Chapter	   5,	   the	   effect	   was	  
absent	   (numerically	  even	   reversed)	   in	  a	   subgroup	  of	  participants	  who	   responded	   in	  a	  
reactant	   way	   to	   the	  manipulation.	   These	   observations	   illustrate	   that	   future	   research	  
should	  shift	  from	  merely	   identifying	  novel	  behaviors	  that	  are	  linked	  to	  the	  strength	  of	  
beliefs	   towards	   specifying	   the	   mechanisms	   that	   determine	   the	   effects	   of	   the	  
manipulation	   at	   a	   single-­‐subject	   level.	   Presumably	   this	   will	   necessitate	   taking	   into	  
account	   participants’	   prior	   belief	   system,	   their	   mood,	   and	   their	   expectations	   with	  






In	   summary,	   the	   volitional	   components	   under	   investigation	   in	   this	   thesis	   have	  
been	   elucidated	   in	   several	   ways.	   Behavioral	   inhibition	   under	   ecologically	   valid	  
circumstances	  seems	  to	  elicit	  a	  form	  of	  inhibition	  that	  recruits	  both	  stopping	  networks,	  
suggesting	   that	   intentional	   and	   externally-­‐guided	   inhibition	   are	  not	   dichotomous,	   but	  
rather	  exist	  along	  a	  continuum.	  Second,	  a	  proposal	  for	  the	  putative	  role	  of	  the	  dFMC	  in	  
inhibition	  has	  been	  generated	  in	  light	  of	  this	  and	  related	  findings.	  This	  proposal	  posits	  
that	   the	   dFMC	   serves	   general	   disengagement	   from	   urges	   and	   impulses	   to	   facilitate	  
successful	   self-­‐regulation.	   Third,	   the	   magnitude	   of	   inhibition-­‐related	   activity	   in	   core	  
regions	   of	   the	   extended	   inhibition	   network	   seems	   to	   be	   associated	   with	   trait	  
differences	  in	  self-­‐regulatory	  abilities,	  yielding	  a	  promising	  avenue	  for	  future	  research.	  
Finally,	   the	  findings	  of	  Chapters	  4	  and	  5	  support	  and	  extend	  previous	  research	  
on	   free	   will	   beliefs	   and	   basic	   cognitive	   processes	   by	   revealing	   that	   weakening	   the	  
strength	   of	   beliefs	   reduces	   intentional	   engagement	   in	   self-­‐control	   and	   attenuates	  
implicit	   components	  of	  agency.	  These	   results	  also	  complement	   the	  proposal	   that	   free	  
will	  beliefs	  have	  an	  adaptive	  function	  in	  controlling	  human	  behavior,	  and	  undermining	  
their	   strength	   reduces	   volitional	   engagement.	   The	   findings	   reported	   in	   Chapter	   5	   are	  
particularly	   informative,	   as	   the	   established	   link	   between	   free	   will	   beliefs	   and	   agency	  
might	  provide	  a	  missing	  link	  to	  explain	  previous	  findings;	  a	  reduced	  intrinsic	  bias	  to	  bind	  
actions	   with	   their	   outcomes	   could	   represent	   the	   first	   step	   in	   a	   cascade	   of	   events	  
subsequent	   to	   free	   will	   manipulations,	   such	   as	   diminishing	   the	   investment	   of	  
intentional	  effort	  in	  action	  production,	  the	  responsiveness	  to	  environmental	  feedback,	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Waaruit	   bestaat	   het	   gevoel	   van	   wil	   (nl.,	   het	   vermogen	   van	   keuze	   en	  
determinatie	  waarmee	  we	   onszelf	   of	   onze	   omgeving	   controleren),	  met	   aanduidingen	  
als	  willen,	  beogen,	  wensen,	  en	  geneigd	  zijn	  om?	  Het	  is	  het	  subtiele	  verschil	  tussen	  een	  
oogknippering	   en	   een	   knipoog	   (Morsella,	  Molapour,	   &	   Lynn,	   2013).	   De	  wil	   is	   zonder	  
twijfel	  fundamenteel	  aan	  wat	  het	  betekent	  om	  mens	  te	  zijn;	  we	  verschillen	  van	  andere	  
soorten	   omwille	   van	   dit	   specifieke	   vermogen	   om	   dingen	   in	   overweging	   te	   nemen.	  
Terwijl	   het	   gedrag	   van	   andere	   soorten	   grotendeels	   bepaald	   wordt	   door	  
omgevingstriggers,	   bevrijdt	   onze	   mogelijkheid	   om	   gedrag	   te	   controleren	   ons	   van	  
onmiddellijkheid	  (Shadlen	  &	  Gold,	  2004).	  
	  
Problemen	  inherent	  aan	  wil	  als	  wetenschappelijk	  concept	  
Door	  het	  gebrek	  aan	  een	  alwetend	   inzicht	   in	  de	   interne	   toestand	  van	  anderen	  
zijn	   wetenschappers	   geconfronteerd	   met	   de	   worsteling	   van	   het	   definiëren	   wat	   een	  
wilsdaad	   is	   en	   hoe	   dit	   gemeten	   kan	   worden.	   Fenomenologisch	   is	   een	   wilsdaad	  
gekarakteriseerd	  door	  de	  eerste-­‐persoonsontologie:	  Ik	  doe	  iets	  uit	  eigen	  wil	  als	  ik	  voel	  
dat	  ik	  gehandeld	  heb	  zoals	  ik	  het	  bedoelde.	  Deze	  conceptie	  van	  wil	  wordt	  gereflecteerd	  
in	  de	  introspectieve	  traditie	  van	  de	  vroege	  dagen	  van	  empirisch	  psychologieonderzoek	  
(e.g.,	   Harleß,	   1861;	   James,	   1890;	   Lotze,	   1852).	   Echter,	   sinds	   de	   opkomst	   van	   het	  
behaviorisme	   werd	   introspectie	   afgeschreven	   omwille	   van	   de	   subjectiviteit	   en	  
grotendeels	   verworpen	   als	   methode	   voor	   psychologisch	   onderzoek.	   Vrijwillig	   gedrag	  
kan	  aan	  de	  andere	  kant	  ook	  gedefinieerd	  worden	  door	  het	   te	  vergelijken	  met	  gedrag	  
dat	  uitgelokt	  wordt	  door	  een	  stimulus	   (e.g.,	  Herwig,	  Prinz,	  &	  Waszak,	  2007;	  Herwig	  &	  
Waszak,	   2009;	   Waszak	   et	   al.,	   2005).	   Deze	   definitie	   is	   vruchtbaarder	   voor	   empirisch	  
onderzoek,	   gezien	   het	   toelaat	   acties	   te	   vergelijken	   die	   verschillen	   in	   de	   locus	   van	   de	  
beslissing,	  terwijl	  ze	  toch	  gelijkaardig	  zijn	  op	  het	  niveau	  van	  bewegingskinematica.	  Deze	  
conceptie	  omvat	  echter	  verschillende	  problemen:	  Ten	  eerste,	  het	  beperkt	  de	  studie	  van	  
wil	   tot	   eerder	   eenvoudige	  bewegingen	   zoals	   het	   indrukken	   van	   toetsen.	   Ten	   tweede,	  
het	   is	   redelijk	   controversieel	   in	   welke	   mate	   interne	   factoren	   experimenteel	   kunnen	  
achterhaald	  worden	   (Nachev	  &	  Husain,	  2010).	  Ten	  slotte	  bestaat	  er	   in	  stijgende	  mate	  
consensus	   dat,	   in	   de	   dagdagelijkse	   ervaring,	   acties	   nooit	   exclusief	   vrijwillig	   of	   door	  
externe	   stimuli	   gedreven	   zijn,	   maar	   eerder	   op	   een	   continuüm	   van	   “reflexiviteit”	  
variëren	  (zie	  Krieghoff,	  Waszak,	  Prinz,	  &	  Brass,	  2011).	  Dus,	  het	  verschil	  tussen	  endogene	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en	   exogene	   oorzaken	   kan	   vervagen,	   vooral	  wanneer	   gelijkaardige	   acties	   herhaaldelijk	  
worden	  uitgevoerd,	  zoals	  in	  de	  meeste	  psychologische	  experimenten.	  
Een	   andere	   uitdaging	   in	   de	   studie	   van	   wil	   is	   het	   design	   van	   geschikte	  
experimentele	  paradigma’s.	  Wilsmatig	  gedrag	  wordt	  gekenmerkt	  door	  het	  vertrouwen	  
op	   endogene,	   in	   plaats	   van	   exogene	   determinanten	   (Haggard,	   2008).	   Dus,	   elke	  
instructie	   van	   de	   experimentator	   die	   specifieert	   hoe	   de	   participant	   zich	   zou	   moet	  
gedragen	   trekt	   onvermijdelijk	   in	   vraag	   in	   welke	   mate	   daaropvolgend	   gedrag	   nog	   als	  
vrijwillig	   kan	   beschouwd	   worden.	   Echter,	   op	   een	   zeker	   niveau	   is	   instructie	  
eenvoudigweg	  noodzakelijk	  om	  betekenisvolle	  data	  te	  verkrijgen	  die	  gekwantificeerd	  en	  
vergeleken	  kunnen	  worden	   tussen	  participanten.	  De	  meest	   voorkomende	   strategie	   in	  
de	   literatuur	   is	  om	  onvolledige	   instructies	   te	  geven,	  waarin	  de	   invulling	  van	  bepaalde	  
bewegingsparameters	   (nl.,	   de	   selectie	   of	   de	   timing	   van	   een	   beweging)	   overgelaten	  
wordt	   aan	   de	   participant	   (Haggard	  &	   Eimer,	   1999;	   Krieghoff,	   Brass,	   Prinz,	   &	  Waszak,	  
2009;	  Libet,	  Gleason,	  Wright,	  &	  Pearl,	  1983).	  Hoewel	  zulke	  “gaten”	  in	  de	  taakinstructie	  
zeker	  beroep	  doen	  op	   interne	  generatie,	  ze	  beperken	  wil	   tot	  zeer	  specifieke	  aspecten	  
van	  het	  beslissingsproces.	  
	   Een	   laatste	   belangrijk	   probleem	   in	   de	   studie	   van	   wil	   betreft	   motivationele	  
aspecten.	  Wilsmatig	  gedrag	   is	   typisch	  gericht	  op	  een	  gewenste	  uitkomst	   (zie	  Haggard,	  
2008).	   In	   andere	   woorden,	   we	   ageren	   of	   onderdrukken	   een	   actie	   omdat	   we	   een	  
bepaalde	  (korte	  termijn	  of	  lange	  termijn)	  verandering	  in	  onze	  omgeving	  teweeg	  willen	  
brengen.	   Dus,	   paradigma’s	   gericht	   op	   het	   informeren	   van	   wil	   zouden	   experimentele	  
contexten	   moeten	   creëren	   waarin	   zulk	   gedrag	   niet	   enkel	   endogeen	   is	   gegenereerd,	  
maar	   ook	   gemotiveerd	   (in	   plaats	   van	   bv.	   kiezen	   tussen	   het	   indrukken	   van	   linker	   –of	  
rechtertoetsen).	   Samengevat	   illustreren	  deze	  overwegingen	  de	  obstakels	   in	   de	   studie	  
van	   wil	   als	   een	   wetenschappelijk	   construct;	   men	   wordt	   geconfronteerd	   met	   een	  
onvermijdbare	   afweging	   tussen	   interne	   en	   ecologische	   validiteit,	   een	   kwestie	  waarop	  
verschillende	  keren	  wordt	  teruggekomen	  in	  deze	  thesis.	  
	  
Wil	  bestuderen	  
Ondanks	  deze	  uitdagingen	  zijn	  verschillende	  effectieve	  strategieën	  gebruikt	  om	  
de	   hierboven	   genoemde	   problemen	   te	   omzeilen	   en	   wil	   te	   meten	   op	   een	  




strategieën	  beschrijven	  die	   in	  het	  bijzonder	   informatief	  zijn	  gebleken.	  De	  eerste	   is	  om	  
indirecte	   of	   impliciete	   metingen	   van	   wilsprocessen	   te	   meten	   in	   plaats	   van	   te	  
vertrouwen	   op	   introspectie.	   Bijvoorbeeld,	   de	   perceptuele	   aantrekking	   tussen	   een	  
vrijwillige	  actie	  en	  het	  sensorisch	  resultaat	  daarvan	  is	  gevalideerd	  als	  een	  methode	  om	  
het	   gevoel	   van	   agency	   te	   meten	   (nl.,	   de	   ervaring	   van	   het	   gevolg	   van	   een	   actie	   te	  
veroorzaken,	  zie	  Moore	  &	  Obhi,	  2012	  en	  latere	  secties).	  Impliciete	  metingen	  zijn	  op	  die	  
manier	   direct	   observeerbare	   en	   kwantificeerbare	   variabelen	   die	   op	   een	   manier	   in	  
relatie	   staan	  met	   het	   onobserveerbare	   proces	   van	  wil	  waarin	  we	   geïnteresseerd	   zijn.	  
Een	   tweede	   strategie	   is	   om	   functionele	   hersenbeeldvorming	   toe	   te	   passen	   terwijl	  
participanten	   vrijwillig	   gedrag	   uitvoeren.	   Neurobeeldvorming	   maakt	   metingen	   van	  
observeerbare	  correlaten	  van	  wilsprocessen	   in	  de	  menselijke	  hersenen	  mogelijk,	  en	   is	  
daardoor	   een	   andere	   manier	   om	   bepaalde	   vrijwillige	   daden	   te	   materialiseren	   en	   te	  
kwantificeren.	   Onderzoek	   langs	   deze	   lijnen	   heeft	   aangetoond	   dat	   endogene	   controle	  
van	   gedrag	   steunt	   op	   de	   mediale	   frontale	   cortex,	   terwijl	   de	   contextuele	   sturing	   van	  
gedrag	   op	   basis	   van	   externe	   informatie	   sterker	   berust	   op	   het	   laterale	   deel	   van	   de	  
frontaalkwab	   (Amodio	  &	   Frith,	   2006;	  Goldberg,	   1985;	   Passingham,	   Bengtsson,	  &	   Lau,	  
2010;	   Rushworth,	   Walton,	   Kennerley,	   &	   Bannerman,	   2004).	   Bovendien	   zijn	   recente	  
neurobeeldvormingsstudies	   begonnen	   aan	   het	   ontbinden	   van	   het	   brede	   concept	   van	  
wil	  in	  verschillende	  deelcomponenten	  op	  basis	  van	  hun	  neurale	  handtekening	  (Brass	  &	  
Haggard,	  2008;	  Brass,	  Lynn,	  Demanet,	  &	  Rigoni,	  2013;	  Haggard,	  2008;	  Krieghoff	  et	  al.,	  
2009).	  Echter,	  ondanks	  de	  grote	  aantrekking	  van	  deze	  methode	  moet	  één	  beperking	  in	  
gedachten	   gehouden	  worden:	   deze	  methode	   steunt	  meestal	   cruciaal	   op	   omgekeerde	  
inferentie,	  nl.	  de	  interferentie	  van	  een	  psychologisch	  proces	  gebaseerd	  op	  de	  activiteit	  
van	  een	  bepaald	  hersengebied,	  hetgeen	  deductief	   invalide	  en	  mogelijks	  misleidend	   is	  
(Poldrack,	   2006).	   Een	   laatste	   strategie	   is	   om	   neuropsychiatrische	   patiënten	   te	  
bestuderen	   van	  wie	   bepaalde	   componenten	   van	  wilscontrole	   fout	   lopen	   (vb.,	   Brandt,	  
Lynn,	  Obst,	   Brass,	  &	  Münchau,	   2014).	   Bijvoorbeeld,	   anarchistisch-­‐handsyndroom,	   dat	  
kan	  resulteren	  van	  hersenletsels	  in	  het	  pre-­‐supplementaire	  motorgebied,	  is	  gekenmerkt	  
door	   de	   onmogelijkheid	   om	   een	   actietendens	   te	   onderdrukken	   eens	   die	   uitgelokt	   is	  
door	  een	  externe	  stimulus,	  ondanks	  de	  subjectieve	  ervaring	  dit	  te	  doen	  (bv.,	  Della	  Sala,	  
Marchetti,	  &	  Spinnler,	  1991;	  Kritikos,	  Breen,	  &	  Mattingley,	  2005;	  Pacherie,	  2007).	  Zulke	  
bevindingen	   zijn	   zeer	   informatief	   over	   de	   fenomenologie,	   de	   neurale	   basis,	   en	   de	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functionele	   mechanismen	   die	   aanleiding	   geven	   tot	   vrijwillig	   gedrag	   en	   ervaringen.	  
Belangrijk	   is	   dat	   elke	   van	   deze	   strategieën	   verschillende	   sterktes	   en	   beperkingen	  
hebben,	  en	  een	  tevredenstellende	  wetenschap	  van	  wil	  vereist	  een	  integratie	  van	  deze	  
methoden.	  
Andere	  onderzoekslijnen	  zijn	  minder	  gefocust	  op	  de	  architectuur	  van	  wil,	  maar	  
eerder	   op	   de	   identificatie	   van	   factoren	   die	   de	   mogelijkheid	   of	   de	   motivatie	   om	  
wilscontrole	   uit	   te	   voeren.	   Bijvoorbeeld,	   een	   reeks	   studies	   heeft	   het	   idee	  onderzocht	  
dat	   wil	   berust	   op	   een	   beperkte	   bron	   van	   zelfregulatie,	   en	   dat	   de	   uitputting	   daarvan	  
(door	  inspannende	  acties	  van	  zelfcontrole)	  resulteert	  in	  een	  storing	  van	  wilscontrole	  op	  
daaropvolgende	   taken	   (ego-­‐depletie,	   zie	   Baumeister,	   Bratslavsky,	   Muraven,	   &	   Tice,	  
1998).	  Andere	  studies	  hebben	  gefocust	  op	  de	   invloed	  van	  complexe	  overtuigingen	  op	  
gedragscontrole.	   Meer	   bepaald,	   overtuigingen	   over	   het	   concept	   “vrije	   wil”	   hebben	  
meer	   en	  meer	   aandacht	   gekregen;	   het	   is	   aangetoond	   dat	   het	   ondermijnen	   van	   deze	  
overtuigingen	   een	   substantiële	   impact	   heeft	   op	   gedrag	   in	   sociale	   contexten	   (bv.,	  
Baumeister,	   Masicampo,	   &	   Dewall,	   2009;	   Vohs	   &	   Schooler,	   2008)	   en	   zelfs	   op	  
basismotorcontroleprocessen	   (Rigoni,	   Kühn,	   Sartori,	   &	   Brass,	   2011),	   hoewel	   de	  
onderliggende	  mechanismen	  nog	  niet	  begrepen	  zijn.	  
Samenvattend	   werden	   er	   verschillende	   manieren	   ontwikkeld	   om	   wil	   te	  
bestuderen,	  die	  grotendeels	  kunnen	  onderverdeeld	  worden	  in	  (i)	  onderzoek	  dat	  poogt	  
bepaalde	   componenten	   van	   wil	   te	   onderzoeken,	   en	   (ii)	   onderzoek	   dat	   tracht	   de	  
factoren	   te	   identificeren	   die	   de	   uitoefening	   van	   wilscontrole	   beïnvloeden.	   Dit	  
onderscheid	   is	   ook	   toepasbaar	   op	   de	   structuur	   van	   deze	   thesis.	   De	   eerste	  
onderzoekslijn	  behandelt	  de	  neurale	  basis	  van	  inhibitoire	  zelfregulatie,	  met	  als	  doel	  een	  
ecologisch	  valide	  manier	  te	  bieden	  om	  deze	  capaciteit	  te	  onderzoeken.	  Daarna,	   in	  het	  
tweede	   deel	   van	   mijn	   thesis,	   is	   mijn	   doel	   om	   factoren	   te	   identificeren	   die	   de	  
mogelijkheid	  om	  wilscontrole	  uit	  te	  oefenen	  beïnvloeden.	  
	  
Deel	  I:	  Wil	  als	  impulscontrole	  
	   Een	   manier	   waarop	   vrijwillig	   gedrag	   kan	   worden	   gedefinieerd	   is	   door	   de	  
mogelijkheid	  het	  te	  onderdrukken	  (Passingham,	  1993).	  We	  ervaren	  elke	  dag	  een	  brede	  
variëteit	   van	   impulsen,	   sommige	   zijn	   gedreven	   door	   stimuli,	   sommige	   zijn	   intern	  




doelen	  of	  maatschappelijke	  normen.	  Bijgevolg	   is	  de	  mogelijkheid	  om	  gedragsimpulsen	  
te	   controleren	   en	   te	   negeren	   kenmerkend	   voor	   adaptief	   gedrag	   in	   complexe	   sociale	  
systemen.	  
	   Om	  deze	  mogelijkheid	  verder	  op	  een	  ecologisch	  valide	  manier	   te	  onderzoeken	  
stel	  ik	  in	  Hoofdstuk	  1	  een	  nieuw	  paradigma	  voor	  dat	  gedragsinhibitie	  in	  de	  context	  van	  
pijnvermijdingsgedrag	  onderzoekt.	  Participanten	  kregen	  thermale	  pijnstimulatie	  aan	  de	  
binnenzijde	  van	  de	  polsen	  van	  afwisselend	  het	   rechter	  –en	   linker	  hand	  en	  konden	  de	  
stimulatie	  beëindigen	  door	  een	   toets	   in	   te	  drukken	  met	  het	  niet-­‐gestimuleerde	  hand.	  
Op	  sommige	  trials	  werd	  de	  beslissing	  om	  te	  reageren	  of	  deze	  respons	  te	  onderdrukken	  
aangegeven	  door	  een	  externe	  cue,	  terwijl	  op	  andere	  trials	  participanten	  zelf	  vrij	  konden	  
kiezen	  tussen	  beide	  opties.	  Het	  voordeel	  van	  dit	  paradigma	  is	  dat	  het	  een	  sterke	  drang	  
induceert	   om	   te	   reageren	   in	   elke	   participant,	   in	   elke	   trial.	   Responsinhibitie	   in	   dit	  
paradigma	   spiegelt	   dus	   meer	   realistische	   gevallen	   van	   zelfcontrole	   dan	   in	   vroegere	  
paradigma’s.	   Opvallend	   is	   dat	   in	   deze	   motivationeel	   opvallende	   condities	   inhibitie	  
berust	  op	  een	  gemeenschappelijke	  activatie	  van	  de	  hersennetwerken	  die	  betrokken	  zijn	  
in	  zowel	  gedrag	  dat	  door	  externe	  factoren	  wordt	  geleid	  én	  intentionele	  inhibitie.	  Deze	  
bevinding	   trekt	   de	   oorspronkelijke	   aanname	   dat	   deze	   netwerken	   onafhankelijke	  
functies	   dienen	   in	   twijfel	   en	   suggereert	   dat	   deze	   mogelijks	   samen	   opereren	   in	   de	  
context	   van	   echte	   zelfcontrole.	   In	   Hoofdstuk	   2	   integreer	   ik	   deze	   en	   andere	  
neurobeeldvormingsbevindingen	   in	   een	   nieuwe	   theoretisch	   uiteenzetting	   van	   de	   rol	  
van	  de	  dorsale	  frontomediane	  cortex	  in	  intentionele	  inhibitie.	  Op	  basis	  van	  een	  aantal	  
studies	   die	   deze	   regio	   gelinkt	   hebben	   aan	   non-­‐motor	   en	   zelf-­‐referentiële	   processen	  
argumenteer	   ik	  dat	  de	  bijdrage	  van	  deze	  regio	  aan	  zelfregulatie	  beter	  beschouwd	  kan	  
worden	  als	  een	  complexe	  onthechting	  van	   intenties	  en	  driften,	  en	  niet	  zozeer	  als	  een	  
vetosignaal	  dat	  motorplannen	  annuleert	  in	  de	  strikte	  zin.	  
	  
Deel	  II:	  Determinanten	  van	  vrijwillig	  gedrag	  
Het	   tweede	   deel	   van	   mijn	   thesis	   verplaatst	   de	   focus	   van	   het	   meten	   en	  
kenmerken	  van	  wil	  zelf	  naar	  het	  omschrijven	  van	  factoren	  die	  de	  mogelijkheid	  en/of	  de	  
motivatie	  om	  wilscontrole	  uit	  te	  oefenen	  beïnvloeden.	  Volgend	  op	  de	  bepaling	  van	  de	  
mechanismen	  betrokken	   in	  de	   inhibitie	   van	  pijnvermijding	   gebruiken	  Hoofdstukken	  3	  
en	   4	   een	   aangepaste	   versie	   van	   hetzelfde	   paradigma.	   Hoofdstuk	   3	   onderzoekt	   de	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relatie	   tussen	   inhibitie-­‐gerelateerde	   hersenactiviteit	   en	   individuele	   verschillen	   in	  
mogelijkheden	  tot	  zelfregulatie	  (zowel	  op	  het	  niveau	  van	  toestand	  als	  trek).	  Resultaten	  
tonen	   dat	   een	   hoge	   mate	   van	   zelfregulatie	   als	   trek	   geassocieerd	   is	   met	   sterkere	  
activatie	   van	   het	   inhibitienetwerk,	   zoals	   gedefinieerd	   in	   het	   vorige	   hoofdstuk,	   terwijl	  
geen	   effecten	   van	   manipulaties	   van	   de	   toestand	   werden	   gevonden.	   Hoofdstuk	   4	  
onderzoekt	   overtuigingen	   over	   wil	   en	   hun	   impact	   op	   gedragscontrole	   door	   te	  
onderzoeken	   of	   het	   verzwakken	   van	   overtuigingen	   over	   vrije	   wil	   de	   intentionele	  
betrokkenheid	  in	  zelfcontrole	  beïnvloedt.	  Een	  aantal	  studies	  geeft	  aan	  dat	  dit	  het	  geval	  
zou	  kunnen	  zijn.	  Echter,	  de	  effecten	  worden	  enkel	  gevonden	  in	  een	  deel	  van	  de	  sample,	  
nl.	   in	   participanten	   die	   voldoende	   pijn	   ervoeren	   om	   zelfcontrole	   nodig	   te	   hebben.	  
Hoofdstuk	  5	   is	  gericht	  op	  het	  onthullen	  hoe	  overtuigingen	  over	  vrije	  wil	  verschillende	  
gedragsparameters	   kunnen	  beïnvloeden,	   van	  het	   gereedheidspotentiaal	   tot	   complexe	  
sociale	   gedragingen.	   Meer	   bepaald,	   het	   test	   de	   hypothese	   dat	   het	   verzwakken	   van	  
overtuigingen	   over	   vrije	   wil	   het	   gevoel	   van	   agency	   vermindert,	   wat	   grotendeels	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